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  1. F. D. Agostino (1988). Relativism and Reflective Equilibrium in Justification. The Monist 71 (3):420-436.
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  2. Hannah Altehenger, Simon Gaus & Andreas Leonhard Menges (2015). Being Realistic About Reflective Equilibrium. Analysis:1-10.
    In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...)
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  3. Hilliard Aronovitch (1996). Reflective Equilibrium or Evolving Tradition? Inquiry 39 (3 & 4):399 – 419.
    This paper presents criticisms of the method for moral and political philosophy known as ?reflective equilibrium? (RE), or in its fuller form ?wide reflective equilibrium? (WRE). This negative purpose has an ulterior positive aim: to set off, by favourable contrast, an alternative approach based on analogical argument as an instrument of an evolving (liberal) tradition. WRE derives from John Rawls but has been broadly endorsed. Though a meta?theory, it involves a certain way of construing liberalism. This essay's target is in (...)
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  4. John D. Arras (2007). The Way We Reason Now: Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics. In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press. 46--71.
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  5. Marcus Arvan (2013). Groundwork for a New Moral Epistemology. Klesis 27:155-190.
    This paper argues that virtue ethics and prevailing epistemic norms in moral and political philosophy more generally both support a new kind of empirically-informed moral-virtue epistemology, or “experimental ethics” – an epistemology according to which disputed normative premises in moral and political philosophy should be epistemically evaluated on the basis of empirically-observed relationships they bear to morally admirable and morally repugnant psycho-behavioral traits, as defined by cross-cultural, cross-historical, and cross-debate agreement on the moral valence of particular traits and behaviors.
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  6. Elvio Baccarini (1991). Rational Consensus and Coherence Methods in Ethics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:151-159.
    The method of reflective equilibrium implies that moral principles received from philosophical reasoning and considered moral judgments received intuitively are finally justified if they cohere with each other. This idea is combined with the proposal of rational consensus (Lehrer), which shows the way in which divergences of judgements could be made to converge. This second method is used to the end of rendering more plausible the intuitions used in reflective equilibrium, and, so, to show the appropriateness of the coherentist method (...)
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  7. Y. Michael Barilan & Margherita Brusa (2011). Triangular Reflective Equilibrium: A Conscience-Based Method for Bioethical Deliberation. Bioethics 25 (6):304-319.
    Following a discussion of some historical roots of conscience, we offer a systematized version of reflective equilibrium. Aiming at a comprehensive methodology for bioethical deliberation, we develop an expanded variant of reflective equilibrium, which we call ‘triangular reflective equilibrium’ and which incorporates insights from hermeneutics, critical theory and narrative ethics.We focus on a few distinctions, mainly between methods of justification in ethics and the social practice of bioethical deliberation, between coherence in ethical reasoning, personal integrity and consensus formation, and between (...)
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  8. Robert Bass (2010). Reflective Equilibrium. In Nils Rauhut & Robert Bass (eds.), Readings on the Ultimate Questions - Third Edition. Pearson.
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  9. Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
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  10. Jared Bates (2004). Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology. Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue (...)
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  11. J. L. Bermudez (2012). Language and Equilibrium. Philosophical Review 121 (2):294-298.
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  12. André Berten (1999). Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 97 (3-4):696-699.
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  13. James Blachowicz (1997). Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral Theory. Synthese 110 (3):447-468.
    In this paper, I analyze the particular conception of reciprocal justification proposed by Nelson Goodman and incorporated by John Rawls into what he called reflective equilibrium. I propose a way of avoiding the twin dangers which threaten to push this idea to either of two extremes: the reliance on epistemically privileged observation reports (or moral judgments in Rawls version), which tends to disrupt the balance struck between the two sides of the equilibrium and to re-establish a foundationalism; and the denial (...)
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  14. Daniel Bonevac (2004). Reflection Without Equilibrium. Journal of Philosophy 101 (7):363 - 388.
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  15. Jeffrey Brand-Ballard (2003). Consistency, Common Morality, and Reflective Equilibrium. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3):231-258.
