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  1. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  2. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2010). Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181.
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.
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  3. Emma Borg, Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric, by A. Berger.
    Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. xi + 234. H/b £?.??, $?.??, P/b £?.??, $?.??. If asked for an example of a rigid designator it is likely that one would suggest a name, like ‘Aristotle’ or ‘Tony Blair’, or a demonstrative, like ‘that book’ said whilst pointing at a certain text. Intuitively, what these expressions have in common is the central role they accord to perception of an object: you can see the book you want to talk about, there are (...)
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  4. João Branquinho (2003). In Defense of Obstinacy. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):1–23.
    The aim of this paper is to make the case for the obstinacy thesis. This is the thesis that proper names like ‘Hitler’, demonstratives like ‘this’, pure indexicals like ‘I’, and natural kind terms like ‘water’ and ‘gold’, are obstinately rigid terms. An obstinately rigid term is one that refers to the object that is its actual referent with respect to every possible world (hence, a fortiori, even with respect to worlds where that object does not exist). This form of (...)
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  5. David Braun (2003). Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
  6. Rafael De Clercq (2008). Lopes on the Ontology of Japanese Shrines. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (2):193–194.
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  7. Harry Deutsch (1989). On Direct Reference. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 167-195.
  8. César Schirmer Dos Santos (2007). A suposta indexicalidade dos designadores de espécies naturais segundo Burge. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 12 (2):87-105.
    Nos anos 1970s, Hilary Putnam defendeu a tese que designadores de espécies naturais, como “água”, “tigre” e “ouro”, são termos indexicais que mudam de significado a cada contexto. No entanto, Tyler Burge rejeitou essa tese, e Putnam veio a adotar a posição de Burge. A rejeição de Burge está apoiada na distinção entre crenças de dicto e crenças de re. Nesse artigo veremos os pontos de contato entre as posições de Putnam e Burge, a posição de Putnam nos anos 1970s, (...)
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  9. Iris Einheuser (2005). Two Types of Rigid Designation. Dialectica 59 (3):367–374.
    The notion of a rigid designator was originally introduced with respect to a modal semantics in which only one world, the world of evaluation, is shifted. Several philosophical applications employ a modal semantics which shifts not just the world of evaluation, but also the world considered as actual. How should the notion of a rigid designator be generalized in this setting? In this note, I show that there are two options and argue that, for the currently most popular application of (...)
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  10. Delia Graff Fara (forthcoming). Names Are Predicates. Philosophical Review.
    Tyler Burge convinced us that names are predicates in at least some of their occurrences: -/- There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. -/- Names, when predicates, satisfy the being-called condition: schematically, a name "N" is true of a thing just in case that thing is called N. This paper defends the unified view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. I follow Clarence Sloat, Paul Elbourne, and Ora Matushansky in saying that when a name seems to occur (...)
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  11. Bryan Frances, “Please Explain What a Rigid Designator Is”.
    This is an essay written for undergraduates who are confused about what a rigid designator is.
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  12. Bryan Frances (2011). Kripke. In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum.
    This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
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  13. Philippe Gagnon (2012). Remarques Sur le Projet Essentialiste de Brian Ellis En Philosophie de la Nature. Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 43 (March):61-94.
  14. Richard Gray (2006). Natural Phenomenon Terms. Analysis 66 (290):141–148.
    In lecture III of Naming and Necessity, Kripke extends his claim that names are non-descriptive to natural kind terms, and in so doing includes a brief supporting discussion of terms for natural phenomena, in particular the terms ‘light’ and ‘heat’. Whilst natural kind terms continue to feature centrally in the recent literature, natural phenomenon terms have barely figured. The purpose of the present paper is to show how the apparent similarities between natural kind terms and the natural phenomenon terms on (...)
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  15. Jussi Haukioja (2008). Rigid Kind Terms. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:55-61.
    Kripke argued, famously, that proper names are rigid designators. It is often assumed that some kind terms (most prominently natural kind terms) are rigid designators as well. This is thought to have significant theoretical consequences, such as the necessity of certain a posteriori identities involving natural kind terms. However, there is no agreement on what it is for a kind term to be rigid. In this paper I will first take a detailed look at the most common view: that rigid (...)
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  16. Wesley H. Holliday & John Perry (forthcoming). Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic. In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Trends in Logic, Outstanding Contributions: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer.
    Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic: Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate logic, implemented formally in Melvin Fitting’s (...)
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  17. Ilhan Inan (2008). Rigid General Terms and Essential Predicates. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):213 - 228.
    What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...)
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  18. Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
  19. Thomas S. Kuhn (1990). Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation. In C. Wade Savage, James Conant & John Haugeland (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press. 58-89.
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  20. Dan López de Sa (2008). The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural&Quot;. Synthese 163 (2):263 - 272.
    According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...)
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  21. Dan López de Sa (2008). Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (1):1-13.
    According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...)
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  22. Dan López de Sa (2007). Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):117-123.
    The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays (...)
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  23. Gilbert Plumer (1989). Mustn't Whatever is Referred to Exist? Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):511-528.
    Some hold that proper names and indexicals are “Kaplan rigid”: they designate their designata even in worlds where the designata don’t exist. An argument they give for this is based on the analogy between time and modality. It is shown how this argument gains forcefulness at the expense of carefulness. Then the argument is criticized as forming a part of an inconsistent philosophical framework, the one with which David Kaplan and others operate. An alternative account of a certain class of (...)
