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  1. S. C. A. (1973). Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):126-127.
  2. Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana.
    Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...)
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  3. Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper (...)
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  4. Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2011). The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press 202--223.
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  5. Kenneth Lee Aizawa (1989). The Promise of Parallel Distributed Processing. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Explanations of psychological regularities in terms of biological regularities are undoubtedly appealing for many reasons. In addition, the scientific methodology that searches for such explanations certainly has merit. Nonetheless, the history of neuroscience, psychology, and computer science over the last one hundred years, indicates that such explanations are difficult to find and that the methodology of searching for them often frustrating. Recent attempts to provide "neurally-inspired" explanations of psychological regularities embodied in the theory of parallel distributed processing, PDP, also show (...)
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  6. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Sciences.
    The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame thus.
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  7. Fritz Allhoff (2005). Neuroscience and Metaphysics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):34 - 36.
    In “Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge In- The assumption at issue here is the assumption that the formed by Genetics,” Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this ismind literally is the brain (i.e., is numerically identical to sue) argue that “traditional bioethics analysis” (TBA), as de-.
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  8. A. P. Atkinson (1998). Persons, Systems and Subsystems: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20:43-60.
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  9. Harald Atmanspacher, Contextual Emergence of Mental States From Neurodynamics.
    The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of mixing hyperbolic systems. These stability (...)
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  10. Harald Atmanspacher (2007). Contextual Emergence From Physics to Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):18-36.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive (...)
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  11. Sunny Auyang, Are You Nothing but Genes or Neurons?
    All complex systems are complex, but some are more complex than others are. Biological systems are generally more complex than physical systems. How do biologists tackle complex systems? In this talk, we will consider two biological systems, the genome and the brain. Scientists know much about them, but much more remains unknown. Ignorance breeds philosophical speculation. Reductionism makes a strong showing here, as it does in other frontier sciences where large gaps remain in our understanding. I will show that reductionism (...)
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker, Neuroscience and the Human Mind.
    I want to raise three questions for discussion: 1. How are a philosopher’s concerns about the human mind related to a neuroscientist’s concerns? 2. Can neuroscience explain everything that we want to understand about the human mind? 3. Does neuroscience threaten our dignity or humanity (or anything else that we cherish about ourselves)? Let’s take these questions one at a time.
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  13. Philip Barnard & Tim Dalgleish (2005). Psychological-Level Systems Theory: The Missing Link in Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic Systems Modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):196-197.
    Bridging between psychological and neurobiological systems requires that the system components are closely specified at both the psychological and brain levels of analysis. We argue that in developing his dynamic systems theory framework, Lewis has sidestepped the notion of a psychological level systems model altogether, and has taken a partisan approach to his exposition of a brain-level systems model.
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  14. R. L. Barnette (1972). Comments on Neurophysiological Reduction. Theoria 38 (3):143-144.
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  15. Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
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  16. Vadim Batitsky (1998). A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism. Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-20.
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata theory. (...)
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  17. Mark Bauer (2012). Multiple Realizability as Compatible with the Mental Constraint Thesis. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):119-127.
  18. William M. Baum (2005). Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution. Blackwell.
    Understanding Behaviorism explains the basis of behavior analysis and its application to human problems in a scholarly but accessible manner. Behaviorism is defined as the proposition that a science of behavior is possible, and the book begins by exploring the question of whether behavior is free or determined, relating behaviorism to pragmatism, and showing how feelings and thoughts can be treated scientifically. Baum then discusses ancient concepts such as purpose, knowledge, and thought, as well as social problems such as freedom, (...)
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  19. Timothy J. Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2005). Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.
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  20. C. Philip Beaman (2000). Neurons Amongst the Symbols? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):468-470.
    Page's target article presents an argument for the use of localist, connectionist models in future psychological theorising. The “manifesto” marshalls a set of arguments in favour of localist connectionism and against distributed connectionism, but in doing so misses a larger argument concerning the level of psychological explanation that is appropriate to a given domain.
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  21. William Bechtel (2008). Mechanisms in Cognitive Psychology: What Are the Operations? Philosophy of Science 75 (5):983-994.
    Cognitive psychologists, like biologists, frequently describe mechanisms when explaining phenomena. Unlike biologists, who can often trace material transformations to identify operations, psychologists face a more daunting task in identifying operations that transform information. Behavior provides little guidance as to the nature of the operations involved. While not itself revealing the operations, identification of brain areas involved in psychological mechanisms can help constrain attempts to characterize the operations. In current memory research, evidence that the same brain areas are involved in what (...)
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  22. William Bechtel (2007). Reducing Psychology While Maintaining its Autonomy Via Mechanistic Explanations. In M. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell Publishing
    Arguments for the autonomy of psychology or other higher-level sciences have often taken the form of denying the possibility of reduction. The form of reduction most proponents and critics of the autonomy of psychology have in mind is theory reduction. Mechanistic explanations provide a different perspective. Mechanistic explanations are reductionist insofar as they appeal to lower-level entities—the component parts of a mechanism and their operations— to explain a phenomenon. However, unlike theory reductions, mechanistic explanations also recognize the fundamental role of (...)
