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  1. William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
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  2. Robert J. Fogelin (1999). The Sceptic's Burden. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):159 – 172.
    The basic thesis ofMichaelWilliams'book Unnatural Doubts is that sceptical doubts, at least of a Cartesian variety, are neither natural nor intuitive, but are, instead, the product of 'contentious and possibly dispensable theoretical preconceptions'. In particular, for Williams, scepticism arises because of a commitment to what he calls 'epistemic realism'. A fundamental thesis of my book Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification is that scepticism (in its most challenging forms) is not based upon such prior theoretical commitments, but rather is the (...)
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  3. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 15. Closure and Skepticism. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press 81-85.
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  4. Paul Forster (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common Sense: Moore's Confidence in His 'Proof of an External World'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):163 – 195.
    (2008). Neither Dogma nor Common sense: Moore's confidence in his ‘proof of an external world’1. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 163-195.
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  5. G. Galloway (1920). Idealism and the External World. Mind 29 (113):72-76.
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  6. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  7. John Greco (2009). Skepticism and Internalism. Iris 1 (2):429-438.
    This paper explores a familiar skeptical problematic and considers some strategies for responding to it. Section 1 reconstructs and disambiguates the skeptical problematic, distinguishing between some importantly different lines of skeptical reasoning. Section 2 distinguishes two kinds of anti-skeptical strategy. “Cooperative strategies” accept the conditions on knowledge that are laid down by a target skeptical argument, and argue that those conditions can be satisfied in a relevant domain. “Critical strategies” respond to a skeptical argument by rejecting some condition on knowledge (...)
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  8. John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416 - 436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers (...)
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  9. Susan Haack (1979). Fallibilism and Necessity. Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.
    Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.
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  10. Mark Heller (1999). Relevant Alternatives and Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
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  11. Jon Hendrix (2007). Wittgenstein, Kripkenstein, and the Skeptical Paradox. Dissertation, University of Florida
    Title from title page of source document.
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  12. Christopher Hookway (1999). Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts: A Reply to Stroud. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press 173--87.
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  13. Bredo C. Johnsen (2009). The Argument for Radical Skepticism Concerning the External World. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):679-693.
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  14. John Kekes (1976). A Justification of Rationality. State University of New York Press.
    I "Things /a/I apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is looted upon the world, The hlood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of ...
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  15. John Kekes (1971). Skepticism and External Questions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):325-340.
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  16. Kristijan Krkač (2002). Michael Williams: Problems of Knowledge. Prolegomena 1 (1):78-81.
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  17. Eunjin Lee (2008). Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
    My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we (...)
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  18. Keith Lehrer (2000). Reid, God and Epistemology. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):357-372.
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  19. Adam Leite (2004). Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232 - 251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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  20. Adam Joaquim Leite (2000). Reasonable Doubts: Skepticism and the Structure of Empirical Justification. Dissertation, Harvard University
    My dissertation aims to understand external world skepticism and its place in our epistemic lives. I propose that the best way to investigate skepticism is to seek the strongest possible argument in its favor. In order to determine what requirements such an argument would have to meet, I develop and defend a novel contextualist account of empirical justification. This account involves four theses. In order to be justified in holding a belief, one must ordinarily be able to justify holding it, (...)
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  21. Douglas C. Long (1975). Other Minds. Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  22. David Macarthur (1999). Skeptical Reason and Inner Experience: A Re-Examination of the Problem of the External World. Dissertation, Harvard University
    In contrast to the recent trend of taking external world skepticism as a narrow problem for a demanding conception of "objective" or "certain" knowledge about the world, my thesis offers a re-examination of the distinctively perceptual basis of the skeptical problem. On my view the skeptic challenges the very possibility of rationally justifying beliefs in so far as they are based on sense experience, a characterization that helps to explain the continuity into the modern period of the ancient skeptical challenge (...)
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  23. Alastair M. Macleod (1965). Moore's Proof. Analysis 25 (4):154 - 160.
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  24. P. D. Magnus (2008). Reid's Defense of Common Sense. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (3):1-14.
    Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...)
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  25. Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  26. Norman Malcolm (1977). Thought and Knowledge: Essays. Cornell University Press.
    Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking.--Thoughtless brutes.--Descartes' proof that he is essentially a non-material thing.--Behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology.--The privacy of experience.--Wittgenstein on the nature of mind.--The myth of cognitive processes and structures.--Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know."--The groundlessness of belief.
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  27. Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol (2012). La naturalidad del escepticismo. Principia 16 (2):277-295.
