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  1. Samuel Bellini-Leite (2013). The Embodied Embedded Character of System 1 Processing. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):239-252.
    In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, (...)
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  2. David Braybrooke (2003). Toward an Alliance Between the Issue-Processing Approach and Pragma-Dialectical Analysis. Argumentation 17 (4):513-535.
    On the approach to discussions of policy choices that treats such discussions as instances of issue-processing, the joint use of the logic of questions and the logic of rules gives precise formulation to two sorts of issues. To one sort of issue belong issue-circumscribing questions; to another sort, issues-simplicter, which consist of disjunctions of policy proposals – so many proposed social rules – that are answers, in the case of each disjunction, to a given issue-circumscribing question. Work in pragma-dialectics can (...)
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  3. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor’s famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor’s analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor’s arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
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  4. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu028.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ``heuristic'' in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ``heuristic'', and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics in order (...)
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  5. Andreas Dorschel (1999). Emotion und Verstand. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):18-40.
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  6. Keith Frankish (2010). Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
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  7. Juan A. Garc (2007). Mental Models in Propositional Reasoning and Working Memory's Central Executive. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):370 – 393.
    We examine the role of working memory's central executive in the mental model explanation of propositional reasoning by using two working memory measures: the classical “reading span” test by Daneman and Carpenter (1980) and a new measure. This new “reasoning span” measure requires individuals to solve very simple anaphora problems, and store and remember the word solution in a growing series of inferential problems. We present one experiment in which we check the involvement of the central executive in conditional and (...)
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  8. David Godden (2014). Modeling Corroborative Evidence: Inference to the Best Explanation as Counter–Rebuttal. Argumentation 28 (2):187-220.
    Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a schematic (...)
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  9. David Godden (2012). Rethinking the Debriefing Paradigm: The Rationality of Belief Perseverance. Logos and Episteme 3:51-74.
    By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing (...)
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  10. David Godden (2010). Corroborative Evidence. In Chris Reed & Christopher W. Tindale (eds.), Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation: An examination of Douglas Walton's theories of reasoning and argument. College Publications. 201-212.
    Corroborative evidence can have a dual function in argument whereby not only does it have a primary function of providing direct evidence supporting the main conclusion, but it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. It has been argued (Redmayne, 2000) that this double function gives rise to the fallacy of double counting whereby the probative weight of evidence is overvalued by counting it twice. Walton has proposed (...)
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  11. David Godden & Douglas Walton (2007). Advances in the Theory of Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions. Informal Logic 27 (3):267-292.
    This paper begins a working through of Blair’s (2001) theoretical agenda concerning argumentation schemes and their attendant critical questions, in which we propose a number of solutions to some outstanding theoretical issues. We consider the classification of schemes, their ultimate nature, their role in argument reconstruction, their foundation as normative categories of argument, and the evaluative role of critical questions.We demonstrate the role of schemes in argument reconstruction, and defend a normative account of their nature against specific criticisms due to (...)
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  12. David Godden & Douglas Walton (2007). A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  13. David Godden & Douglas Walton (2004). Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy: A Dialectical Model. Informal Logic 24 (3):219-243.
    The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage of DA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of (...)
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  14. David Godden & Frank Zenker (2015). Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art. Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.
    Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather (...)
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  15. Lars Hall, Thomas Strandberg, Philip Pärnamets, Andreas Lind, Betty Tärning & Petter Johansson (2013). How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions. PLoS ONE 8 (4):e60554. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.
    Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our (...)
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  16. Jürgen Hollatz (1999). Analogy Making in Legal Reasoning with Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):289-301.
    Analogy making from examples is a central task in intelligent system behavior. A lot of real world problems involve analogy making and generalization. Research investigates these questions by building computer models of human thinking concepts. These concepts can be divided into high level approaches as used in cognitive science and low level models as used in neural networks. Applications range over the spectrum of recognition, categorization and analogy reasoning. A major part of legal reasoning could be formally interpreted as an (...)
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  17. Tokuyasu Kakuta, Makoto Haraguchi & Yoshiaki Okubo (1997). A Goal-Dependent Abstraction for Legal Reasoning by Analogy. Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (1-2):97-118.
    This paper presents a new algorithm to find an appropriate similarityunder which we apply legal rules analogically. Since there may exist a lotof similarities between the premises of rule and a case in inquiry, we haveto select an appropriate similarity that is relevant to both thelegal rule and a top goal of our legal reasoning. For this purpose, a newcriterion to distinguish the appropriate similarities from the others isproposed and tested. The criterion is based on Goal-DependentAbstraction (GDA) to select a (...)
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  18. Joachim Kopper (1984). Subjektivität und Öffentlichkeit. Betrachtungen zum Denken Gerhard Funkes. Kant-Studien 75 (1-4):135-148.
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  19. Jacky Legrand (1999). Some Guidelines for Fuzzy Sets Application in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):235-257.
