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  1. G. Aldo Antonelli (2002). The Complexity of Revision, Revised. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.
    The purpose of this note is to acknowledge a gap in a previous paper, "The complexity of revision," and to provide a corrected version of the argument.
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  2. G. Aldo Antonelli (1994). A Revision-Theoretic Analysis of the Arithmetical Hierarchy. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (2):204-218.
    In this paper we apply the idea of Revision Rules, originally developed within the framework of the theory of truth and later extended to a general mode of definition, to the analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy. This is also intended as an example of how ideas and tools from philosophical logic can provide a different perspective on mathematically more “respectable” entities. Revision Rules were first introduced by A. Gupta and N. Belnap as tools in the theory of truth, and they (...)
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  3. G. Aldo Antonelli (1992). Revision Rules: An Investigation Into Non-Monotonic Inductive Definitions. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Many different modes of definition have been proposed over time, but none of them allows for circular definitions, since, according to the prevalent view, the term defined would then be lacking a precise signification. I argue that although circular definitions may at times fail uniquely to pick out a concept or an object, sense still can be made of them by using a rule of revision in the style adopted by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap in the theory of truth.
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  4. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1996). What's in a Function? Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
    In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due (...)
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  5. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1994). The Complexity of Revision. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):67-72.
    In this paper we show that the Gupta-Belnap systems S# and S* are П12. Since Kremer has independently established that they are П12-hard, this completely settles the problem of their complexity. The above-mentioned upper bound is established through a reduction to countable revision sequences that is inspired by, and makes use of a construction of McGee.
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  6. C. M. Asmus (2013). Vagueness and Revision Sequences. Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist (...)
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  7. Juan Barba (2010). Trees for Truth. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):71-99.
    This papers aims to analyse sentences of a self-referential language containing a truth-predicate by means of a Smullyan-style tableau system. Our analysis covers three variants of Kripke's partial-model semantics and three variants of the revision theory of truth.
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  8. Juan Barba (2001). Trees for Truth. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):71-99.
    This papers aims to analyse sentences of a self-referential language containing a truth-predicate by means of a Smullyan-style tableau system. Our analysis covers three variants of Kripke's partial-model semantics (strong and weak Kleene's and supervaluational) and three variants of the revision theory of truth (Belnap's, Gupta's and Herzberger's).
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  9. Eduardo Alejandro Barrio (2002). Verdad y Circularidad. Theoria 17 (1):63-79.
    Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects (...)
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  10. Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo (2013). Notes on Ω-Inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
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  11. Nuel Belnap (2006). Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
    Tim Maudiin’s Truth and Paradox (Maudlin 2004, cited here as T&P), a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993 (The Revision Theory of Truth, henceforth RTT).1 There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes (...)
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  12. Nuel Belnap (1999). Truth by Ascent. Dialectica 53 (3-4):291–306.
    This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, (...)
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  13. Nuel Belnap (1993). On Rigorous Definitions. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):115 - 146.
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  14. Nuel D. Belnap (1982). Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  15. Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  16. Riccardo Bruni (2013). Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision. Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.
    The paper introduces Hilbert– and Gentzen-style calculi which correspond to systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ from Gupta and Belnap [3]. Systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ were shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics of finite revision. Here, it is shown that Gentzen-style systems ${\mathsf{GC}_{n}}$ admit a syntactic proof of cut elimination. As a consequence, it follows that they are consistent.
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  17. Riccardo Bruni (2009). A Note on Theories for Quasi-Inductive Definitions. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):684-699.
    This paper introduces theories for arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (Burgess, 1986) as it has been done for first-order monotone and nonmonotone inductive ones. After displaying the basic axiomatic framework, we provide some initial result in the proof theoretic bounds line of research (the upper one being given in terms of a theory of sets extending Kripke–Platek set theory).
