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  1. David Braybrooke (2003). Toward an Alliance Between the Issue-Processing Approach and Pragma-Dialectical Analysis. Argumentation 17 (4):513-535.
    On the approach to discussions of policy choices that treats such discussions as instances of issue-processing, the joint use of the logic of questions and the logic of rules gives precise formulation to two sorts of issues. To one sort of issue belong issue-circumscribing questions; to another sort, issues-simplicter, which consist of disjunctions of policy proposals – so many proposed social rules – that are answers, in the case of each disjunction, to a given issue-circumscribing question. Work in pragma-dialectics can (...)
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  2. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu028.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ``heuristic'' in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ``heuristic'', and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics in order (...)
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  3. Andreas Dorschel (1999). Emotion und Verstand. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):18-40.
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  4. Keith Frankish (2010). Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
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  5. Juan A. Garc (2007). Mental Models in Propositional Reasoning and Working Memory's Central Executive. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):370 – 393.
    We examine the role of working memory's central executive in the mental model explanation of propositional reasoning by using two working memory measures: the classical “reading span” test by Daneman and Carpenter (1980) and a new measure. This new “reasoning span” measure requires individuals to solve very simple anaphora problems, and store and remember the word solution in a growing series of inferential problems. We present one experiment in which we check the involvement of the central executive in conditional and (...)
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  6. Lars Hall, Thomas Strandberg, Philip Pärnamets, Andreas Lind, Betty Tärning & Petter Johansson (2013). How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions. PLoS ONE 8 (4):e60554. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.
    Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our (...)
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  7. Jürgen Hollatz (1999). Analogy Making in Legal Reasoning with Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):289-301.
    Analogy making from examples is a central task in intelligent system behavior. A lot of real world problems involve analogy making and generalization. Research investigates these questions by building computer models of human thinking concepts. These concepts can be divided into high level approaches as used in cognitive science and low level models as used in neural networks. Applications range over the spectrum of recognition, categorization and analogy reasoning. A major part of legal reasoning could be formally interpreted as an (...)
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  8. Tokuyasu Kakuta, Makoto Haraguchi & Yoshiaki Okubo (1997). A Goal-Dependent Abstraction for Legal Reasoning by Analogy. Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (1-2):97-118.
    This paper presents a new algorithm to find an appropriate similarityunder which we apply legal rules analogically. Since there may exist a lotof similarities between the premises of rule and a case in inquiry, we haveto select an appropriate similarity that is relevant to both thelegal rule and a top goal of our legal reasoning. For this purpose, a newcriterion to distinguish the appropriate similarities from the others isproposed and tested. The criterion is based on Goal-DependentAbstraction (GDA) to select a (...)
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  9. Joachim Kopper (1984). Subjektivität und Öffentlichkeit. Betrachtungen zum Denken Gerhard Funkes. Kant-Studien 75 (1-4):135-148.
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  10. Jacky Legrand (1999). Some Guidelines for Fuzzy Sets Application in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):235-257.
    As an introduction to our work, we emphasize the parallel interpretation of abstract tools and the concepts of undetermined and vague information. Imprecision, uncertainty and their relationships are inspected. Suitable interpretations of the fuzzy sets theory are applied to legal phenomena in an attempt to clearly circumscribe the possible applications of the theory. The fundamental notion of reference sets is examined in detail, hence highlighting their importance. A systematic and combinatorial classification of the relevant subsets of the legal field is (...)
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  11. Mona Mamulea (2012). A Thought Experiment of Cross-Cultural Comparison. The Question of Rationality. Cercetări Filosofico-Psihologice 4 (2):105-114.
    David Bloor’s thought experiment is taken into consideration to suggest that the rationality of the Other cannot be inferred by way of argument for the reason that it is unavoidably contained as a hidden supposition by any argument engaged in proving it. We are able to understand a different culture only as far as we recognize in it the same kind of rationality that works in our own culture. Another kind of rationality is either impossible, or indiscernible.
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  12. Moti Mizrahi (2010). Take My Advice—I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority. Informal Logic 30 (4):435-456.
    In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that (...)
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  13. Thomas Nagel (1997). The Last Word. OUP USA.
    If there is such a thing as reason, it has to be universal - it must work the same way for everyone. Reason must reflect objective principles whose validity is independent of our point of view. To reason is to think systematically in ways that anyone looking on ought to be able to recognize as correct. But this generality of reason is what relativists and subjectivists deny in ever-increasing numbers. And such subjectivism is not just an inconsequential intellectual flourish or (...)
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  14. Shyam Nair (2014). Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations. Mind 123 (491):753-790.
    Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...)
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  15. María G. Navarro (2013). El Poder de la Imprecisión Humana. DIAGONAL 189:29.
    La lógica borrosa se ha definido como un sistema preciso de razonamiento, deducción y computación en el que los objetos del discurso se encuentran asociados a información que, por lo general, consideramos imprecisa, incompleta, incierta, poco fiable, parcialmente verdadera o parcialmente posible.
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  16. Richard E. Nisbett (ed.) (1993). Rules for Reasoning. L. Erlbaum Associates.
    This book examines two questions: Do people make use of abstract rules such as logical and statistical rules when making inferences in everyday life? Can such abstract rules be changed by training? Contrary to the spirit of reductionist theories from behaviorism to connectionism, there is ample evidence that people do make use of abstract rules of inference -- including rules of logic, statistics, causal deduction, and cost-benefit analysis. Such rules, moreover, are easily alterable by instruction as it occurs in classrooms (...)
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  17. Joseph Raz, Reasoning with Rules.
    What is special about legal reasoning? In what way is it distinctive? How does it differ from reasoning in medicine, or engineering, physics, or everyday life? The answers range from the very ambitious to the modest. The ambitious claim that there is a special and distinctive legal logic, or legal ways of reasoning, modes of reasoning which set the law apart from all other disciplines. Opposing them are the modest, who claim that there is nothing special to legal reasoning, that (...)
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  18. Joseph Raz (2009). Reasons : Practical and Adaptive. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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  19. Richard A. Griggs Richard, D. Platt Stephen, E. Newstead Sherri & L. Jackson (1998). Attentional Factors in a Disjunctive Reasoning Task. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):1 – 14.
    Girotto and Legrenzi's 1993 facilitation effect for their SARS version of Wason s THOG problem a disjunctive reasoning task was examined. The effect was not replicated when the standard THOG problem instructions were used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 when Girotto and Legrenzi's precise instructions were used, facilitation was observed. Experiment 4 further investigated the role of the type of instructions in the observed facilitation. The results suggest that such facilitation may result from attentional factors rather (...)
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  20. David Sherry (2006). Mathematical Reasoning: Induction, Deduction and Beyond. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):489-504.
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  21. Jan-R. Sieckmann (2003). Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):211-219.
    This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its (...)
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  22. Pascal Wagner-Egger (2007). Conditional Reasoning and the Wason Selection Task: Biconditional Interpretation Instead of Reasoning Bias. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):484 – 505.
    Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the participants as strict logical conditionals, whereas others are interpreted as expressing a biconditional relationship. A deductive task was used jointly with the selection task to show that the original abstract rule is quite ambiguous in this respect, contrary to deontic rules: the typical “error” (...)
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