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Relative Identity

Edited by A. P. Taylor (North Dakota State University)
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  1. William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett (1984). Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege. Philosophical Review 93 (4):553-567.
    P. T. Geach, notoriously, holds the Relative Identity Thesis, according to which a meaningful judgment of identity is always, implicitly or explicitly, relative to some general term. ‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term (what Frege calls a Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck). (P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 69. I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether (...)
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  2. Donald L. M. Baxter (2001). Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else. Noûs 35 (4):592–601.
    Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution--a Humean feigning-of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relation supports a predictable change in some collective. (...)
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  3. E. J. Borowski (1975). Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100):271-276.
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  4. James Wallace Cain (1985). The Logic of Relative Identity. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    My dissertation evaluates Peter Geach's theory of relative identity. Typically discussions of relative identity focus on predicative identity expressions of the form "is the same A as". My approach, following Geach, is broader: it also looks at how, if correct, the theory of relative identity must play into our accounts of proper names and quantifiers. ;Geach's theory is well known for denying the coherence of the concept of absolute identity, and for its espousal of a concept of identity allowing true (...)
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  5. Massimiliano Carrara (2009). Relative Identity and the Number of Artifacts. Techne 13 (2):108-122.
    Relativists maintain that identity is always relative to a general term (RI). According to them, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz’s Law does not hold. For relativists RI is at least as good as the Fregean cardinality thesis (FC), which contends that an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept specifying what, in any specific case, counts as a unit. The same train of (...)
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  6. Harry Deutsch, Relative Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  7. Frederick Doeke (1982). Spatially Coinciding Objects. Ratio:10--24.
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  8. George Englebretsen (1982). Do We Need Relative Identity? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):91-93.
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  9. Richard H. Feldman (1981). Nicholas Griffin on Relative Identity. Dialogue 20 (2):365-375.
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  10. Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  11. P. Garbacz (2004). Subsumption and Relative Identity. Axiomathes 14 (4):341-360.
    This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute identity but (...)
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  12. Pawe? Garbacz (2002). Logics of Relative Identity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (1):27-50.
    This paper is the first part of an exploration into the logical properties of relative identity. After providing the semantic grounds for various monadic logics of relative identity, I define the minimal system and its nine extensions. It is suggested that despite their purely formal origin at least some of them may contain nontrivial philosophical insights. All logics are axiomatized by means of sound and complete sequent calculi. I show their affinities with existing formalizations.
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  13. P. T. Geach (1969). Geach and Relative Identity-Reply. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):556-559.
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  14. Peter Thomas Geach (1973). Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology. New York,New York University Press
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  15. James Goetz, Weak Relative Identity and the General Partnership Model of the Trinity.
    This paper briefly proposes a weak relative identity strategy for the doctrine of the Trinity called the general partnership model. This model develops a logically consistent metaphysical constitution for the orthodox Christian doctrines of one divine substance and three divine persons. Moreover, the model rejects the rigid use of absolute identity in Trinitarian doctrine while modeling relative identity with an analogy of general partnerships in the United States.
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  16. James Goetz (2016). Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism. Journal of Analytic Theology 4:128-146.
    Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.
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  17. James Goetz (2014). Natural Unity and Paradoxes of Legal Persons. Journal Jurisprudence 21:27-46.
    This essay proposes an ontological model in which a legal person such as a polity possesses natural unity from group properties that emerge in the self-organization of the human population. Also, analysis of customary legal persons and property indicates noncontradictory paradoxes that include Aristotelian essence of an entity, relative identity over time, ubiquitous authority, coinciding authorities, and identical entities. Mathematical modeling helps to explain the logic of the paradoxes.
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  18. Nicholas Griffin (1978). Relative Identity Relations: A Reply to Dr. Noonan. Mind 87 (348):576-581.
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  19. Nicholas Griffin (1977). Relative Identity. Clarendon Press.
    The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, (...)
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  20. Nicholas Griffin (1976). Ayers on Relative Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):579 - 594.
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  21. Nicholas Griffin & Richard Routley (1979). Towards a Logic of Relative Identity. Logique Et Analyse 22 (85):65.
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  22. Herbert E. Hendry (1978). "Relative Identity," by Nicholas Griffin. Modern Schoolman 55 (4):406-407.
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  23. Olin Hills Joynton (1976). Relative Identity Reconsidered. Dissertation, Rice University
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  24. Kathrin Koslicki (2005). Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy. Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):55 - 77.
    This paper examines a variety of contexts in metaphysics which employ a strategy I consider to be suspect. In each of these contexts, ‘The Suspect Strategy’ (TSS) aims at excluding a series of troublesome contexts from a general principle whose truth the philosopher in question wishes to preserve. We see (TSS) implemented with respect to Leibniz’s Law (LL) in the context of Gibbard’s defense of contingent identity, Myro and Gallois’ defense of temporary identity, as well as Terence Parsons’ defense of (...)
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  25. Bruce Langtry (1975). Locke and the Relativisation of Identity. Philosophical Studies 27 (6):401 - 409.