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  18. John P. Burgess (1986). The Truth is Never Simple. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  19. James Cargile (1995). The Revision Theory of Truth. Philosophical Books 36 (3):165-173.
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  20. André Chapuis (2003). An Application of Circular Definitions: Rational Decision. In Benedikt Löwe, Thoralf Räsch & Wolfgang Malzkorn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Ii. Kluwer 47--54.
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  21. André Chapuis (1996). Alternative Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399 - 423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth (Gupta/Belnap 93) has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
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  22. Andre Chapuis (1993). Circularity, Truth, and the Liar Paradox. Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the Liar claims (...)
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  23. André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.) (2000). Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
  24. R. T. Cook (2002). Counterintuitive Consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth. Analysis 62 (1):16-22.
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  25. Roy Cook (2002). Counterintuitive Consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth. Analysis 62 (273):16–22.
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  26. Roy T. Cook (2003). Still Counterintuitive: A Reply to Kremer. Analysis 63 (279):257–261.
    In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..
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  27. José Martínez Fernández (2007). Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (4):449-472.
    This paper gives a propositional reformulation of the fixed-point problem posed by Gupta and Belnap, using the stipulation logic of Visser. After presenting a solution for clones of three-valued operators that include the constant functions, I determine the maximal three-valued clones with constants that have the fixed-point property, giving different characterizations of them.
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  28. A. Gupta (2006). Review: Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (457):163-165.
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  29. A. Gupta (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Harvard University Press.
    This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...)
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  30. A. Gupta & N. Belnap (1993). The Revision Theory of Truth. MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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  31. Anil Gupta (2012). Truth, Meaning, Experience. OUP Usa.
    This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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  32. Anil Gupta (2008). Empiricism and Experience. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...)
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  33. Anil Gupta (2006). Finite Circular Definitions. In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications 79-93.
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  34. Anil Gupta (1997). Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin. Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.
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  35. Anil Gupta (1990). Two Theorems Concerning Stability. In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer 49--60.
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  36. Anil Gupta (1988). Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:227 - 246.
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  37. Anil Gupta (1987). The Meaning of Truth. In Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. Academic Press 453--480.
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  38. Anil Gupta (1982). Truth and Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
  39. Anil Gupta & Nuel Belnap (1994). Reply to Robert Koons. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4):632-636.
    We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 — 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is (...)
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  40. Anil Gupta & Andre Chapuis (eds.) (2000). Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
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  41. Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer (forthcoming). Conditionals in Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-37.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  42. Volker Halbach (2003). Löwe Benedikt and Welch Philip. Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory. Studia Logica, Vol. 68 (2001), Pp. 21–41. Löwe Benedikt. Revision Sequences and Computers with an Infinite Amount of Time. Journal of Logic and Computation, Vol. 11 (2001), Pp. 25–40. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):235-237.
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  43. W. D. Hart (1989). For Anil Gupta. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:161 - 165.
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  44. John Hawthorn (1983). The Liar and Theories of Truth. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    I first discuss Chihara's claim that the presence of Liar-paradoxical sentences presents no problem for our understanding of natural languages, and argue that this cannot be held as easily as he suggests. I then consider the theories advanced by Martin, van Fraassen, Kripke and Burge which attempt to meet some of the problems involved. I argue that the claim in the first two theories that Liar sentences are ill-formed cannot be maintained, and that Burge's theory is methodologically unsound and seriously (...)
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  45. Hans G. Herzberger (1982). Notes on Naive Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
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  46. Hans G. Herzberger (1982). Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
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  47. Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch (2012). Revision Revisited. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
    This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  48. Ming Hsiung (2009). Jump Liars and Jourdain's Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme. Studia Logica 91 (2):239 - 271.
    A relativized version of Tarski’s T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain’s card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n , the n -jump liar sentence is (...)
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  49. Robert C. Koons (1994). Book Review: Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap. The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4):606-631.
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  50. M. Kremer (2002). Intuitive Consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth. Analysis 62 (4):330-336.
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