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- Daan Evers (2009). Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
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- James Lenman (2009). Reasons for Action: Justification Vs. Explanation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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