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Reasons

Edited by Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
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  1. Daniel Adler, Positive and Negative Practical Reasons.
    In this essay, I argue that positive and negative practical reasons have asymmetrical normative force. In other words, the negative reasons for one action, and the positive reasons for another action that they correspond to, do not have equivalent normative force. This asymmetry is defended by appealing to Dancy's holism about practical reasons, and Greenspan's critical conception of practical reasons. It is also vindicated by appealing to an analogous asymmetry among positive and negative theoretical reasons. If this is right, then (...)
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  2. Maria Alvares (2013). Explaining Actions and Explaining Bodily Movements. In G. D’Oro, A. Laitinen & C. Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes. Palgrave Macmillan 141-159.
  3. M. Alvarez (2009). Slaves of the Passions * by Mark Schroeder. Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
    Like much in this book, the title and dust jacket illustration are clever. The first evokes Hume's remark in the Treatise that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’ The second, which represents a cross between a dance-step and a clinch, links up with the title and anticipates an example used throughout the book to support its central claims: that Ronnie, unlike Bradley, has a reason to go to a party – namely, that there will (...)
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  4. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  5. Maria Alvarez, Review of Mark Schroeder's 'Slaves of the Passions'. [REVIEW]
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  6. Elizabeth Anderson (1996). Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper. Ethics 106 (3):538-554.
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  7. Chrisoula Andreou (2001). The Moral Grip. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Implicit in common views about morality is the assumption that the grip of morality is inescapable in the sense that moral considerations give reasons for acting to everyone. On the basis of this assumption, it is claimed that there is a necessity associated with behaving morally, even when we are not compelled to do so, and that while one may reasonably dismiss certain non-moral requirements with a "So what?" one cannot reasonably offer this in response to a statement about the (...)
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  8. Steven Arkonovich (2007). Goals, Wishes, and Reasons for Action. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):161-184.
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  9. Steven Lorin Arkonovich (1998). Reasons for Action and the Roles of Desire. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    It is common sense to say that, at least sometimes, what one has reason to do depends on what one wants. In contemporary ethical theory, "internalists" and "externalists" divide over the issue whether one's practical reasons are always dependent on one's desires. Internalists insist, while externalists deny, that an agent has reason to act only if that agent wants, or could come to want, to so act. ;The present investigation attempts to adjudicate the issue dividing internalists and externalists by assessing (...)
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  10. Orin Thomas Atwater (1977). Wants and Two Kinds of Reasons for Actions. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
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  11. Robert Audi (2010). Reasons for Action. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge
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  12. Robert Audi (1979). Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):227–249.
    This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively, that both the way in which reasons render intelligible the actions they explain and the (...)
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  13. Susan E. Babbitt (2005). Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell. Hypatia 20 (4):144-163.
    : In this essay, I suggest that significant insights of recent feminist philosophy lead, among other things, to the thought that it is not always better to choose than to be compelled to do what one might have done otherwise. However, few feminists, if any, would defend such a suggestion. I ask why it is difficult to consider certain ideas that, while challenging in theory, are, nonetheless, rather unproblematic in practice. I suggest that some questions are not pursued seriously enough (...)
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  14. K. Baier (1953). Good Reasons. Philosophical Studies 4 (1):1 - 15.
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  15. Kurt Baier (1964). Reasons for Doing Something. Journal of Philosophy 61 (6):198-203.
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  16. Jonathan Baron (1986). Tradeoffs Among Reasons for Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):173–195.
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  17. Stephanie Beardman (2000). Affective Deliberation: Toward a Humean Account of Practical Reasons. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    On a Humean account, a person's reasons for action are determined by her desires---in the broadest sense of 'desires', that is, noncognitive pro-attitudes. In four essays, I defend this account against several prominent objections. The first essay addresses the concern that the Humean cannot account for rationalizing reasons . The next three essays concern justifying reasons : reasons for action that are more fully normative than those that merely make action intelligible. Instrumental reasons, prudential reasons, and intrinsic reasons are three (...)
