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  1. Frederick Adams & David Kline (1987). Nomic Reliabilism: Weak Reliability is Not Enough. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):433-443.
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  2. Kent Bach (1985). A Rationale for Reliabilism. The Monist 68 (2):246-263.
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  3. Adrian Bardon (2007). Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction. Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):45–64.
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  4. Kelly Becker (2006). Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? Dialectica 60 (1):79–84.
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  5. Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
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  6. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Developmental Process Reliabilism: On Justification, Defeat, and Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.
    Here I present and defend an etiological theory of objective, doxastic justification, and related theories of defeat and evidence. The theory is intended to solve a problem for reliabilist epistemologies— the problem of identifying relevant environments for assessing a process's reliability. It is also intended to go some way to accommodating, neutralizing, or explaining away many internalist-friendly elements in our epistemic thinking.
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  7. J. R. Beebe (2004). Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties. Synthese 140 (3):307 - 329.
    According to the thought experiment most commonly used to argue against reliabilism, Mr. Truetemp is given an unusual but reliable cognitive faculty. Since he is unaware of the existence of this faculty, its deliverances strike him as rather odd. Many think that Truetemp would not have justified beliefs. Since he satisfies the reliabilist conditions for justified belief, reliabilism appears to be mistaken. I argue that the Truetemp case is underdescribed and that this leads readers to make erroneous assumptions about Truetemp's (...)
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  8. James R. Beebe (2001). Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):163-186.
    One branch of Alvin Goldman's proposed "scientific epistemology" is devoted to the scientific study of how folk epistemic evaluators acquire and deploy the concepts of knowledge and justified belief. The author argues that such a "descriptive epistemology," as Goldman calls it, requires a more sophisticated theory of interpretation than is provided by the simulation theory Goldman adopts. The author also argues that any adequate account of folk epistemic concepts must reconstruct the intersubjective conceptual roles those concepts play in discursive practices. (...)
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  9. Sven Bernecker (2008). Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):164–172.
    This paper argues that John Greco’s agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double requirement of accounting for the internalist intuition that knowledge requires sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence and evading the charge of psychological implausibility.
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  10. Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
    The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S's belief, B, is justified on the basis of S's knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly (but not perfectly) reliable way of reasoning, R. The (...)
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  11. Michael A. Bishop (2000). In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be? Synthese 122 (1-2):179 - 208.
    Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I (...)
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  12. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  13. Marcel Boumans (2004). The Reliability of an Instrument. Social Epistemology 18 (2 & 3):215 – 246.
    Scientific measurements are made objective through the use of reliable instruments. Instruments can have this function because they can - as material objects - be investigated independently of the specific measurements at hand. However, their materiality appears to be crucial for the assessment of their reliability. The usual strategies to investigate an instrument’s reliability depend on and assume possibilities of control, and control is usually specified in terms of materiality of the instrument and environment. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  14. Robert B. Brandom (1998). Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism. The Monist 81 (3):371-392.
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  15. Daniel Breyer & John Greco (2008). Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):173–184.
    This paper responds to Sven Bernecker’s argument that agent reliabilism cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about clarvoyance cases. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker’s objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for (...)
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  16. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For some (...)
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  17. Berit Brogaard (2006). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge (...)
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  18. J. Brown (2000). Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.
    I consider whether one particular anti-individualist claim, the doctrine of object-dependent thoughts (DODT), is compatible with the Principle of Privileged Access, or PPA, which states that, in general, a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her thought contents. The standard defence of the compatibility of anti-individualism and PPA emphasises the reliability of the process which produces a subject's second order beliefs about her thought contents. I examine whether this defence can be applied to DODT, given that DODT generates the possibility (...)
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  19. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  20. Albert Casullo (1992). Causality, Reliabilism, and Mathematical Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):557-584.
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  21. Albert Casullo (1988). Revisability, Reliabilism, and a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):187-213.
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  22. James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115–137.
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
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  23. James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137.
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
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  24. Paul M. Churchland (2001). What Happens to Reliabilism When It Is Liberated From the Propositional Attitudes? Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):91-112.
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  25. Murray Clarke (2000). Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:75-82.
    It has been suggested, recently and not so recently, by a number of analytic epistemologists that reliabilist and externalist accounts of justification and knowledge are inadequate responses to the goals of traditional epistemology and other goals of inquiry. But philosophers of science decry reliabilism and externalism because they are connected to traditional, analytic epistemology, an outmoded and utopian form of inquiry. Clearly, both groups of critics cannot be right. I think both groups are guilty of conceptual confusions that, once clarified, (...)
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  26. Stewart Cohen (2003). Greco's Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):437–443.
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  27. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  28. Juan Comesaña (2009). What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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  29. Rebecca Copenhaver (2004). Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response. Philosophical Review 113 (4):574-577.
  30. Dan D. Crawford (2002). Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
    When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model (...)
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  31. Terence Cuneo (2004). Review of Philip De Bary: Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response. [REVIEW] Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (2):194-199.
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  32. Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger (2012). Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
    Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional (...)
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  33. Philip de Bary (2002). Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response. Routledge.
    This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors.
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  34. Sinan Dogramaci (2012). Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
    This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
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  35. Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  36. Jeffrey Dunn (2012). Reliabilism: Holistic or Simple? [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (3):225-233.
    Simple versions of Reliabilism about justification say that S's believing that p is justified if and only if the belief was produced by a belief-forming process that is reliable above some high threshold. Alvin Goldman, in Epistemology and Cognition, argues for a more complex version of the view according to which it is total epistemic systems that are assessed for reliability, rather than individual processes. Why prefer this more complex version of Reliabilism? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, it seems that (...)
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  37. Jane Duran (1988). Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory. Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
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  38. Richard Feldman (1989). Goldman on Epistemology and Cognitive Science. Philosophia 19 (2-3):197-207.
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  39. Michael J. Fitzgerald (2003). The Medieval Roots of Reliabilist Epistemology: Albert of Saxony's View of Immediate Apprehension. Synthese 136 (3):409 - 434.
    In the essay I first argue that Albert ofSaxony's defense of perceptual ``directrealism'' is in fact a forerunner of contemporaryforms of ``process reliabilist''epistemologies. Second, I argue that Albert's defenseof perceptual direct realism has aninteresting consequence for his philosophy oflanguage. His semantic notion of `naturalsignification' does not require any semanticintermediary entity called a `concept' or`description', to function as the directsignificatum of written or spoken termsfor them to designate perceptual objects. AlthoughAlbert is inspired by Ockham's mentalact theory, I conclude that Albert seemsto (...)
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  40. Richard Foley (1985). What's Wrong With Reliabilism? The Monist 68 (2):188-202.
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  41. Bruce Freed (1988). Book Review:Epistemology and Cognition Alvin I. Goldman. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 55 (3):479-.
  42. Roger Gallie (2003). Review: Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):518-521.
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  43. R. Douglas Geivett (2003). Is "Simple Reliabilism" Adequately Motivated? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):444–450.
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  44. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Critical Study of Goldberg's Relying on Others. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (1):81-88.
    This critical study of Sanford Goldberg's Relying on Others focuses on the book's central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes relevant for assessing the reliability of a hearer's testimonial belief include the cognitive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
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  45. Carl Ginet (1992). Causal Theories in Epistemology. In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  46. Carl Ginet (1985). Contra Reliabilism. The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
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  47. Gary Gleb (1990). The Trouble with Goldman's Reliabilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):382 – 394.
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  48. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  49. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  50. Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘tracking’ theories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly to refer to process reliabilism (...)
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