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  1. Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana.
    Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...)
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  2. Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.
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  3. Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2011). The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 202--223.
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  4. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Sciences.
    The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame thus.
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  5. Fritz Allhoff (2005). Neuroscience and Metaphysics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):34 - 36.
    In “Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge In- The assumption at issue here is the assumption that the formed by Genetics,” Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this ismind literally is the brain (i.e., is numerically identical to sue) argue that “traditional bioethics analysis” (TBA), as de-.
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  6. Harald Atmanspacher, Contextual Emergence of Mental States From Neurodynamics.
    The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of mixing hyperbolic systems. These stability (...)
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  7. Harald Atmanspacher (2007). Contextual Emergence From Physics to Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):18-36.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive (...)
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  8. Sunny Auyang, Are You Nothing but Genes or Neurons?
    All complex systems are complex, but some are more complex than others are. Biological systems are generally more complex than physical systems. How do biologists tackle complex systems? In this talk, we will consider two biological systems, the genome and the brain. Scientists know much about them, but much more remains unknown. Ignorance breeds philosophical speculation. Reductionism makes a strong showing here, as it does in other frontier sciences where large gaps remain in our understanding. I will show that reductionism (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker, Neuroscience and the Human Mind.
    I want to raise three questions for discussion: 1. How are a philosopher’s concerns about the human mind related to a neuroscientist’s concerns? 2. Can neuroscience explain everything that we want to understand about the human mind? 3. Does neuroscience threaten our dignity or humanity (or anything else that we cherish about ourselves)? Let’s take these questions one at a time.
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  10. Philip Barnard & Tim Dalgleish (2005). Psychological-Level Systems Theory: The Missing Link in Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic Systems Modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):196-197.
    Bridging between psychological and neurobiological systems requires that the system components are closely specified at both the psychological and brain levels of analysis. We argue that in developing his dynamic systems theory framework, Lewis has sidestepped the notion of a psychological level systems model altogether, and has taken a partisan approach to his exposition of a brain-level systems model.
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  11. R. L. Barnette (1972). Comments on Neurophysiological Reduction. Theoria 38 (3):143-144.
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  12. C. Philip Beaman (2000). Neurons Amongst the Symbols? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):468-470.
    Page's target article presents an argument for the use of localist, connectionist models in future psychological theorising. The “manifesto” marshalls a set of arguments in favour of localist connectionism and against distributed connectionism, but in doing so misses a larger argument concerning the level of psychological explanation that is appropriate to a given domain.
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  13. William P. Bechtel (2002). Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why Is It Important? Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S48-S58.
    The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scientific practice and discussions of scientific methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose—multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists (...)
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  14. William P. Bechtel (2001). Cognitive Neuroscienec: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.
  15. William P. Bechtel (1983). A Bridge Between Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: The Functional Architecture of Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 44 (November):319-30.
  16. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1996). Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function. Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.
    The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...)
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  17. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  18. Jonathan Bentwich (2006). The Duality Principle: Irreducibility of Sub-Threshold Psychophysical Computation to Neuronal Brain Activation. Synthese 153 (3):451-455.
    A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] (...)
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  19. John Bickle (2008). Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience : Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!). In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
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  20. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
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  21. John Bickle (2005). Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
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  22. John Bickle (2005). Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
    This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the (...)
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  23. John Bickle (2005). Replies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):285-296.
    I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
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  24. John Bickle (2001). New Wave Metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and Stephan. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:285-293.
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  25. John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
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  26. Fred Boogerd, Frank Bruggeman, Catholijn Jonker, Huib Looren de Jong, Allard Tamminga, Jan Treur, Hans Westerhoff & Wouter Wijngaards (2002). Inter-Level Relations in Computer Science, Biology, and Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):463–471.
    Investigations into inter-level relations in computer science, biology and psychology call for an *empirical* turn in the philosophy of mind. Rather than concentrate on *a priori* discussions of inter-level relations between 'completed' sciences, a case is made for the actual study of the way inter-level relations grow out of the developing sciences. Thus, philosophical inquiries will be made more relevant to the sciences, and, more importantly, philosophical accounts of inter-level relations will be testable by confronting them with what really happens (...)
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  27. Alison C. Boyce (2009). Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical Consequences for Patient Care. Bioethics 23 (6):349-359.
    According to many researchers, it is inevitable and obvious that psychiatric illnesses are biological in nature, and that this is the rationale behind the numerous neuroimaging studies of individuals diagnosed with mental disorders. Scholars looking at the history of psychiatry have pointed out that in the past, the origins and motivations behind the search for biological causes, correlates, and cures for mental disorders are thoroughly social and historically rooted, particularly when the diagnostic category in question is the subject of controversy (...)
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  28. Janez Bregant, Andraž Stožer & Marko Cerkvenik (2010). Molecular Reduction: Reality or Fiction? [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (3):437 - 450.
    Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at (...)
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  29. Andrew Brook (1998). Neuroscience Versus Psychology in Freud. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 843 (1):66-79.
    In the 1890's, Freud attempted to lay out the foundations of a complete, interdisciplinary neuroscience of the mind. The conference that gave rise to this collection of papers, Neuroscience of the Mind on the Centennial of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology, celebrated the centrepiece of this work, the famous Project (1895a). Freud never published this work and by 1896 or 1897 he had abandoned the research programme behind it. As he announced in the famous Ch. VII of The Interpretation (...)
