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  1. Carla Bagnoli (ed.) (2011). Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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  2. R. J. R. Blair (2007). What Emotional Responding is to Blame It Might Not Be to Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.
  3. Jeffrey Blustein (2010). Forgiveness, Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions. Metaphilosophy 41 (4):582-617.
    Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and (...)
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  4. Nicolas Bommarito (2011). Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18:357-81.
    In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...)
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  5. Peter Caws (1992). Choosing Emotions. Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 4 (2/3):209-217.
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  6. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  7. Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch (2012). Blameworthiness and Time. Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...)
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  8. Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Punitive Emotions and Norm Violations. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.
    The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of (...)
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  9. Eva-Maria Engelen (2009). Anger, Shame and Justice: The Regulative Function of Emotions in the Ancient and Modern World. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes. Springer. 395-413.
    Analyzing the ancient Greek point of view concerning anger, shame and justice and a very modern one, one can see, that anger has a regulative function, but shame does as well. Anger puts the other in his place, thereby regulating hierarchies. Shame regulates the social relations of recognition. And both emotions also have an evaluative function, because anger evaluates a situation with regard to a humiliation; shame, with regard to a misdemeanor. In addition, attention has to be paid to the (...)
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  10. John Gardner (2009). The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3):315-338.
    Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability (...)
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  11. David Goldman (2014). Modification of the Reactive Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):1-22.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ P. F. Strawson argues that reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation cannot be eliminated altogether, because doing so would involve exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to resentment: a form of moral sadness about wrongdoing that, I argue, preserves our participation in interpersonal relationships. Substituting this moral sadness for resentment and indignation would amount to a deep and far-reaching change in the way we relate to each other – while keeping in place the interpersonal (...)
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  12. Robert M. Gordon (1986). The Passivity of Emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  13. Jules Holroyd (2010). The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):343-371.
    It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering (...)
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  14. No Authorship Indicated (1999). Review of Emotion, Character, and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):119-119.
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  15. Claudia Eisen Murphy (1999). Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (2):163-205.
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  16. Jerome Neu (2004). Emotions and Freedom. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  17. Marina A. L. Oshana (1997). Ascriptions of Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):71 - 83.
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  18. Julinna Oxley (2012). The Moral Dimensions of Empathy. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  19. Shelley M. Park (2005). In Defense of Happiness: Presidential Address to the Florida Philosophical Association. Florida Philosophical Review 4.1.
    In this address, I defend happiness as a disposition conducive to, or at least compatible with, a view of the world that is both cognitively and politically valuable, that is, both conducive to truth and ethically appropriate.
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  20. Robert C. Roberts (1984). Solomon on the Control of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.
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  21. Nancy Schauber (2009). Complexities of Character: Hume on Love and Responsibility. Hume Studies 35 (1):29-55.
  22. Eugene Schlossberger (1986). Why We Are Responsible for Our Emotions. Mind 95 (377):37-56.
    It is often said that one cannot be held responsible for something one cannot help. Indeed, Ted Honderich, Paul Edwards, and C. A. Campbell have suggested that it is obtuse, barbaric, or a solecism to think otherwise 1. Thus, if (contra Sartre and others) one cannot help feeling one's emotions, one is not responsible for one's emotions. In this paper I will argue otherwise; one is responsible for one's emotions, even if one cannot help feeling them. 2 In particular, I (...)
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  23. Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.) (1987). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are: what scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his character given genetic and environmental factors; does an account of responsiblity provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions; are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurrences over which we have no control; does responsibility for the consequences of our (...)
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  24. Anastasia Scrutton (2009). Living Like Common People: Emotion, Will, and Divine Passibility. Religious Studies 45 (4):373-393.
    This paper explores the perennial objection to passibilism (conceived as susceptibility to or capacity for emotion) that an omnipotent being could not experience emotions because emotions are essentially passive and outside the subject's control. Examining this claim through the lens of some recent philosophy of emotion, I highlight some of the ways in which emotions can be chosen and cultivated, suggesting that emotions are not incompatible with divine omnipotence. Having concluded that divine omnipotence does not exclude emotional experience in general, (...)
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  25. Marco Solinas (2010). Die Melancholie, der Geist des Kapitalismus und die Depression. Freie Assoziation 13 (4):79-99.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
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  26. Jussi Suikkanen (2011). Intentions, Blame, and Contractualism: A Review of T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence 2 (2):561-573.
    This is a longer critical notice of T.M. Scanlon's book Moral Dimensions. The main crux of the article is to investigate how Scanlon's claims about the moral significance of intentions and reactive attitudes in this book fit with the earlier contractualist ethical theory which he presented in What We Owe to Each Other.
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  27. Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun (2011). Shame, Guilt and Morality. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
    The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...)
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  28. Brandon Warmke (2013). Two Arguments Against the Punishment-Forbearance Account of Forgiveness. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):915-920.
    One account of forgiveness claims that to forgive is to forbear punishment. Call this the Punishment-Forbearance Account of forgiveness. In this paper I argue that forbearing punishment is neither necessary nor sufficient for forgiveness.
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  29. Roger Wertheimer (1998). Constraining Condemning. Ethics 108 (3):489-501.
    Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...)
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  30. Andrea Westlund (2009). Anger, Faith, and Forgiveness. The Monist 92 (4):507-536.
    Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated. Now (...)
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