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  18. Daniel Bennett (1965). Action, Reason, and Purpose. Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):85-96.
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  19. Monika Betzler (2009). Expressive Actions. Inquiry 52 (3):272-292.
    Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...)
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  20. Rüdiger Bittner (2003). Stronger Reasons. In Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson & Thomas W. Pogge (eds.), Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes From the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz. OUP Oxford
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  21. Charles Blatz & Mano Daniel, Community, Argumentation, and the Legitimacy of Reasons for Action.
    Communities gather persons sharing saliencies, the meaning of events, and accountability based in shared values and practices. These shared features ensure community wide legitimacy for moral agents and their reasons for acting. But they also might ensure personal reasons for action are not universally legitimate. This discussion considers Hannah Arendt’s and an alternative view of judgment seeking an ac-count of community-limited legitimacy for reasons in both moral and closely related political thought.
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  22. Michael S. Brady (1998). Reasons and Rational Motivational Access. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):99–114.
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  23. Talbot Brewer (2002). The Real Problem with Internalism About Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):443 - 473.
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  24. Robert Brown (1963). On Having One's Reasons. Philosophy 38 (145):264 - 271.
    The question of what we are doing when we give an explanation in terms of the agent's reasons for his behaviour is both familiar and complicated. The question I shall raise here, however, is somewhat more limited. It is that of what is involved in making use of such explanations once we have some cursory acquaintance with their structure. In particular, I wish to draw attention to some relations between explanations in terms of intended goals and relations in terms of (...)
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  25. Rüdiger Bubner (1973). Action and Reason. Ethics 83 (3):224-236.
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  26. J. D. C. (1970). The Essence of Reasons. Review of Metaphysics 23 (4):742-742.
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  27. John V. Canfield (1979). Calculations, Reasons and Causes. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer 179--195.
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  28. Norman S. Care (1967). On Avowing Reasons. Mind 76 (302):208-216.
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  29. James Cargile (1966). On Having Reasons. Analysis 26 (6):189 - 192.
    Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When (...)
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  30. Alejandra Carrasco (2000). Practical Reasons, Person, and Common Good. Vera Lex 1 (1/2):73-98.
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  31. W. R. Carter (1974). Armstrong on Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):251 – 256.
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  32. Ruth Chang (2004). Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...)
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  33. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  34. Philip Clark (1997). Practical Steps and Reasons for Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.
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  35. Zvi Y. Cohen (1999). Reasons, Justifications and Excuses. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Austin lamented philosophers' obsession with justifications and disregard for other forms of reasoned defense. He urged attention to another way in which reasons function, which he described in terms of "excuses" and "the opposite number of excuses". I articulate a conception of reasons founded on Austin's distinction. The conception is heterogeneous, in that it construes reasons as defined by an inherent duality of function: their roles in both justifying and making excuses. The conception applies uniformly in both speculative and practical (...)
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  36. Rachel Cohon (2000). The Roots of Reasons. Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
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  37. Mary Clayton Coleman (2005). Public Reasons and Practical Solipsism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):317-336.
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  38. L. W. Colter (1998). The Sources of Normativity. Review of Metaphysics 51 (4):940-941.
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  39. David Copp (2001). Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert's Rational Options. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
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  40. Garrett Cullity (2013). The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons. Ethics 124 (1):8-34.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen.
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  41. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):163–177.
    The paper defends Collingwood's account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologizes the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalizations from rationalizations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of nonpsychologizing internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form (...)
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  42. Jonathan Dancy (2012). Response to Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 157 (3):455-462.
    Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  43. Jonathan Dancy (2011). Acting in Ignorance. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.
    This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p . The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
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  44. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Enticing Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press
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  45. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Two Ways of Explaining Actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:25-42.
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we (...)
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  46. Stephen Darwall (2007). How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action? In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press
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  47. Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends (2015). Reason to Promotion Inferences. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-10.
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  48. Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
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  49. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
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  50. Robert Dunn (2010). New Essays on the Explanation of Action, by Constantine Sandis. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):193-196.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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