About this topic
Summary "Realism" comes in many philosophical guises. One sort of realism concerns whether certain entities exist, or whether they exist independent of our minds. Realism in this metaphysical sense arises for numerous subject matters: everyday material objects, concepts, universals, mathematical objects, moral values, unobservable theoretical entities, and so on. Michael Dummett characterizes realism and anti-realism in semantic terms, suggesting that the fundamental issue is not about the existence of entities, but rather about whether statements of some specified class (such as mathematics or ethics) can have an objective truth value, independently of our means of knowing it.
Key works The diversity of realisms is discussed e.g. in Devitt 1991, Miller 2008, and Raatikainen 2014. A good systematic discussion of  realism about the external world as opposed to phenomenalism and idealism can be found in Locke 1967; see also Armstrong 1961. An already classic collection of articles for and against realism about unobservable theoretical entities, i.e. "scientific realism", is Leplin 1984. An influential recent defense is Psillos 1999; see also Devitt 1991. The realism/antirealism issue was recasted in semantic terms in Dummett 1978, 1993; see also Wright 1993Miller 2006 and Shieh 1998 are useful discussions. Devitt 1983 is a well-known critique of the Dummettian anti-realism.  
Introductions On the variety of realisms: Miller 2008; on scientific realism: Chakravartty 2013, Devitt 2005; on semantic realism and anti-realism: Miller 2006.
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Subcategories:History/traditions: Realism and Anti-Realism
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  1. Juan José Acero (2011). Origins of Objectivity. Theoria 26 (3):373-376.
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  2. Samuel Alexander (1914). The Basis of Realism. [Oxford University Press].
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  3. Keith Algozin (1989). Metaphysics: The Elements. By Bruce Aune. Modern Schoolman 66 (2):153-155.
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  4. C. Allan (1998). Science, Epistemological Relativism and Truth: Some Comments on Roy Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):37-49.
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  5. Barry Allen (1994). Realism with a Human Face. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):665-688.
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  6. William P. Alston (ed.) (2002). Realism and Antirealism. Cornell Up.
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  7. William P. Alston, Roderick M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, Richard Rorty & John R. Searle (1997). Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  8. Daniel Durante Pereira Alves (2011). Logic is Metaphysics. Principia 15 (1):31-42.
    Analisando alguns aspectos das posições de dois filósofos cujas abordagens são reconhecidamente divergentes, W. O. Quine e M. Dummett, pretendemos sustentar um contundente ponto de acordo entre eles: a ideia de que nossos princípios lógicos constituem nossos princípios sobre o que há, e portanto, que lógica é metafísica. DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n1p3.
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  9. David Leech Anderson (1987). The Realism-Idealism Debate: Theoretical and Practical. Dissertation, Harvard University
    The thesis of this dissertation is that "the realism-idealism debate" is both a theoretical and a practical dispute. The practical dimension has been largely ignored because the deficiencies in the theoretical positions have gone unnoticed. As theoretical doctrines, realism and idealism are best interpreted as semantic theories specifying the conditions in virtue of which our statements are true and false. As semantic doctrines, however, both realism and idealism are false. Neither semantic theory is consistent with other philosophical positions to which (...)
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  10. Holger Andreas (2011). Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):17 - 31.
    This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (...)
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  11. Julio Armero & Purificación Navarro (1986). Putnam: Aventuras y desventuras del funcionalismo. Teorema 15 (3-4):181-200.
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  12. D. M. Armstrong (1988). Reply to Van Fraassen. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):224 – 229.
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  13. Max Ascoli (forthcoming). Realism Versus the Constitution. Social Research.
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  14. R. J. B. (1968). Realism. Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):747-747.
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  15. R. J. B. (1968). Realism. Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):747-747.
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  16. R. J. B. (1961). Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 14 (4):728-728.
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  17. Murat Baç (2004). Can Realists Know That They Know? Acta Analytica 19 (32):65-90.
    Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers, however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism. In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction of (...)
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  18. Julian Baggini (2001). Putnam's Progress. The Philosophers' Magazine 15:43-45.
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  19. George Bailey (1983). Putnam and Metaphysical Realism. International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):11-14.
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  20. George A. Barrow (1919). A Defect in the Argument for Realism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (13):337-347.
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  21. Michael Baur (1993). Radical Realism. Review of Metaphysics 47 (2):379-380.
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  22. John Bengson (forthcoming). Grasping the Third Realm. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    Some things we can know just by thinking about them: for example, that identity is transitive, that Gettier’s Smith does not know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pockets, that the ratio between two and six holds also between one and three, that it is wrong to wantonly torture innocent sentient beings, and various other things that simply strikeus, intuitively, as true when we consider them. The question is how : how can we (...)
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  23. Ted Benton (2004). 16 Realism About the Value of Nature? In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. 239.
