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  1. Gianluigi Oliveri (2006). Mathematics as a Quasi-Empirical Science. Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):41-79.
    The present paper aims at showing that there are times when set theoretical knowledge increases in a non-cumulative way. In other words, what we call ‘set theory’ is not one theory which grows by simple addition of a theorem after the other, but a finite sequence of theories T1, ..., Tn in which Ti+1, for 1 ≤ i < n, supersedes Ti. This thesis has a great philosophical significance because it implies that there is a sense in which mathematical theories, (...)
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  2. Claire L. Parkinson (1987). Paradigm Transitions in Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica (2):127-150.
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  3. Iulian D. Toader (2016). Why Did Weyl Think That Dedekind's Norm of Belief in Mathematics is Perverse? In Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 80, 445-451.
    This paper discusses an intriguing, though rather overlooked case of normative disagreement in the history of philosophy of mathematics: Weyl's criticism of Dedekind’s famous principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." This criticism, as I see it, challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.
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