    : Biomedical ethicists often assume that common morality constitutes a largely consistent normative system. This premise is not taken for granted in general normative ethics. This paper entertains the possibility of inconsistency within common morality and explores methodological implications. Assuming common morality to be inconsistent casts new light on the debate between principlists and descriptivists. One can view the two approaches as complementary attempts to evade or transcend that inconsistency. If common morality proves to be inconsistent, then principlists might have (...)
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  16. R. B. Brandt (1990). The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Ethics 100 (2):259-278.
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  17. David O. Brink (forthcoming). Principles and Intuitions in Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. .
    This essay situates some recent empirical research on the origin, nature, role, and reliability of moral intuitions against the background of nineteenth-century debates between ethical naturalism and rational intuitionism. The legitimate heir to Millian naturalism is the contemporary method of reflective equilibrium and its defeasible reliance on moral intuitions. Recent doubts about moral intuitions—worries that they reflect the operation of imperfect cognitive heuristics, are resistant to undermining evidence, are subject to framing effects, and are variable—are best addressed by ethical naturalism (...)
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  18. Georg Brun (2014). Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
    In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...)
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  19. Richmond Campbell (2013). Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):1-19.
    It is more than a half-century since Nelson Goodman [1955] applied what we call the Reflective Equilibrium model of justification to the problem of justifying induction, and more than three decades since Rawls [1971] and Daniels [1979] applied celebrated extensions of this model to the problem of justifying principles of social justice. The resulting Wide Reflective Equilibrium model (WRE) is generally thought to capture an acceptable way to reconcile inconsistency between an intuitively plausible general principle and an intuitively plausible judgment (...)
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  20. James Robert Chandler, Reflective Equilibrium and the 'Moral Conservatism' Objection.
    Reflective equilibrium is widely accepted as a method of justifying ethical beliefs. Narrow reflective equilibrium justifies moral beliefs by achieving coherence between moral principles and moral judgments. However, this theory has been accused of moral conservatism objection; that is, moral beliefs may appear to be coherent but wrong. What are the normative grounds for criticizing implausible beliefs that seem to be in equilibrium? Wide reflective equilibrium has been the traditional attempt to respond to the conservatism objection. It adds non-moral beliefs (...)
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  21. Christopher Michael Cloos (2009). The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments. Dissertation, San Jose State University
    The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments(CMJs) are not truth‐conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I setup the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best (...)
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  22. W. E. Cooper (1981). Taking Reflective Equilibrium Seriously. Dialogue 20 (03):548-555.
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  23. Robert C. Cummins (1998). Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Rowman & Littlefield. 113-128.
    As a procedure, reflective equilibrium (RE) is simply a familiar kind of standard scientific method with a new name. (For descriptions of reflective equilibrium, see Daniels 1979, 1980b, 1984; Goodman 1965; Rawls 1971.) A theory is constructed to account for a set of observations. Recalcitrant data may be rejected as noise or explained away as the effects of interference of some sort. Recalcitrant data that cannot be plausibly dismissed force emendations in theory. What counts as a plausible dismissal depends, among (...)
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  24. Thomas V. Cunningham, Rawlsian Reflective Equilibrium.
    This paper proposes a Rawlsian conception of moral justification as a social activity. Through a close reading, Rawls’ view of ethical justification is shown to be significantly more dialogical and deliberative than is commonly appreciated. The result is a view that emphasizes the social nature of ethical justification and identifies information sharing between persons as the crux of justification in metaethics, in contrast to normative ethics. I call it Rawlsian reflective equilibrium to distinguish it from other varieties.
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  25. Fred D'Agostino (1988). Relativism and Reflective Equilibrium. The Monist 71 (3):420-436.
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  26. Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  27. Norman Daniels (1996). Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.
    We all have beliefs, even strong convictions, about what is just and fair in our social arrangements. How should these beliefs and the theories of justice that incorporate them guide our thinking about practical matters of justice? This wide-ranging collection of essays by one of the foremost medical ethicists in the USA explores the claim that justification in ethics, whether of matters of theory or practice, involves achieving coherence between our moral and non-moral beliefs. Amongst the practical issues addressed in (...)
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  28. Norman Daniels (1980). Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):83 - 103.
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  29. Norman Daniels (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.
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  30. John K. Davis (2007). Intuition and the Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (1):1-30.
    Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or (...)
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  31. Nythamar de Oliveira (2014). Reflective Equilibrium and Normative Reconstruction: Recasting the Phenomenological Deficit of Critical Theory. Ethic@ 13 (1):91-111.
    In this paper, which reflects an ongoing interdisciplinary research in Cognitive and Social Sciences, I recast the normative claims of a political constructivism in reflective equilibrium and of a formal, pragmatic reconstruction as instances of a weak social constructionism. I proceed thus to investigate how social, evolutionary processes, in both semantic and normative terms , may be said to pursue universalizable, valid normative claims that could be justified from an externalist standpoint, generated through reflective equilibrium without reductionism.
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  32. Ronald de Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...)
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  33. Martine de Vries & Evert van Leeuwen (2010). Reflective Equilibrium and Empirical Data: Third Person Moral Experiences in Empirical Medical Ethics. Bioethics 24 (9):490 - 498.
    In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences (...)
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  34. M. R. DePaul (2011). Methodological Issues. Reflective Equilibrium. In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
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  35. Michael R. DePaul (1993). Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry. Routledge.
    We all have moral beliefs. What if we are unsure about what to believe about a serious moral issue, or if one belief conflicts with another that we hold with equal conviction? When such conflicts and doubts occur, we try to make our beliefs cohere, and are forced to engage in a moral inquiry. Michael R. DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. Methods such as that which (...)
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  36. Michael R. Depaul (1988). Naivete and Corruption in Moral Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):619-635.
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  37. Michael R. Depaul (1988). The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):67 - 86.
    One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chisholm's work has played a (...)
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  38. Michael R. DePaul (1987). Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics. Mind 96 (384):463-481.
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  39. Michael R. DePaul (1986). Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):59 - 69.
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  40. Michael Raymond Depaul (1983). Intuitionism, Reliability and Reflective Equilibrium. Dissertation, Brown University
    I seek to defend coherentist methods of theory construction in normative ethics, specifically J. Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium, on the basis of a naturalistic theory of epistemic justification. The dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is essentially a taxonomic discussion of approaches which might be taken towards the construction of theories of such epistemological notions as justification, knowledge or rational belief and such moral notions as right action or justice. The taxonomy extends that presented by R. M. (...)
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  41. Neelke Doorn (2010). A Rawlsian Approach to Distribute Responsibilities in Networks. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2):221-249.
    Due to their non-hierarchical structure, socio-technical networks are prone to the occurrence of the problem of many hands. In the present paper an approach is introduced in which people’s opinions on responsibility are empirically traced. The approach is based on the Rawlsian concept of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) in which people’s considered judgments on a case are reflectively weighed against moral principles and background theories, ideally leading to a state of equilibrium. Application of the method to a hypothetical case with (...)
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  42. Simon John Duffy (2001). An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A Critique of Mackie's Scepticism, and an Alternative Proposal Combining Ross's Intuitionism with a Kantian Epistemology. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then (...)
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  43. Roger P. Ebertz (1993). Is Reflective Equilibrium a Coherentist Model? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):193 - 214.
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  44. Ben Eggleston (2010). Practical Equilibrium: A Way of Deciding What to Think About Morality. Mind 119 (475):549 - 584.
    Practical equilibrium, like reflective equilibrium, is a way of deciding what to think about morality. It shares with reflective equilibrium the general thesis that there is some way in which a moral theory must, in order to be acceptable, answer to one’s moral intuitions, but it differs from reflective equilibrium in its specification of exactly how a moral theory must answer to one’s intuitions. Whereas reflective equilibrium focuses on a theory’s consistency with those intuitions, practical equilibrium also gives weight to (...)
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  45. Svein Eng (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification. Ratio Juris 27 (1):138-154.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
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  46. Svein Eng (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach. Ratio Juris 27 (2):288-310.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
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  47. Svein Eng (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool. Ratio Juris 27 (3):440-459.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
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  48. Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
    This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and (...)
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  49. Danny Frederick, Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.
    I present a structural critique of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid this by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely (...)
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  50. R. Gillon (1996). Ethnography, Medical Practice and Moral Reflective Equilibrium. Journal of Medical Ethics 22 (5):259-260.
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