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  24. George Berger (1976). Realism and Complex Entities. Philosophical Studies 30 (2):95 - 103.
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  25. Roy Bhaskar (2004). 1 A Considerable Realist. In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. 1.
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  26. Roy Bhaskar (1986). Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  27. Michel Bitbol (2001). Non-Representationalist Theories of Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):37-61.
    Quantum Mechanics has imposed strain on traditional (dualist and representationalist) epistemological conceptions. An alternative was offered by Bohr and Heisenberg, according to whom natural science does not describe nature, but rather the interplay between nature and ourselves. But this was only a suggestion. In this paper, a systematic development of the Bohr-Heisenberg conception is outlined, by way of a comparison with the modern self-organizational theories of cognition. It is shown that a perfectly consistent non-representationalist (and/or relational) reading of quantum mechanics (...)
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  28. Simon Blackburn (2002). Realism: Deconstructing the Debate. Ratio 15 (2):111–133.
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  29. Simon Blackburn (1995). 16 How to Be an Ethical Antirealist. In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. 357.
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  30. Simon Blackburn (1989). Manifesting Realism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):29-47.
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  31. Simon Blackburn (1980). Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):353-372.
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  32. David Bloor (1984). Realism and the Aim of Science. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 17 (2):217-221.
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  33. Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson & Javier Cumpa (2014). Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter.
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  34. Frangois Bonsack (1989). Prolegomena to a Realist Epistemology. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):67-81.
    SummaryAfter exposing certain confusions , 1 give a sketch of a non‐metaphysical realism which involves the construction of a world‐O, mainly by means of criteria of invariance and of independence of variables.This world‐O facilitates description of the relationships of sensations among themselves and with actions. It includes the subject objectivized with his subjectivity , which makes it possible to describe without difficulty the relationship between this subject and the world. This realism reconstructs as it were realism from an idealist standpoint, (...)
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  35. John E. Boodin (1907). The New Realism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (20):533-542.
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  36. Stephen J. Boulter (2000). Could Aquinas Reject Semantic Realism? Reply to de Anna. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):515-518.
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  37. Richard Boyd (1990). Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. 355-391.
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  38. Richard Boyd (1989). What Realism Implies and What It Does Not. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.
    SummaryThis paper addresses the question of what scientific realism implies and what it does not when it is articulated so as to provide the best defense against plausible philosophical alternatives. A summary is presented of “abductive” arguments for scientific realism, and of the epistemological and semantic conceptions upon which they depend. Taking these arguments to be the best current defense of realism, it is inquired what, in the sense just mentioned, realism implies and what it does not. It is concluded (...)
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  39. William F. Bristow (2002). Are Kant's Categories Subjective? Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):551-580.
    Argues that there is a significant respect in which Kant's categories are to be understood as subjective, namely, in the sense that they are to be understood as the self-legislated rules of our understanding. Argues that the subjectivism of Kant's idealism, by which is meant the relativization of knowledge of objects to our standpoint, is a consequence of the subjectivity of the categories, on this interpretation of their subjectivity. On the reading opposed here, Kant's subjectivism is strictly a consequence of (...)
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  40. Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism. Routledge.
    There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature is in some important (...)
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  41. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
    In his presidential address to the APA, ‘‘How to be an Anti-realist’’ (1982, 64–66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist.1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances. Plantinga demonstrates, with modest modal resources, that AR entails (...)
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  42. Harold Brown (2009). Interpretation, Constraint, and the Prospects of Scientific Realism. Human Affairs 19 (2).
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  43. James R. Brown (1999). Realism, Antirealism, and NOA. In Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. 338.
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  44. James Robert Brown (1987). The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory Arthur Fine Chicaco, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Pp. Xi, 186. $25.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 26 (04):776-.
  45. Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (2008). Response-Dependence of Concepts Is Not for Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):377 - 386.
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  46. Mario Bunge (1993). Realism and Antirealism in Social Science. Theory and Decision 35 (3):207-235.
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  47. Panayot Butchvarov (1999). Metaphysical Realism. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 562--563.
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  48. Marco Buzzoni (2000). On Allan Franklin's Conjectural Realism. Epistemologia 23 (1):77-98.
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  49. H. G. Callaway (1996). Review: Carl R. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy. [REVIEW] Dialectica 50 (No. 2):153-161.
    Carl Hausman is a former editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, a revival of one of the first American philosophy journals, where Peirce published some of his early work; and Hausman has devoted a good deal of his career to Peirce scholarship. He interprets Peirce’s thought “as a fallibilistic foundationalism that affirms a unique realism according to which what is real is a dynamic, evolving extramental condition.” The theme is an interesting one partly in view of the many recent (...)
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  50. Nicholas Capaldi (1985). Realism and the Aim of Science. Review of Metaphysics 38 (4):900-901.
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