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Relative Identity

Edited by A. P. Taylor (State University of New York, Buffalo)
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  1. E. J. Borowski (1975). Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100):271-276.
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  2. Massimiliano Carrara (2009). Relative Identity and the Number of Artifacts. Techné 13 (2):108-122.
    Relativists maintain that identity is always relative to a general term (RI). According to them, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz’s Law does not hold. For relativists RI is at least as good as the Fregean cardinality thesis (FC), which contends that an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept specifying what, in any specific case, counts as a unit. The same train of (...)
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  3. Harry Deutsch, Relative Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  4. Frederick Doeke (1982). Spatially Coinciding Objects. Ratio:10--24.
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  5. George Englebretsen (1982). Do We Need Relative Identity? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):91-93.
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  6. Richard H. Feldman (1981). Nicholas Griffin on Relative Identity. Dialogue 20 (02):365-375.
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  7. Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  8. P. Garbacz (2004). Subsumption and Relative Identity. Axiomathes 14 (4):341-360.
    This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute identity but (...)
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  9. Pawe? Garbacz (2002). Logics of Relative Identity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (1):27-50.
    This paper is the first part of an exploration into the logical properties of relative identity. After providing the semantic grounds for various monadic logics of relative identity, I define the minimal system and its nine extensions. It is suggested that despite their purely formal origin at least some of them may contain nontrivial philosophical insights. All logics are axiomatized by means of sound and complete sequent calculi. I show their affinities with existing formalizations.
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  10. Nicholas Griffin (1978). Relative Identity Relations: A Reply to Dr. Noonan. Mind 87 (348):576-581.
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  11. Nicholas Griffin (1977). Relative Identity. Clarendon Press.
    The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, (...)
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  12. E. J. Lowe (1986). Sortal Terms and Absolute Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):64 – 71.
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  13. Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  14. Uwe Meixner (2005). The Rationality of (a Form of) Relative Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):449–455.
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  15. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Identificational Sentences. Natural Language Semantics 21 (1):43-77.
    Based on the notion of a trope, this paper gives a novel analysis of identificational sentences such as 'this is Mary','this is a beautiful woman', 'this looks like Mary', or 'this is the same lump of clay, but not the same statue as that'.
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  16. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity. Noûs 47 (2):346-370.
    Philosophers who accept tropes generally agree that tropes act as the objects of reference of nominalizations of adjectives, such as 'Socrates’ wisdom' or 'the beauty of the landscape'. This paper argues that tropes play a further important role in the semantics of natural language, namely in the semantics of bare demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' in what in linguistics is called identificational sentences.
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  17. Jack Nelson (1970). Relative Identity. Noûs 4 (3):241-260.
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  18. H. W. Noonan (1980). Relative Identity: A Reply to Nicholas Griffin. Mind 89 (353):96-98.
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  19. Harold W. Noonan (1980). Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.
    ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...
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  20. Roy W. Perrett (2000). Libertarianism, Feminism, and Relative Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):383-395.
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  21. John Perry (1970). The Same F. Philosophical Review 79 (2):181-200.
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  22. Roland Puccetti (1978). Borowski on the Relative Identity of Persons. Mind 87 (346):262-263.
    Borowski ("identity and personal identity," "mind", Volume lxxxv, Number 340, October 1976, Pages 481-502) claims that if x's brain were successfully transplanted into y's body, Our judgment of who the survivor z really is would be relative to our interest in z: for example, If the body y is that of an athlete or film actor, We would say it is y if we are athletic coaches or film directors. This view completely overlooks that acting talents and athletic skills are (...)
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  23. Michael Rea (2003). Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity. Philosophia Christi 5 (2):431 - 445.
    The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ’three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else (...)
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  24. D. J. Saab, Culture as Mediator for What is Ready-to-Hand: A Phenomenological Exploration of Semantic Networks.
    Upon what philosophical foundation are semantic network graphs based? Does this foundation allow for the legitimization of other semantic networks and ontological diversity? How can we design our computational and informational systems to accommodate this ontological diversity and the variety of semantic networks? Are semantic networks segmentations of larger semantic landscapes? This paper explores semantic networks from a Heideggerian existentialist and phenomenological perspective. The analysis presented uses cultural schema theory to bridge the syntactic and lexical elements to the semantic and (...)
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  25. Leslie Stevenson (1972). Relative Identity and Leibniz's Law. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (87):155-158.
    The indiscernibility of identicals is incompatible with geach's theory of 'relative' identity, But consistent with the view that x is identical with y iff x is the same a as y, For some count-Noun 'a'. 'x is the same a as y' expresses identity only if x is an a, Otherwise it is merely an equivalence relation.
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  26. Xuefeng Wen (2007). A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Connective and a Partial Solution to the Paradox of Analysis. Studia Logica 85 (2):251 - 260.
    We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial (...)
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  27. John Zeimbekis (forthcoming). Digital Pictures, Sampling and Vagueness (The Ontology of Digital Pictures). Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    Digital pictures can be type-identical in respect of colours, shapes and sizes (allographic), but they are not tokens of notational systems, because the types under which they are identical have vague limits and do not meet the requirements for notational characters. Digital display devices are designed to instantiate only limited ranges of objective properties (light intensities, sizes and shapes). Those ranges keep differences in objective magnitudes below sensory discrimination thresholds, and thus define objective conditions sufficient, but not necessary, for the (...)
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  28. John Zeimbekis (2009). Phenomenal and Objective Size. Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (§2) We cannot (...)
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  29. E. M. Zemach (1982). Schematic Objects and Relative Identity. Noûs 16 (2):295-305.
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  30. Eddy M. Zemach (1974). In Defence of Relative Identity. Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):207 - 218.
    I defend a slightly modified version of geach's rule r, I.E., That although both a and b are g, It is possible for a to be the same f as b and a different h than b, Provided that the question whether a and b are the same g is undecidable. Answering those who object to relative identity I claim that they tacitly adhere to a false fregean view, I.E., That one cannot use a singular term to denote an entity (...)
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