    In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is (...)
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  28. Kevin McCain (2016). The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach. Springer.
    This book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the epistemology of science. It not only introduces readers to the general epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge, but also provides key insights into the particular nuances of scientific knowledge. No prior knowledge of philosophy or science is assumed by The Nature of Scientific Knowledge. Nevertheless, the reader is taken on a journey through several core concepts of epistemology and philosophy of science that not only explores the characteristics of the (...)
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  29. Marie McGinn (1993). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism by Michael Williams. Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):211-215.
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  30. Abraham Meidan (1987). Arguments for Skepticism. In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers 17--20.
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  31. Mark Migotti (2001). Michael Hymers, Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (3):182-184.
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  32. Boaz Miller (2016). What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.
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  33. G. E. Moore (2003). 23. Proof of an External World. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman 227.
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  34. Jennifer Nagel (2005). Contemporary Scepticism and the Cartesian God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):465-497.
    Descartes claims that God is both incomprehensible and yet clearly and distinctly understood. This paper argues that Descartes’s development of the contrast between comprehension and understanding makes the role of God in his epistemology more interesting than is commonly thought. Section one examines the historical context of sceptical arguments about the difficulty of knowing God. Descartes describes the recognition of our inability to comprehend God as itself a source of knowledge of him; section two aims to explain how recognizing limits (...)
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  35. John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
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  36. Esther Adouth Nepomechie (1993). Skepticism: An Overview. Dissertation, University of Miami
    This is an historical account of epistemological skepticism. The first two chapters are expository in nature. To some degree, so is the third chapter. Chapter IV deals with Peter Unger's revival of skepticism. I argue against his views and conclude that on the one hand, his classical argument is no improvement over Descartes's skeptical argument of the First Meditation, and that his second and third arguments are flawed. Chapter V examines two different current strategies against the skeptic: a revival of (...)
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  37. Ram Neta (1997). The Instability of Skepticism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    According to "skepticism about the external world", one cannot know whether there are any things that have these two characteristics: they exist, or occur, at, or come from, some place, and they might have existed even had no one been conscious of them. In attempting to show that one cannot know whether or not there are any such things, the skeptic appeals to the alleged fact that one cannot rule out various possibilities, e.g., the possibility that one is dreaming. But, (...)
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  38. Martha Craven Nussbaum (1991). Skeptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in Ancient Skepticism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (4):521-557.
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  39. Paul J. Olscamp (1965). Wittgenstein's Refutation of Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):239-247.
  40. Maybelle Padua (2012). The Skeptic’s Passion. Philosophia 41 (1).
    This paper aims at understanding the condition of the skeptic as skeptical. Using the mechanism of cognition argued by Aquinas, which explains how cognitions are connected with dispositions and affections, it tries to unlock the skeptic’s disposition to doubt as something willed. Culling insights from Wittgenstein, this essay points to certainty as a necessity for the person who wishes to live without the constant apprehension of doubt and pervasive suspicion of others. It concludes with an analysis of the skeptic’s need (...)
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  41. V. I. Part (2010). Responses to Skepticism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge
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  42. Roger Penrose (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Winner of the Wolf Prize for his contribution to our understanding of the universe, Penrose takes on the question of whether artificial intelligence will ever ...
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  43. August Piper Jr (1999). A Skeptic Considers, Then Responds to Cheit. Ethics and Behavior 9 (4):277 – 293.
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  44. John Post, Minimal Epistemology: BeyondTerminal Philosophy to Truth (Latest Working Title).
    . In whatever form, terminal philosophy holds that some matters are so fundamental that they are presupposed in any practice of reason-giving; accordingly, if reason-giving were applied to such matters in order to justify them, or even to criticize, then the very attempt to do so would necessarily assume what is at issue, a fatal circularity . No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality ; rational reason-giving must terminate.
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  45. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge. Principia 4 (2):187-214.
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued (...)
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  46. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Anti-Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge. Iris 1 (2):419-428.
    It is argued that the debate regarding radical scepticism needs to be conducted in the light of a value-theoretic methodological constraint. It is further shown that such a methodological constraint raises some uncomfortable problems for the main anti-sceptical proposals in the literature.
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  47. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
    It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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  48. Duncan Pritchard, Contemporary Skepticism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  49. Duncan Pritchard (2000). Doubt Undogmatized. Principia: Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2):187-214.
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued (...)
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  50. Richard L. Purtill (1971). Some Varieties of Epistemological Scepticism. Philosophia 1 (1-2):107-116.
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