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  1. Carla Bagnoli (ed.) (2011). Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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  2. Christiane Bailey (2014). Le double sens de la communauté morale : la considérabilité morale et l’agentivité morale des autres animaux. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (3):31-67.
    Christiane Bailey | : Distinguant deux sens de « communauté morale », cet article soutient que certains animaux appartiennent à la communauté morale dans les deux sens : ils sont des patients moraux dignes de considération morale directe et équivalente, mais également des agents moraux au sens où ils sont capables de reconnaître, d’assumer et d’adresser aux autres des exigences minimales de bonne conduite et de savoir-vivre. Au moyen de la notion d’« attitudes réactives » développée par Peter F. Strawson, (...)
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  3. R. J. R. Blair (2007). What Emotional Responding is to Blame It Might Not Be to Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.
  4. Jeffrey Blustein (2010). Forgiveness, Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions. Metaphilosophy 41 (4):582-617.
    Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and (...)
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  5. Nicolas Bommarito (2011). Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18:357-81.
    In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...)
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  6. Peter Caws (1992). Choosing Emotions. Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 4 (2/3):209-217.
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  7. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  8. Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch (2012). Blameworthiness and Time. Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...)
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  9. Jason D'Cruz (2015). Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
    Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...)
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  10. Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions: Philosophical Issues About. WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  11. Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Punitive Emotions and Norm Violations. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.
    The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of (...)
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  12. Eva-Maria Engelen (2009). Anger, Shame and Justice: The Regulative Function of Emotions in the Ancient and Modern World. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes. Springer 395-413.
    Analyzing the ancient Greek point of view concerning anger, shame and justice and a very modern one, one can see, that anger has a regulative function, but shame does as well. Anger puts the other in his place, thereby regulating hierarchies. Shame regulates the social relations of recognition. And both emotions also have an evaluative function, because anger evaluates a situation with regard to a humiliation; shame, with regard to a misdemeanor. In addition, attention has to be paid to the (...)
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  13. Jeremy Fischer (2015). Pride and Moral Responsibility. Ratio 28 (4):n/a-n/a.
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...)
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  14. Christopher Evan Franklin (2013). Valuing Blame. In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press
  15. John Gardner (2009). The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3):315-338.
    Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability (...)
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  16. David Goldman (2014). Modification of the Reactive Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):1-22.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ P. F. Strawson argues that reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation cannot be eliminated altogether, because doing so would involve exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to resentment: a form of moral sadness about wrongdoing that, I argue, preserves our participation in interpersonal relationships. Substituting this moral sadness for resentment and indignation would amount to a deep and far-reaching change in the way we relate to each other – while keeping in place the interpersonal (...)
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  17. Robert M. Gordon (1986). The Passivity of Emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  18. Jules Holroyd (2010). The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):343-371.
    It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering (...)
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  19. Grace Hunt (2010). Performing Dignity. Women in Philosophy Annual Journal of Papers 6:47-61.
  20. No Authorship Indicated (1999). Review of Emotion, Character, and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):119-119.
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  21. L. Lengbeyer (2006). Nancy Sherman's Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind. Journal of Military Ethics 5 (3):233.
  22. Leonhard Menges (forthcoming). The Emotion Account of Blame. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
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  23. Claudia Eisen Murphy (1999). Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (2):163-205.
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  24. Jerome Neu (2004). Emotions and Freedom. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  25. Kathryn J. Norlock (2013). Pettigrove, Glen.Forgiveness and Love. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 200. $60.00. Ethics 123 (4):780-784.
    Glen Pettigrove's work enlarges my own thinking on forgiveness. In this review, I argue for even more attention to some philosophical connections that I suggest he neglects. But it is undeniably the case that Pettigrove advances a new view of forgiveness, taking the results of his analysis of the utterance, “I forgive you,” to inform a “broader definition that encompasses a wider range of experiences” than are accommodated by predominant conceptions of forgiveness as an emotional state (151). Philosophers interested in (...)
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  26. Marina A. L. Oshana (1997). Ascriptions of Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):71 - 83.
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  27. Julinna Oxley (2012). The Moral Dimensions of Empathy. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  28. Shelley M. Park (2005). In Defense of Happiness: Presidential Address to the Florida Philosophical Association. Florida Philosophical Review 4 (1):1-15.
    In this address, I defend happiness as a disposition conducive to, or at least compatible with, a view of the world that is both cognitively and politically valuable, that is, both conducive to truth and ethically appropriate.
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  29. Erick Ramirez (forthcoming). Neurosurgery for Psychopaths? The Problems of Empathy and Neurodiversity. American Journal of Bioethics: Ajob.
    I argue that deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a bad approach for incarcerated psychopaths for two reasons. First, given what we know about psychopathy, empathy, and DBS, it is unlikely to function as an effective treatment for the moral problems that characterize psychopathy. Second, considerations of neurodiversity speak against seeing psychopathy as a mental illness in the first place.
