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Summary Recognitional concepts are those concepts whose possession conditions require that one be able to correctly sort, identify, or categorize things that fall under them. Recognitional concepts therefore tie concept possession to specific types of behavioral or cognitive abilities.
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  1. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Overcoming Aduality of Concepts and Causes: A Unifying Thread in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In R.M. Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell.
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  2. Darragh Byrne (2004). The 'Compositional Rigidity' of Recognitionality. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169.
    Abstract Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ?recognitional? concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ?inherited? by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics (...)
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  3. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
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  4. Richard E. Grandy (1998). Recognitional Concepts and Compositionality. Philosophical Issues 9:21-25.
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  5. Terence E. Horgan (1998). Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
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  6. Paul Horwich (1998). Concept Constitution. Philosophical Issues 9:15-19.
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  7. Ruth G. Millikan (1998). A More Plausible Kind of "Recognitional Concept". Philosophical Issues 9:35-41.
    It's a sort of moebus strip argument. Rather than circularly assuming what it should prove, it assumes one of the things Fodor says he has disproved. It assumes that the extensions of those concepts thought by some to be recognitional are in fact controlled by stereotypes. Why do I say that? Because Fodor assumes that what makes an instance of a concept a "good instance" is that it is an average instance, that it sports the properties statistically most commonly found (...)
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  8. Ruth G. Millikan (1998). A More Plausible Kind of "Recognitional Concept". Philosophical Issues 9:35-41.
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  9. Ruth G. Millikan (1994). On Unclear and Indistinct Ideas. Philosophical Perspectives 8:75-100.
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  10. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2000). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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  11. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don't Need Friends. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-100.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the (...)
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  12. Marcus Ohlström, Marco Solinas & Olivier Voirol (2010). Redistribuzione o riconoscimento? di Nancy Fraser e Axel Honneth. Iride 23 (2):443-460.
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  13. Christopher Peacocke (1992). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press.
  14. David Pereplyotchik (2011). Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
    I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.
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  15. Bradley Rives (2010). Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts. Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.
    Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.
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  16. Timothy Schroeder (2003). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts Ruth Garrett Millikan New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Xiii + 258 Pp., $92.25, $35.50 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 42 (01):148-.
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  17. Marco Solinas (2010). Review of Bert van den Brink and David Owen (eds.), Recognition and Power. Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory. [REVIEW] Iride (59):223-224.
  18. Italo Testa (2012). Scepsis and Scepticism. In De Laurentis Allegra & Edwards Jeffrey (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. Bloomsbury/Continuum (2012). Bloomsbury. 273-278.
    Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In this way, (...)
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