    Arc there cases in which an object x is thc same F as an object y but x is not the same G as y, cvcn though x is a G? A11 aihrmativc answer will have drastic repercussions 011 0ne’s account of identity and on one’s quantification theory. For suppose that the expression ‘x is the same F as y’ can be understood as ‘x is an F and y is an F and x is identical with y’, and that (...)
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  26. E. J. Lowe (1986). Sortal Terms and Absolute Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):64 – 71.
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  27. Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  28. Nicholas Mantegani (2013). Instantiation is Not Partial Identity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):697-715.
    In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the “relation” of instantiation, Baxter and, following him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one of the relata of the partial identity “relation” to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial identity, which allows for (...)
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  29. Uwe Meixner (2005). The Rationality of (a Form of) Relative Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):449–455.
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  30. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Identificational Sentences. Natural Language Semantics 21 (1):43-77.
    Based on the notion of a trope, this paper gives a novel analysis of identificational sentences such as 'this is Mary','this is a beautiful woman', 'this looks like Mary', or 'this is the same lump of clay, but not the same statue as that'.
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  31. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity. Noûs 47 (2):346-370.
    Philosophers who accept tropes generally agree that tropes act as the objects of reference of nominalizations of adjectives, such as 'Socrates’ wisdom' or 'the beauty of the landscape'. This paper argues that tropes play a further important role in the semantics of natural language, namely in the semantics of bare demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' in what in linguistics is called identificational sentences.
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  32. Jack Nelson (1970). Relative Identity. Noûs 4 (3):241-260.
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  33. H. W. Noonan (1980). Relative Identity: A Reply to Nicholas Griffin. Mind 89 (353):96-98.
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  34. H. W. Noonan (1979). GRIFFIN, N. "Relative Identity". [REVIEW] Mind 88:299.
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  35. Harold Noonan (2013). Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity. The Monist 96 (1):101-130.
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  36. Harold W. Noonan (2015). Relative Identity. Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
    Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.
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  37. Harold W. Noonan (1986). Relative Identity: A Reconsideration. Analysis 46 (1):6 - 10.
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  38. Harold W. Noonan (1980). Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.
    ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...
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  39. Harold Noonan & Benjamin L. Curtis, Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in particular, the disagreement (...)
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  40. Douglas Odegard (1978). The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Relativity of Identity. Philosophical Studies 33 (3):313 - 317.
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  41. Roy W. Perrett (2000). Libertarianism, Feminism, and Relative Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):383-395.
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  42. John Perry (1978). Relative Identity and Number. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):1-14.
    I argue for the consistency of frege's treatments of identity and number. Specifically, I argue that geach is wrong in suggesting that frege's insights about number should have led him to the doctrine of relative identity.
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  43. John Perry (1970). The Same F. Philosophical Review 79 (2):181-200.
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  44. Martin Pickup (forthcoming). A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of Theseus Puzzle. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper outlines a novel solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle. The solution relies on situations, a philosophical tool used in natural language semantics among other places. The core idea is that what is true is always relative to the situation under consideration. I begin by outlining the problem before briefly introducing situations. I then present the solution: in smaller situations the candidate is identical to Theseus’s ship. But in larger situations containing both candidates these identities are neither true (...)
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  45. Roland Puccetti (1978). Borowski on the Relative Identity of Persons. Mind 87 (346):262-263.
    Borowski ("identity and personal identity," "mind", Volume lxxxv, Number 340, October 1976, Pages 481-502) claims that if x's brain were successfully transplanted into y's body, Our judgment of who the survivor z really is would be relative to our interest in z: for example, If the body y is that of an athlete or film actor, We would say it is y if we are athletic coaches or film directors. This view completely overlooks that acting talents and athletic skills are (...)
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  46. Michael C. Rea (2003). Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity. Philosophia Christi 5 (2):431 - 445.
    The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ’three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else (...)
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  47. D. J. Saab, Culture as Mediator for What is Ready-to-Hand: A Phenomenological Exploration of Semantic Networks.
    Upon what philosophical foundation are semantic network graphs based? Does this foundation allow for the legitimization of other semantic networks and ontological diversity? How can we design our computational and informational systems to accommodate this ontological diversity and the variety of semantic networks? Are semantic networks segmentations of larger semantic landscapes? This paper explores semantic networks from a Heideggerian existentialist and phenomenological perspective. The analysis presented uses cultural schema theory to bridge the syntactic and lexical elements to the semantic and (...)
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  48. L. Splitter (1980). GRIFFIN, N., "Relative Identity". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:298.
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  49. Leslie Stevenson (1972). Relative Identity and Leibniz's Law. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (87):155-158.
    The indiscernibility of identicals is incompatible with geach's theory of 'relative' identity, But consistent with the view that x is identical with y iff x is the same a as y, For some count-Noun 'a'. 'x is the same a as y' expresses identity only if x is an a, Otherwise it is merely an equivalence relation.
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  50. Gerald Vision (1979). Relative Identity. International Studies in Philosophy 11:176-177.
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