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  30. Silvia A. Bunge & Michael J. Souza (2008). Neural Representations Used to Specify Action. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.
  31. Alex Byrne (2000). Two Radical Neuron Doctrines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):833-833.
    G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful theory' must (...)
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  32. Keith Campbell (1986). Can Intuitive Psychology Survive the Growth of Neuroscience? Inquiry 29 (June):143-152.
    This paper considers the impact which developments in neuroscience seem likely to have on our inherited, intuitive psychology ? the system of beliefs called ?folk psychology? by enthusiasts for its elimination. The paper argues that while closer relations between a developing genuinely scientific cognitive psychology and a burgeoning neurological understanding are to be welcomed, physiology will not reduce psychology, and the concepts belonging to intuitive psychology will be transformed and enriched, but not discredited or discarded, when psychology, in its cognitive (...)
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  33. Nick Chater (1999). Why Biological Neuroscience Cannot Replace Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-834.
    Gold & Stoljar argue persuasively that there is presently not a good case for the “radical neuron doctrine.” There are strong reasons to believe that this doctrine is false. An analogy between psychology and economics strongly throws the radical neuron doctrine into doubt.
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  34. Antonio Chella (2005). An Intermediate Level Between the Psychological and the Neurobiological Levels of Descriptions of Appraisal-Emotion Dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.
    Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry.
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  35. Wayne D. Christensen & Luca Tomassi (2006). Neuroscience in Context: The New Flagship of the Cognitive Sciences. Biological Theory 1 (1):78-83.
    © 2006 Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research.
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  36. Paul M. Churchland (1989). On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:59--101.
  37. Paul M. Churchland (1986). Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology. Mind 95 (July):279-309.
  38. Paul M. Churchland (1982). Is 'Thinker' a Natural Kind? Dialogue 21 (June):223-38.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.
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  39. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  40. Richard P. Cooper & Tim Shallice (2010). Cognitive Neuroscience: The Troubled Marriage of Cognitive Science and Neuroscience. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):398-406.
    We discuss the development of cognitive neuroscience in terms of the tension between the greater sophistication in cognitive concepts and methods of the cognitive sciences and the increasing power of more standard biological approaches to understanding brain structure and function. There have been major technological developments in brain imaging and advances in simulation, but there have also been shifts in emphasis, with topics such as thinking, consciousness, and social cognition becoming fashionable within the brain sciences. The discipline has great promise (...)
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  41. Carl F. Craver (2005). Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):373-395.
  42. Mark Crooks (2002). Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):193-222.
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  43. Huib L. de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2005). Ruthless Reductionism: A Review Essay of John Bickle's Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):473-486.
    John Bickle's new book on philosophy and neuroscience is aptly subtitled 'a ruthlessly reductive account'. His 'new wave metascience' is a massive attack on the relative autonomy that psychology enjoyed until recently, and goes even beyond his previous (Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: The new wave. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) new wave reductionsism. Reduction of functional psychology to (cognitive) neuroscience is no longer ruthless enough; we should now look rather to cellular or molecular neuroscience at the lowest possible level for (...)
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  44. Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    This volume collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behavior, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition.
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  45. Guillermo Del Pinal & Marco J. Nathan (2013). There and Up Again: On the Uses and Misuses of Neuroimaging in Psychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 30 (4):233-252.
    The aim of this article is to discuss the conditions under which functional neuroimaging can contribute to the study of higher cognition. We begin by presenting two case studies—on moral and economic decision making—which will help us identify and examine one of the main ways in which neuroimaging can help advance the study of higher cognition. We agree with critics that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies seldom “refine” or “confirm” particular psychological hypotheses, or even provide details of the neural (...)
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  46. William Dembski, Challenging Materialism's "Chokehold" on Neuroscience.
    In the epilogue to The Mind and the Brain , we read: "Finally, after a generation or more in which biological materialism has had neuroscience -- indeed, all the life sciences -- in a chokehold, we may at last be breaking free.... Biological materialism did and does have real-world consequences. We feel its reach every time a pharmaceutical company tells us that, to cure shyness (or "social phobia"), we need only reach for a little pill.... Biological materialism is nothing if (...)
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  47. Liam P. Dempsey (2004). Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl’s “twofold-access theory,” is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although twofold-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way “eliminates” conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily (...)
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  48. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  49. Birgitta Dresp (1999). The Cognitive Impenetrability Hypothesis: Doomsday for the Unity of the Cognitive Neurosciences? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):375-376.
    The heuristic value of Pylyshyn's cognitive impenetrability theory is questioned in this commentary, mainly because, as it stands, the key argument cannot be challenged empirically. Pylyshyn requires unambiguous evidence for an effect of cognitive states on early perceptual mechanisms, which is impossible to provide because we can only infer what might happen at these earlier levels of processing on the basis of evidence collected at the post-perceptual stage. Furthermore, the theory that early visual processes cannot be modified by cognitive states (...)
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  50. Steven M. Duncan, The Consequences of Neurophysiological Materialism.
    In this essay, I argue that neurophysiological materialism - the thesis that all of our mental contents are caused by non-mental, purely physical brain states - is epistemically self-refuting, and ought to be rejected even if it cannot be otherwise disproved.
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