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- Daniel Gilman (1997). Consciousness and Mental Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):150-151.
- Richard Gray (2003). Tye's Representationalism: Feeling the Heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):245-256.
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- James Hopkins, Representation of the Inner and the Concept of Mind.
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- René Jagnow (2009). How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4).
- Zoltán Jakab (2006). Metameric Surfaces: The Ultimate Case Against Color Physicalism and Representational Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
- Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3).
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- Mark Eli Kalderon (forthcoming). Color Illusion. Nous.
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- Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134:405-427.
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- Uriah Kriegel (2002). Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.
- Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
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- Dominic M. M. Lopes (2000). What is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
- Riccardo Luccio (2003). Isomorphism and Representationalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):418-419.
- Robert W. Lurz (2000). A Defense of First-Order Representationalist Theories of Mental-State Consciousness. Psyche 6 (1).
- William G. Lycan (2001). Response to Polger and Flanagan. Minds and Machines 11 (1):127-132.
- William G. Lycan, Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- William G. Lycan (1998). In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye). Philosophical Perspectives 12.
- William G. Lycan (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
- William G. Lycan (1996). Layered Perceptual Representation. Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.
- William G. Lycan (1996). Replies to Tomberlin, Tye, Stalnaker and Block. Philosophical Issues 7:127-142.
- William G. Lycan (1987). Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.
- Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
- Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
- Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
- Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
- Fiona Macpherson (1999). Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).
- Pete Mandik (2009). Beware of the Unicorn: Consciousness as Being Represented and Other Things That Don't Exist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.
- Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, Space, and Control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
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