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  1. Mathew Abbott (2010). The Poetic Experience of the World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):493-516.
    In this article I develop Heidegger's phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher's work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language's designative and world-disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein's absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world's existence in such (...)
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  2. Jonathan E. Adler (1983). A Note on Defeasibility and Skepticism. Philosophia 12 (3-4):299-305.
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  3. David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  4. Robert Almeder (2006). Review: Claudine Tiercelin. Le Doute En Question: Parades Pragmatistes au D�Fi Sceptique (Doubt in Question: Pragmatist Responses to the Challenge of Skepticism). Paris & Tel-Aviv: Editions de l'Eclat, 2005. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):282-289.
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  5. Majid Amini & Christopher M. Caldwell (2011). Boghossian's Refutation of Relativism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):79-103.
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  6. Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (2012). Do We Know (Almost) Nothing? Global Scepticism and Justification. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):91-109.
    According to the minimal version of the traditional analysis of knowledge, there are (at least) three necessary components to knowledge, that is, truth, belief and justification. In this paper we will argue that even in a global sceptical scenario, all three conditions minimally necessary for knowledge can be satisfied. In particular, we will focus on the justification requirement and analyse two “traditional” theories of justification, i.e., coherentism and foundationalism, as well as a more “innovative” one, i.e., reliabilism. Then, we will (...)
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  7. Michael Andolina (1987). The Refutation of Scepticism. Idealistic Studies 17 (3):278-279.
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  8. Dan Arnold (2001). How to Do Things with Candrakirti: A Comparative Study in Anti-Skepticism. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):247-279.
    Two strikingly similar critiques of epistemological foundationalism are examined: J. L. Austin's critique of A. J. Ayer in the former's "Sense and Sensibilia," and part of Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga in the first chapter of the "Prasannapadā." With respect to Austin, it is argued that his writings on epistemology in fact relate quite closely to his better-known philosophy of speech acts, and that the appeal to ordinary language is part of a transcendental argument against the possibility of radical skepticism. It (...)
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  9. Yuval Avnur (2012). Closure Reconsidered. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
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  10. Yuval Avnur (2011). An Old Problem for the New Rationalism. Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
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  11. Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2011). No Closure On Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  12. Guy Axtell (2008). Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments for improving (...)
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  13. Guy Axtell (2006). Blind Man's Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-Skeptical Stratagem. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  14. Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1984). Scepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell.
  15. Frank Barel (2012). Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):21-43.
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  16. Gerald W. Barnes (1973). Unger's Defense of Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 24 (2):119 - 124.
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  17. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  18. Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  19. William Berkson (1979). Skeptical Rationalism. Inquiry 22 (1-4):281 – 320.
    To improve our methods of rational inquiry and decision-making we need to recognize that such methods should guide but not fully determine the choices of individuals. Failure to acknowledge the essential incompleteness of rational methods made the methods of Classical Rationalism quite impractical and opened them to skeptical refutation. Mitigated Skepticism and Fideism failed to correct the error, and as a result put undesirable limits on rational inquiry. When the guiding character of rational methods is recognized, existing methods of scientific (...)
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  20. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Defending Contrastivism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):59-64.
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  21. Ralph Mason Blake (1924). A Criticism of Scepticism and Relativism. Journal of Philosophy 21 (10):253-272.
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  22. William S. Boardman (1978). Conclusive Reasons and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):32 – 40.
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  23. James Bogen (1985). Traditional Epistemology and Naturalistic Replies to its Skeptical Critics. Synthese 64 (2):195 - 224.
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  24. Paul Boghossian (2012). Reply to Amini and Caldwell, Boghossians Refutation of Relativism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):45-49.
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  25. Inga Bostad (2011). The Life and Learning of Arne Naess: Scepticism as a Survival Strategy. Inquiry 54 (1):42-51.
    ABSTRACT It is obvious that Arne Naess had his most important philosophical experience, and quite possibly made his most significant achievement, in confrontation with the variety of philosophical scepticism known as Pyrrhonism. Naess maintained, however, that he did not defend scepticism as a philosophical position, and he was concerned to distinguish Pyrrhonism from the inverse form of dogmatism often associated with the term ?scepticism?. Naess was primarily preoccupied with the practical implications of this radical form of scepticism, in which he (...)
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  26. Michael S. Brady (2002). Skepticism, Normativity, and Practical Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):403-412.
