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  1. William Alston (1981). ``Level Confusions in Epistemology&Quot. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:135-150.
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  2. William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
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  3. P. Aubenque & R. S. Walker (1985). Truth and Skepticism: On the Limits of a Philosophical Refutation of Skepticism. Diogenes 33 (132):95-106.
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  4. G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1988). Scepticism, Rules & Language. Noûs 22 (4):618-624.
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  5. Dorit Bar-On (1990). Scepticism: The External World and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):207 - 231.
    In this paper, I compare and contrast two kinds of scepticism, Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Quinean scepticism about meaning. I expose Quine's metaphysical claim that there are no facts of the matter about meaning as a sceptical response to a sceptical problem regarding the possibility of our knowledge of meanings. I argue that this sceptical response is overkill; for the sceptical problem about our knowledge of meanings may receive a treatment similar to the naturalistic treatment Quine himself (...)
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  6. David James Barnett (2014). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
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  7. William Barrett (1939). On the Existence of an External World. Journal of Philosophy 36 (13):346-354.
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  8. Cameron Boult (2013). Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination. Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.
    Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two arguments. I (...)
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  9. William F. Bristow (2005). Bildung and the Critique of Modern Skepticism in McDowell and Hegel. Internationales Jahrbuck des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 3:179-207.
  10. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.
  11. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
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  12. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Two Transcendental Arguments Concerning Self-Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  13. Otávio Bueno (2010). Davison on Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic. Principia 9 (1-2):1-18.
    In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory (...)
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  14. Tyler Burge (2003). Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  15. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). The Problem of the Criterion. Milwaukee,Marquette University Press.
  16. Maciej Chlewicki (2008). What the Skeptic Doubts. Dialogue and Universalism 18 (1/3):87-92.
    The paper offers a critical analysis of the skeptic’s conviction that his doubts about the truth of thought on existence of the world outside the mind are not equivalent to real the doubts about existence of the world alone, but they are only a theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge. The main case of this criticism is based on the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy, precisely, on his theory of truth.
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  17. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic (...)
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  18. William Lane Craig (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):291–295.
  19. Cora Diamond (1985). Scepticism, Rules and Language. Philosophical Books 26 (1):26-29.
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  20. Sinan Dogramaci (2014). A Problem for Rationalist Responses to Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.
    Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...)
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  21. Fred Dretske (2004). Externalism and Modest Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173 - 186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  22. Gavin G. Enck (2014). I Talked to a Genius and All I Got Was Knowledge. Philosophia 42 (2):335-347.
    Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this (...)
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  23. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2013). On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Ṭūsī's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  24. Robert J. Fogelin (1999). The Sceptic's Burden. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):159 – 172.
    The basic thesis ofMichaelWilliams'book Unnatural Doubts is that sceptical doubts, at least of a Cartesian variety, are neither natural nor intuitive, but are, instead, the product of 'contentious and possibly dispensable theoretical preconceptions'. In particular, for Williams, scepticism arises because of a commitment to what he calls 'epistemic realism'. A fundamental thesis of my book Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification is that scepticism (in its most challenging forms) is not based upon such prior theoretical commitments, but rather is the (...)
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  25. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 15. Closure and Skepticism. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 81-85.
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  26. Paul Forster (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common Sense: Moore's Confidence in His 'Proof of an External World'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):163 – 195.
    (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common sense: Moore's confidence in his ‘proof of an external world’1. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 163-195.
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  27. G. Galloway (1920). Idealism and the External World. Mind 29 (113):72-76.
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  28. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  29. John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416 - 436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers (...)
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  30. Susan Haack (1979). Fallibilism and Necessity. Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.
    Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.
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  31. Mark Heller (1999). Relevant Alternatives and Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
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  32. Christopher Hookway (1999). Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts: A Reply to Stroud. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press. 173--87.
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  33. Bredo C. Johnsen (2009). The Argument for Radical Skepticism Concerning the External World. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):679-693.
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  34. John Kekes (1976). A Justification of Rationality. State University of New York Press.
    I "Things /a/I apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is looted upon the world, The hlood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of ...
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  35. John Kekes (1971). Skepticism and External Questions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):325-340.
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  36. Kristijan Krkač (2002). Michael Williams: Problems of Knowledge. Prolegomena 1 (1):78-81.
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  37. Eunjin Lee (2008). Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
    My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we (...)
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  38. Keith Lehrer (2000). Reid, God and Epistemology. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):357-372.
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  39. Adam Leite (2004). Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232 - 251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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  40. David A. C. Macarthur (1999). Skeptical Reason and Inner Experience: A Re-Examination of the Problem of the External World. Dissertation, Harvard University
    In contrast to the recent trend of taking external world skepticism as a narrow problem for a demanding conception of "objective" or "certain" knowledge about the world, my thesis offers a re-examination of the distinctively perceptual basis of the skeptical problem. On my view the skeptic challenges the very possibility of rationally justifying beliefs in so far as they are based on sense experience, a characterization that helps to explain the continuity into the modern period of the ancient skeptical challenge (...)
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  41. Alastair M. Macleod (1965). Moore's Proof. Analysis 25 (4):154 - 160.
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  42. P. D. Magnus (2008). Reid's Defense of Common Sense. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (3):1-14.
    Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...)
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  43. Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  44. Norman Malcolm (1977). Thought and Knowledge: Essays. Cornell University Press.
    Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking.--Thoughtless brutes.--Descartes' proof that he is essentially a non-material thing.--Behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology.--The privacy of experience.--Wittgenstein on the nature of mind.--The myth of cognitive processes and structures.--Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know."--The groundlessness of belief.
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  45. Marie McGinn (1993). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism by Michael Williams. Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):211-215.
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  46. Abraham Meidan (1987). Arguments for Skepticism. In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 17--20.
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  47. G. E. Moore (2003). 23. Proof of an External World. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 227.
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  48. Jennifer Nagel (2005). Contemporary Scepticism and the Cartesian God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):465-497.
    Descartes claims that God is both incomprehensible and yet clearly and distinctly understood. This paper argues that Descartes’s development of the contrast between comprehension and understanding makes the role of God in his epistemology more interesting than is commonly thought. Section one examines the historical context of sceptical arguments about the difficulty of knowing God. Descartes describes the recognition of our inability to comprehend God as itself a source of knowledge of him; section two aims to explain how recognizing limits (...)
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  49. John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
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  50. Ram Neta (1997). The Instability of Skepticism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    According to "skepticism about the external world", one cannot know whether there are any things that have these two characteristics: they exist, or occur, at, or come from, some place, and they might have existed even had no one been conscious of them. In attempting to show that one cannot know whether or not there are any such things, the skeptic appeals to the alleged fact that one cannot rule out various possibilities, e.g., the possibility that one is dreaming. But, (...)
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