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  30. Erick Ramirez (2015). Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath. Philosophical Explorations (3):1-14.
    I argue that psychopathy undermines three important assumptions thought to favor moderate reasons responsiveness. First, I argue that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate. Next, I claim that this bifurcation suggests that reactivity is not 'all of a piece.' Lastly, I argue that attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza do not want their theory to depend on the outcome of debates about the nature (...)
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  31. Erick Ramirez (2015). Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath. Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):330-343.
    I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...)
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  32. Robert C. Roberts (1984). Solomon on the Control of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.
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  33. Brian Rosebury (2009). Private Revenge and its Relation to Punishment. Utilitas 21 (1):1-21.
    In contrast to the vast literature on retributive theories of punishment, discussions of private revenge are rare in moral philosophy. This paper reviews some examples, from both classical and recent writers, finding uncertainty and equivocation over the ethical significance of acts of revenge, and in particular over their possible resemblances, in motive, purpose or justification, to acts of lawful punishment. A key problem for the coherence of our ethical conception of revenge is the consideration that certain acts of revenge may (...)
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  34. Brian Rosebury (2008). Respect for Just Revenge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):451-471.
    The paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extra-legal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgement we may make of such acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not (...)
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  35. Nancy Schauber (2009). Complexities of Character: Hume on Love and Responsibility. Hume Studies 35 (1):29-55.
    Hume claims that moral assessments refer to character; it is character of which we morally approve and disapprove. This essay explores what Hume means by “character.” Is it true that moral assessments refer to character, and should Hume think this given his other commitments in moral philosophy and moral psychology? I discuss two prominent themes—namely, Hume’s views on moral responsibility; and Hume’s comparison of moral feelings with feelings of love—to see what light these themes can shed on Hume’s broader views (...)
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  36. Eugene Schlossberger (1986). Why We Are Responsible for Our Emotions. Mind 95 (377):37-56.
    It is often said that one cannot be held responsible for something one cannot help. Indeed, Ted Honderich, Paul Edwards, and C. A. Campbell have suggested that it is obtuse, barbaric, or a solecism to think otherwise 1. Thus, if (contra Sartre and others) one cannot help feeling one's emotions, one is not responsible for one's emotions. In this paper I will argue otherwise; one is responsible for one's emotions, even if one cannot help feeling them. 2 In particular, I (...)
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  37. Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.) (1987). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are: what scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his character given genetic and environmental factors; does an account of responsiblity provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions; are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurrences over which we have no control; does responsibility for the consequences of our (...)
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  38. Anastasia Scrutton (2009). Living Like Common People: Emotion, Will, and Divine Passibility. Religious Studies 45 (4):373-393.
    This paper explores the perennial objection to passibilism (conceived as susceptibility to or capacity for emotion) that an omnipotent being could not experience emotions because emotions are essentially passive and outside the subject's control. Examining this claim through the lens of some recent philosophy of emotion, I highlight some of the ways in which emotions can be chosen and cultivated, suggesting that emotions are not incompatible with divine omnipotence. Having concluded that divine omnipotence does not exclude emotional experience in general, (...)
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  39. Marco Solinas (2010). Die Melancholie, der Geist des Kapitalismus und die Depression. Freie Assoziation 13 (4):79-99.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
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  40. Jussi Suikkanen (2011). Intentions, Blame, and Contractualism: A Review of T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence 2 (2):561-573.
    This is a longer critical notice of T.M. Scanlon's book Moral Dimensions. The main crux of the article is to investigate how Scanlon's claims about the moral significance of intentions and reactive attitudes in this book fit with the earlier contractualist ethical theory which he presented in What We Owe to Each Other.
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  41. Julie Tannenbaum (2015). Mere Moral Failure. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):58-84.
    When, in spite of our good intentions, we fail to meet our obligations to others, it is important that we have the correct theoretical description of what has happened so that mutual understanding and the right sort of social repair can occur. Consider an agent who promises to help pick a friend up from the airport. She takes the freeway, forgetting that it is under construction. After a long wait, the friend takes an expensive taxi ride home. Most theorists and (...)
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  42. Christine Tappolet (2016). Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford University Press.
    The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such (...)
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  43. Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun (2011). Shame, Guilt and Morality. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
    The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...)
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  44. Brandon Warmke (2013). Two Arguments Against the Punishment-Forbearance Account of Forgiveness. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):915-920.
    One account of forgiveness claims that to forgive is to forbear punishment. Call this the Punishment-Forbearance Account of forgiveness. In this paper I argue that forbearing punishment is neither necessary nor sufficient for forgiveness.
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  45. Roger Wertheimer (1998). Constraining Condemning. Ethics 108 (3):489-501.
    Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...)
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  46. Andrea Westlund (2009). Anger, Faith, and Forgiveness. The Monist 92 (4):507-536.
    Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated. Now (...)
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