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  23. William Bechtel (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.
  24. William P. Bechtel (2002). Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why Is It Important? Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S48-S58.
    The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scientific practice and discussions of scientific methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose—multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists (...)
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  25. William P. Bechtel (2001). Cognitive Neuroscienec: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press
  26. William P. Bechtel (1983). A Bridge Between Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: The Functional Architecture of Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 44 (November):319-30.
  27. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1996). Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function. Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.
    The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...)
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  28. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological <span class='Hi'>explanation</span>?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To (...)
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  29. Jonathan Bentwich (2006). The Duality Principle: Irreducibility of Sub-Threshold Psychophysical Computation to Neuronal Brain Activation. Synthese 153 (3):451-455.
    A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] (...)
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  30. John Bickle (2008). Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience : Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!). In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press
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  31. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
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  32. John Bickle (2005). Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
    This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the (...)
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  33. John Bickle (2005). Replies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):285-296.
    I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
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  34. John Bickle (2005). Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
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  35. John Bickle (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience a Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  36. John Bickle (2001). Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:249-255.
  37. John Bickle (2001). New Wave Metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and Stephan. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:285-293.
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  38. John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
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  39. John W. Bickle (2008). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. A Bradford Book.
    One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents a (...)
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  40. Erhard Bieberich, In Search of a Neuronal Substrate of the Human Mind: New Concepts From "Topological Neurochemistry".
    Neurochemistry is a powerful discipline of modern neuroscience based on a description of neuronal function in terms of molecular reaction and interaction. This study aims at a neurochemical approach to the "hard" philosophical mind-body problem: the search for the neuronal correlate of consciousness. The scattered pattern of remote areas in the human brain simultaneously busy with the computation of single perceptions has left us with the unanswered questions why, where, and how the neuronal activity gives rise to a unified conscious (...)
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  41. Margaret A. Boden (1981). Minds And Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology And Computational Models. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  42. John Herbert Bolender (1996). Explaining Psychology: Psychophysical Reductionism, Explanation, and the Unity of Science. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Since functionalism implies that mental categories cross classify physical categories, it has classically been construed as precluding both the reduction of psychological theory to physical theory as well as the replacement of psychological by physical theory. However, many recent arguments for psychophysical reductionism and eliminative materialism also presuppose that mental categories cross classify physical categories. This raises questions as to the true significance of the cross classification of mental and physical categories. ;I argue that viewing psychophysical reductionism or eliminative materialism (...)
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  43. Thomas Bontly (2000). John Bickle Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):901-905.
  44. Fred Boogerd, Frank Bruggeman, Catholijn Jonker, Huib Looren de Jong, Allard Tamminga, Jan Treur, Hans Westerhoff & Wouter Wijngaards (2002). Inter-Level Relations in Computer Science, Biology, and Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):463–471.
    Investigations into inter-level relations in computer science, biology and psychology call for an *empirical* turn in the philosophy of mind. Rather than concentrate on *a priori* discussions of inter-level relations between 'completed' sciences, a case is made for the actual study of the way inter-level relations grow out of the developing sciences. Thus, philosophical inquiries will be made more relevant to the sciences, and, more importantly, philosophical accounts of inter-level relations will be testable by confronting them with what really happens (...)
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  45. Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini (2016). The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution. Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
    We outline a framework of multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms that incorporates representation and computation. We argue that paradigmatic explanations in cognitive neuroscience fit this framework and thus that cognitive neuroscience constitutes a revolutionary break from traditional cognitive science. Whereas traditional cognitive scientific explanations were supposed to be distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations, neurocognitive explanations aim to be mechanistic through and through. Neurocognitive explanations aim to integrate computational and representational functions and structures across multiple levels of organization in order to explain (...)
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  46. Alison C. Boyce (2009). Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical Consequences for Patient Care. Bioethics 23 (6):349-359.
    According to many researchers, it is inevitable and obvious that psychiatric illnesses are biological in nature, and that this is the rationale behind the numerous neuroimaging studies of individuals diagnosed with mental disorders. Scholars looking at the history of psychiatry have pointed out that in the past, the origins and motivations behind the search for biological causes, correlates, and cures for mental disorders are thoroughly social and historically rooted, particularly when the diagnostic category in question is the subject of (...)
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  47. Michael Brearley (2002). Psychoanalysis and the Body–Mind Problem. Ratio 15 (4):429–443.
  48. Janez Bregant (2006). John Bickle, Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16:133-140.
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  49. Janez Bregant, Andraž Stožer & Marko Cerkvenik (2010). Molecular Reduction: Reality or Fiction? [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (3):437 - 450.
    Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at (...)
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  50. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). Robert N. McCauley, Ed., The Churchlands and Their Critics Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 19 (1):39-41.
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