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  27. Jason Bridges, Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly so Called.
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  28. Anthony Brueckner (2011). Idealism and Scepticism. Theoria 77 (4):368-371.
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
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  29. Anthony Brueckner (2010). Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    The guiding questions of this volume are: Can we have knowledge of the external world of things outside our minds?
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  30. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):733–736.
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  31. Anthony Brueckner (1994). Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
  32. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  33. Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  34. Anthony L. Brueckner (1987). Begging the Skeptic's Question. Philosophia 17 (4):523-529.
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  35. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Why Nozick is a Sceptic. Mind 93 (370):259-264.
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  36. Reid Buchanan (2002). Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis of Scepticism. Synthese 131 (1):57 - 80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'''' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'''' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif (...)
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  37. John Burkey (1990). Descartes, Skepticism, and Husserl's Hermeneutic Practice. Husserl Studies 7 (1):1-27.
    In the preceding pages, Husserl's objections to the content of Descartes'Meditations on First Philosophy have been reconstructed over the line ofargument in that work. The tone of his interpretation moved from ambivalence to outfight rejection. Husserl's ambivalence manifested itself intwo of the three meditations to which he pays significant attention. We sawthe much heralded methodological strategy of the First Meditation, uponclose examination, is not endorsed by Husserl, that he finds reason toprotest (...)
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  38. Panayot Butchvarov (1994). The Untruth and the Truth of Skepticism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):41 - 61.
    The skepticism I propose to discuss concerns the reality of an external world of perceivable material objects. There are three questions our skeptic may ask. The first is nonmodal and nonepistemic: Are some of the objects we perceive real? The second is also nonmodal but epistemic: Do we know, or at least have evidence, that some of the objects we perceive are real? The third is both modal and epistemic: Can we know, or at least have evidence, that some of (...)
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  39. Panayot K. Butchvarov (1998). Skepticism About the External World. New York: Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important and perennially debated philosophical questions is whether we can have knowledge of the external world. Butchvarov here considers whether and how skepticism with regard to such knowledge can be refuted or at least answered. He argues that only a direct realist view of perception has any hope of providing a compelling response to the skeptic and introduces the radical innovation that the direct object of perceptual, and even dreaming and hallucinatory, experience is always a material (...)
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  40. Keith Butler (2000). Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
  41. V. C. C. (1955). Scepticism and Animal Faith. Review of Metaphysics 9 (2):363-363.
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  42. Christopher M. Caldwell & Majid Amini (2011). Boghossian's Refutation of Relativism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):79-103.
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  43. John J. Callanan (2011). Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti-Scepticism. Theoria 77 (3):261-278.
    Strawson's philosophical attitude towards scepticism is frequently thought to have undergone a significant shift from the “strong” or “robust” employment of transcendental arguments in Individuals to a more “modest” understanding of the efficacy of such arguments in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. I argue that this interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the function of transcendental arguments in Strawson's earlier works. Examining the continuity of Strawson's modest naturalistic approach to scepticism can offer some insight as to the continuing overestimation (...)
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  44. Joseph Campbell (2010). Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.
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  45. James Cargile (2000). Skepticism and Possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):157-171.
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  46. James Cargile (1972). In Reply to a Defense of Skepticism. Philosophical Review 81 (2):229-236.
  47. Nathan P. Carson (2013). Passionate Epistemology: Kierkegaard on Skepticism, Approximate Knowledge, and Higher Existential Truth. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (1):29-49.
    In this article, I probe the extent of Kierkegaard's skepticism and irrationalism by examining the nature and limits of his “objective” and “approximate” knowledge. I argue that, for Kierkegaard, certain objective knowledge of contingent being is impossible and “approximate” knowledge of the same is funded by the volitional passion of belief. But, while Kierkegaard endorses severe epistemic restrictions, he rejects wholesale skepticism, allowing for genuine “approximate” knowledge of mind-independent reality. However, I further argue that we cannot ignore his criticisms of (...)
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  48. A. J. Cascardi (1984). Skepticism and Deconstruction. Philosophy and Literature 8 (1):1-14.
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  49. Stanley Cavell (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. University of Chicago Press.
    These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
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  50. David Chalmers (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford University Press.
    Uncorrected proofs for Constructing the World (contents, introduction, chapter 1, and first excursus).
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