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  1. Jonathan E. Adler (1987). Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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  2. Jonathan E. Adler (1981). Skepticism and Universalizability. Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.
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  3. Robert F. Almeder (2003). Defeating Skepticism. Philosophical Inquiry 25 (1-2):245-254.
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  4. Kelly Becker (2009). Contrastivism and Lucky Questions. Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
    There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, (...)
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  5. Alexander Bird (2001). Scepticism and Contrast Classes. Analysis 61 (2):97–107.
    1. Contextualism seeks to acknowledge the power of sceptical arguments while permitting to be true at least some of the assertions of knowledge and justification we commonly make. It seems to me now just as if I am in an office in Edinburgh. According to the sceptic the claim that I am in fact in an office in Edinburgh is unjustified, since there is no reason I can give for this belief that is not also consistent with (or undermined by) (...)
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  6. Tim Black (2002). RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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  7. Edward Craig (1989). Nozick and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version. Analysis 49 (4):161--2.
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  8. Simon D'Alfonso (2013). Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle. Logos and Episteme (4).
    The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how (...)
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  9. Iris Einheuser (2010). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Quantifying Over Everything. Dialectica 64 (2):237-246.
    A variant of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism appears to show that our quantifiers do not determinately range over absolutely everything. This paper argues that some recent attempts to respond to the quantificational skeptic are unsuccessful and offers an alternative response: the key to answering the skeptic is not to refute her argument but to realize that the argument's setup prevents it from being convincing to those it is directed at.
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  10. Theodore J. Everett (2006). Antiskeptical Conditionals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
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  11. Rolf A. George (1971). Scepticism and Contrast. Dialogue 10 (01):92-95.
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  12. John Greco (1994). Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of “Relevant Possibility”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):61-77.
    In this paper I defend a relevant possibilities approach against a familiar kind of skepticism, and I argue that virtue epistemology can provide a theoretical grounding for the kind of solutions that is offered. In the section that follows I outline both the skeptical problems and the solution. In the remaining sections I develop the proposal in more detail. If my argument is sound then the paper also constitutes an argument in favor of virtue epistemology.
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  13. John Greco (1993). How to Beat a Sceptic Without Begging the Question. Ratio 6 (1):1-15.
    In this paper I offer a solution to scepticism about the world which neither embraces idealism, nor ends in a stalemate, nor begs the question against the sceptic. In the first part of the paper I explicate the sceptical argument and try to show why it has real force. In the next part of the paper I propose a version of the relevant possibilities approach to scepticism. The central claim of the proposed solution is that a sceptical possibility undermines knowledge (...)
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  14. R. F. Harrod (1942). Memory. Mind 51 (January):47-68.
  15. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...)
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  16. Wesley H. Holliday (2012). Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.
    According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations of two versions of the (...)
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  17. Bredo C. Johnsen (1987). Relevant Alternatives and Demon Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):643-653.
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  18. Albert A. Johnstone (1991). Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously. State University of New York Press.
    Roughly characterized, solipsism is the skeptical thesis that there is no reason to think that anything exists other than oneself and one’s present experience. Since its inception in the reflections of Descartes, the thesis has taken three broad and sometimes overlapping forms: Internal World Solipsism that arises from an account of perception in terms of representations of an external world; Observed World Solipsism that arises from doubts as to the existence of what is not actually present sensuously in experience; Unreal (...)
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  19. Mylan Engel Jr (2004). What's Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox. Erkenntnis 61 (2/3):203 - 231.
    Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I don't know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I don't know that I am not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I don't know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as a absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend (...)
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  20. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 456-484.
  21. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  22. Kevin McCain (2008). The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 164 (2):185 - 200.
    Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding these criticisms, this formulation of epistemic conservatism has several (...)
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  23. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Deliberative Alternatives. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
    There are powerful skeptical challenges to the idea that we are free. And yet, it seems simply impossible for us to shake the sense that we really are free. Some are convinced that the skeptical challenges are insurmountable and resign themselves to living under an illusion, while others argue that the challenges can be met. Even among those who believe that our sense of ourselves as free is at least roughly accurate, there are deep differences of opinion concerning what freedom (...)
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  24. Robert Nozick (1978). Abstracts of Symposium Paper: Knowledge and Skepticism. Noûs 12 (1):53 -.
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  25. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism. Social Epistemology 22 (3):305 – 323.
    I offer a critical treatment of the contrastivist response to the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, I argue that if contrastivism is understood along externalist lines then it is unnecessary, while if it is understood along internalist lines then it is intellectually dissatisfying. Moreover, I claim that a closer examination of the conditions under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge reveals that we can accommodate many of the intuitions appealed to by contrastivists without having to opt for this (...)
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  26. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
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  27. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic <span class='Hi'>luck</span> plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not (...)
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  28. Duncan Pritchard (2002). Recent Work on Radical Skepticism. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
    This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this (...)
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  29. Steven Rieber (1998). Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation. Noûs 32 (2):189-204.
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  30. Eisuke Sakakibara (2013). Incarnating Kripke's Skepticism About Meaning. Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-291.
    Although Kripke’s skepticism leads to the conclusion that meaning does not exist, his argument relies upon the supposition that more than one interpretation of words is consistent with linguistic evidence. Relying solely on metaphors, he assumes that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations without providing any strict proof. In his book The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant pointed out that there are serious obstacles to this thesis and concluded that the skeptic’s nonstandard interpretations are “will o’ wisps.” In (...)
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  31. Basil Smith (2006). Epistemic Luck, by Duncan Pritchard. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (2):291-295.
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  32. G. C. Stine (1976). Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
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  33. Jonathan Vogel (1999). The New Relevant Alternatives Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):155-180.
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  34. Palle Yourgrau (1983). Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives. Synthese 55 (2):175 - 190.
    Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (by the preferred means) (...)
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  35. T. E. Zimmermann (1999). Scepticism de Se. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):267-275.
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