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  1. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  2. Mark Alfano (2009). Sensitivity Theory and the Individuation of Belief-Formation Methods. Erkenntnis 70 (2):271 - 281.
    In this paper it is argued that sensitivity theory suffers from a fatal defect. Sensitivity theory is often glossed as: (1) S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. As Nozick showed in his pioneering work on sensitivity theory, this formulation needs to be supplemented by a further counterfactual condition: (2) S knows that p only if S would believe p if p were true. Nozick further showed that the theory needs a (...)
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  3. James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
    In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.
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  4. Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen (2013). Yes, Safety is in Danger. Philosophia (2):1-14.
    In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...)
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  5. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2012). Epistemic Dispositions. Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.
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  6. Simon D'Alfonso (2013). Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle. Logos and Episteme (4).
    The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how (...)
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  7. Evan Fales (2004). Proper Basicality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):373–383.
    Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, I argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.
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  8. Paul Faulkner (2013). Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8):121-138.
    Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to (...)
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  9. Branden Fitelson, Likelihoods, Counterfactuals, and Tracking.
    Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References..
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  10. Delia Graff Fara (2002). An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):127-142.
    Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. (...)
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  11. Gary Hatfield (1986). Cognition and Epistemic Reliability: Comments on Goldman. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:312 - 318.
    The paper provisionally accepts the goal of Goldman's primary epistemics, which is to seek reliability values for basic cognitive processes, and questions whether such values may plausibly be expected. The reliability of such processes as perception and memory is dependent on other aspects of cognitive structure, and especially on one's "conceptual scheme," the evaluation of which goes beyond primary epistemics (and its dependence on cognitive science) to social epistemics, or indeed to traditional epistemology and philosophy of science. Two general arguments (...)
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  12. John Heil (1984). Reliability and Epistemic Merit. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):327 – 338.
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  13. Joachim Horvath (2009). Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non-instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non-instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than mere true (...)
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  14. Valeriano Iranzo (2006). Justificación y perspectiva epistémica. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (1):21-36.
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  15. Peter D. Klein (1976). Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.
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  16. J. J. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
  17. Jonathan Kvanvig (1996). Plantinga's Proper Function Account of Warrant. In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
    Plantinga thus offers an approach that begins by assessing the faculties or abilities of a cognitive system or agent. Once such an assessment is complete, the epistemologist is in a position to infer the epistemic status of the doxastic products of those faculties or abilities.
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  18. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). ``How to Be a Reliabilist&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 23:189-198.
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  19. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme.
    The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try (...)
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  20. Diego E. Machuca (2012). Review of S. Goldberg, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (OUP, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 32 (6):468-470.
  21. A. Millar & A. Haddock, Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than (...)
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  22. Luca Moretti (2012). Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: OUP (2009). [REVIEW] Mind 121 (484):1069-1073.
  23. Carolyn R. Morillo (1984). Epistemic Luck, Naturalistic Epistemology and the Ecology of Knowledge or What the Frog Should Have Told Dretske. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.
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  24. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge and Reliability. In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
    Internalists have criticised reliabilism for overlooking the importance of the subject's point of view in the generation of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a troubling ambiguity in the intuitive examples that internalists have used to make their case, and on either way of resolving this ambiguity, reliabilism is untouched. However, the argument used to defend reliabilism against the internalist cases could also be used to defend a more radical form of externalism in epistemology.
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  25. Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
    Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and driven (...)
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  26. S. Orestis Palermos (2013). Knowledge and Cognitive Integration. Synthese (8):1-21.
    Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of (...)
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  27. David H. Sanford (1981). Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on the wrong track. (...)
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  28. Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander & Jonathan Weinberg (2008). The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):138-155.
    A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case (...)
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  29. John Turri (forthcoming). From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments. In Tbd (ed.), TBD.
    I review several theoretical and empirical developments relevant to assessing contemporary virtue epistemology’s theory of knowledge. What emerges is a leaner theory of knowledge that is more empirically adequate, better captures the ordinary conception of knowledge, and is ripe for cross-fertilization with cognitive science. I call this view abilism. Along the way I identify several topics for future research.
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  30. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...)
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  31. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.
    Vogel (2000) argues that bootstrapping poses a novel problem for reliabilist theories of knowledge. According to the reliabilist, a true belief is knowledge just in case it was formed by a reliable process, even if one does not know that the process is reliable. Vogel argues that reliabilism allows one to gain knowledge of a source’s reliability in an intuitively illicit way, using the deliverances of the source itself. Cohen (2002; 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and others have argued that bootstrapping (...)
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