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  24. Gilbert Plumer (1988). Kaplan Rigidity, Time, and Modality. Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):329-335.
    Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true (...)
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  25. Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Descriptions Which Have Grown Capital Letters. Mind and Language.
    Almost entirely ignored in the linguistic theorising on names and descriptions is a hybrid form of expression which, like definite descriptions, begin with 'the' but which, like proper names, are capitalised and seem to lack descriptive content. These are expressions such as the following, 'the Holy Roman Empire', 'the Mississippi River', or 'the Space Needle'. Such capitalised descriptions are ubiquitous in natural language, but to which linguistic categories do they belong? Are they simply proper names? Or are they definite descriptions (...)
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  26. Michael Rubin (2013). Are Chemical Kind Terms Rigid Appliers? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1303-1316.
    According to Michael Devitt, the primary work of a rigidity distinction for kind terms is to distinguish non-descriptional predicates from descriptional predicates. The standard conception of rigidity fails to do this work when it is extended to kind terms. Against the standard conception, Devitt defends rigid application: a predicate is a rigid applier iff, if it applies to an object in one world, it applies to that object in every world in which it exists. Devitt maintains that rigid application does (...)
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  27. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons are either not the right reasons (...)
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  28. Heidi Savage, Descriptive Names and Shifty Characters: A Context-Sensitive Account.
    Standard rigid designator accounts of a name’s meaning have trouble accommodating what I will call a descriptive name’s “shifty” character -- its tendency to shift its referent over time in response to a discovery that the conventional referent of that name does not satisfy the description with which that name was introduced. I offer a variant of Kripke’s historical semantic theory of how names function, a variant that can accommodate the character of descriptive names while maintaining rigidity for proper names. (...)
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  29. David Sosa (2001). Rigidity in the Scope of Russell's Theory. Noûs 35 (1):1–38.
  30. Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.
    Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, taken (...)
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  31. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (forthcoming). The Distance Between 'Here' and 'Where I Am'. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    This paper argues that Michael Dummett's proposed distinction between a declarative sentence's "assertoric content" and "ingredient sense" is not in fact supported by what Dummett presents as paradigmatic evidence in its support.
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  32. Kai F. Wehmeier (2005). Modality, Mood, and Descriptions. In Reinhard Kahle (ed.), Intensionality: An Interdisciplinary Discussion. AK Peters.
    §1. Introduction. By means of what semantic features is a proper name tied to its bearer? This is a puzzling question indeed: proper names — like “Aristotle” or “Paris” — are syntactically simple, and it therefore does not seem possible to reduce their meanings, by means of a principle of compositionality, to the meanings of more basic, and hence perhaps more tractable, linguistic elements.
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  33. Roger Wertheimer (1998). Identity: Logic, Ontology, Epistemology. Philosophy 73 (2):179-193.
    Greece is Hellas and Greeks are Hellenes. Azure is cobalt and everything (coloured) azure is (coloured) cobalt. Pre-Fregeans would call all these statements of identity. <span class='Hi'>Frege</span> taught us to distinguish between Conaming [Name] [Name]. Ngh: Greece is Hellas g=h. Nac: Azure is cobalt a=c Copredicating [Predicate] [Predicate]. PGH: Greeks are Hellenes (x)(Gx[identical with]Hx). PAC: Everything azure is cobalt (x)(Ax[identical with]Cx) Singular Predication [Name] [Predicate]. PcA: Como is azure Ac. PaC: Azure is a colour Ca. PaL: Azure is like indigo (...)
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  34. Michael P. Wolf, Rigid Designation and Natural Kind Terms, Pittsburgh Style. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
    This paper addresses recent literature on rigid designation and natural kind terms that draws on the inferentialist approaches of Sellars and Brandom, among others. Much of the orthodox literature on rigidity may be seen as appealing, more or less explicitly, to a semantic form of “the given” in Sellars’s terms. However, the important insights of that literature may be reconstructed and articulated in terms more congenial to the Pittsburgh school of normative functionalism.
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  35. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2007). Naming with Necessity (Part of the Dissertation Portfolio Modality, Names and Descriptions). Dissertation, New York University
    In “Naming with Necessity”, it is argued that Kripke’s thesis that proper names are rigid designators is best seen as being motivated by an individual-driven picture of modality, which has two parts. First, inherent in proper-name usage is the expectation that names refer to modally robust individuals: individuals that can sustain modal predications like ‘is necessarily human’. Second, these modally robust individuals are the fundamental building blocks on the basis of which possible worlds should be conceived in a modal semantics (...)
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  36. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2006). Analytic Truths and Kripke's Semantic Turn. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):327-341.
    In his influential Naming and Necessity lectures, Saul Kripke made new sense of modal statements: “Kant might have been a bachelor”, “Königsberg is necessarily identical with Kaliningrad”. Many took the notions he introduced-metaphysical necessity and rigid designation -- to herald new metaphysical issues and have important consequences. In fact, the Kripkean insight is at bottom semantic, rather than metaphysical: it is part of how proper names work that they purport to refer to individuals to whom modal properties can be ascribed. (...)
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