    As an introduction to our work, we emphasize the parallel interpretation of abstract tools and the concepts of undetermined and vague information. Imprecision, uncertainty and their relationships are inspected. Suitable interpretations of the fuzzy sets theory are applied to legal phenomena in an attempt to clearly circumscribe the possible applications of the theory. The fundamental notion of reference sets is examined in detail, hence highlighting their importance. A systematic and combinatorial classification of the relevant subsets of the legal field is (...)
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  20. Mona Mamulea (2012). A Thought Experiment of Cross-Cultural Comparison. The Question of Rationality. Cercetări Filosofico-Psihologice 4 (2):105-114.
    David Bloor’s thought experiment is taken into consideration to suggest that the rationality of the Other cannot be inferred by way of argument for the reason that it is unavoidably contained as a hidden supposition by any argument engaged in proving it. We are able to understand a different culture only as far as we recognize in it the same kind of rationality that works in our own culture. Another kind of rationality is either impossible, or indiscernible.
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  21. Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). A Theory of Argumentation. [REVIEW] Metascience.
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  22. Moti Mizrahi (2010). Take My Advice—I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority. Informal Logic 30 (4):435-456.
    In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that (...)
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  23. Thomas Nagel (1997). The Last Word. Oup Usa.
    In this important new book Nagel, one of the most distinguished philosophers writing in English today, presents a sustained defence of reason against the attacks of subjectivism. He offers systematic rebuttals of relativistic claims with respect to language, logic, science, and ethics.
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  24. Shyam Nair (2014). Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations. Mind 123 (491):753-790.
    Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...)
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  25. María G. Navarro (forthcoming). El rol de las heurísticas sociales en la deliberación. Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía.
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  26. María G. Navarro (2013). El Poder de la Imprecisión Humana. DIAGONAL 189:29.
    La lógica borrosa se ha definido como un sistema preciso de razonamiento, deducción y computación en el que los objetos del discurso se encuentran asociados a información que, por lo general, consideramos imprecisa, incompleta, incierta, poco fiable, parcialmente verdadera o parcialmente posible.
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  27. Richard E. Nisbett (ed.) (1993). Rules for Reasoning. L. Erlbaum Associates.
    This book examines two questions: Do people make use of abstract rules such as logical and statistical rules when making inferences in everyday life? Can such abstract rules be changed by training? Contrary to the spirit of reductionist theories from behaviorism to connectionism, there is ample evidence that people do make use of abstract rules of inference -- including rules of logic, statistics, causal deduction, and cost-benefit analysis. Such rules, moreover, are easily alterable by instruction as it occurs in classrooms (...)
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  28. Joseph Raz, Reasoning with Rules.
    What is special about legal reasoning? In what way is it distinctive? How does it differ from reasoning in medicine, or engineering, physics, or everyday life? The answers range from the very ambitious to the modest. The ambitious claim that there is a special and distinctive legal logic, or legal ways of reasoning, modes of reasoning which set the law apart from all other disciplines. Opposing them are the modest, who claim that there is nothing special to legal reasoning, that (...)
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  29. Joseph Raz (2009). Reasons : Practical and Adaptive. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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  30. Richard A. Griggs Richard, D. Platt Stephen, E. Newstead Sherri & L. Jackson (1998). Attentional Factors in a Disjunctive Reasoning Task. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):1 – 14.
    Girotto and Legrenzi's 1993 facilitation effect for their SARS version of Wason s THOG problem a disjunctive reasoning task was examined. The effect was not replicated when the standard THOG problem instructions were used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 when Girotto and Legrenzi's precise instructions were used, facilitation was observed. Experiment 4 further investigated the role of the type of instructions in the observed facilitation. The results suggest that such facilitation may result from attentional factors rather (...)
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  31. David Sherry (2006). Mathematical Reasoning: Induction, Deduction and Beyond. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):489-504.
    Mathematics used to be portrayed as a deductive science. Stemming from Polya , however, is a philosophical movement which broadens the concept of mathematical reasoning to include inductive or quasi-empirical methods. Interest in inductive methods is a welcome turn from foundationalism toward a philosophy grounded in mathematical practice. Regrettably, though, the conception of mathematical reasoning embraced by quasi-empiricists is still too narrow to include the sort of thought-experiment which Mueller describes as traditional mathematical proof and which Lakatos examines in Proofs (...)
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  32. Jan-R. Sieckmann (2003). Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):211-219.
    This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its (...)
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  33. Pascal Wagner-Egger (2007). Conditional Reasoning and the Wason Selection Task: Biconditional Interpretation Instead of Reasoning Bias. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):484 – 505.
    Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the participants as strict logical conditionals, whereas others are interpreted as expressing a biconditional relationship. A deductive task was used jointly with the selection task to show that the original abstract rule is quite ambiguous in this respect, contrary to deontic rules: the typical “error” (...)
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