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Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was a German-American philosopher mainly working in logic and philosophy of science. He began his philosophical career as a neo-Kantian, and later became a leading figure of the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Since that time, he considered it as one of the main tasks of philosophy to “overcome metaphysics” – not simply as an internal philosophical issue, but also as a contribution of philosophy to the project of enlightenment and the fight against politically and morally pernicious ideologies. After his emigration to the United States (1935) he became one of the best-known representatives of philosophy of science and analytic philosophy. According to Carnap, the task of philosophy was to construct linguistic and ontological frameworks that could be used in the ongoing progress of scientific knowledge. In the last decades of his life he dedicated a great part of his work in the elaboration of inductive logic. 

Key works Two classical works of Carnap are Carnap 1928 (translated into English as Carnap 1969) and Carnap 1937. Two excellent collections of papers on all aspects of Carnap's philosophy are  Creath & Friedman 2007 and Richardson & Uebel 2007. The Schilpp volume Schilpp 1963 dedicated to Carnap is still worth reading. Klein & Awodey 2004 and  Friedman 2002 offer useful information on the European context of Carnap's philosophy.
Introductions Many introductory works on specific Carnapian themes may be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are surprisingly few introductory works that deal with Carnap's philosophy in general. An internet source is Murzi 2001, for a book-length general introduction into Carnap's philosophy see Mormann 2000
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Carnap: Epistemology
  1. Steve Awodey & A. W. Carus (2009). From Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean : Carnap's Dream of Logical Syntax. In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
  2. Gilead Bar-Elli (1986). Identity, Semantics and Ontology in Carnap. Philosophia 16 (3-4):315-331.
  3. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel & Rudolf Carnap (1953). Semantic Information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (14):147-157.
  4. N. Belnap, Nuel Belnap Under Carnap's Lamp: Flat Pre-Semantics.
    “Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered separately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the usefulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parameters of (...)
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  5. Michel Bitbol (2004). The Problem of Other Minds: A Debate Between Schrödinger and Carnap. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):115-123.
    This paper reviews the debate between Carnap and Schrödinger about Hypothesis P (It is not only I who have perceptions and thoughts; other human beings have them too)–a hypothesis that underlies the possibility of doing science. For Schrödinger this hypothesis is not scientifically testable; for Carnap it is. But Schrödinger and Carnap concede too much to each other and miss an alternative understanding: science does not depend on an explicit hypothesis concerning what other human beings see and think; it is (...)
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  6. Thomas Bonk (ed.) (2003). Language, Truth, and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language and logic, as well as professional philosophers, historians of analytic philosophy, and philosophically inclined logicians. Language, Truth and Knowledge brings together 11 new essays that offer a wealth of insights on a number of Carnap's concerns and ideas. The volume arose out of a symposium on Carnap's work at an international conference held in Vienna in 2001. The (...)
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  7. Thomas Bonk (ed.) (2003). Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language ...
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  8. John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  9. Richard Butrick (1970). Carnap on Meaning and Analyticity. The Hague,Mouton.
  10. Rudolf Carnap (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (2):20--40.
  11. Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan (1987). On Protocol Sentences. Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
  12. David J. Chalmers (2011). Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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  13. Alberto Coffa (1991). The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Cambridge University Press.
    This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...)
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  14. Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he (Quine) has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is (...)
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  15. Richard Creath (1987). Some Remarks on "Protocol Sentences". Noûs 21 (4):471-475.
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  16. Richard Creath (1986). Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  17. Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) (2007). Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap. Cambridge University Press.
  18. William Demopoulos (2001). Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap Michael Potter. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):599-612.
  19. Michael Friedman (2011). Carnap on Theoretical Terms: Structuralism Without Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Synthese 180 (2):249 - 263.
    Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap's developed view on theoretical terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap's mature conception of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position. To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is no (...)
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  20. Henri Galinon (2009). Les Termes Théoriques, de Carnap à Lewis. Philonsorbonne 4:1-12.
    This is a short introductory paper to the Ramsey-Carnap method, as introduced by Carnap in his "Philosophical foundations of Physics" (1966) to explain the meaning of theoretical terms.
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  21. Warren Goldfarb (1997). Semantics in Carnap. Philosophical Topics 25 (2):51-66.
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  22. Paul A. Gregory (2003). Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  23. Jan Heylen (2010). Carnap's Theory of Descriptions and its Problems. Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap’s theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap’s theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  24. Robert Hudson (2010). Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 77 (3):341-358.
    Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis‐à‐vis (...)
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  25. Peter Inwagen (2002). “Carnap” and “the Polish Logician”. Acta Analytica 17 (1):7-17.
    InThe Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, Hilary Putnam has presented an argument for the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to how many objects there are. In brief: Carnap says that a certain imaginary world contains three objects, ×1, ×2, and ×3. The Polish logician says that this same world must contain four other objects (×1 + ×2, ×1 + ×2 + ×3, etc.). Putnam maintains that there can be no fact of the matter as (...)
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  26. Gregory Lavers (2008). Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):4-24.
    Carnap's position on mathematical truth in The Logical Syntax of Language has been attacked from two sides: Kreisel argues that it is formalistic but should not be, and Friedman argues that it is not formalistic but needs to be. In this paper I argue that the Carnap of Syntax does not eliminate our ordinary notion of mathematical truth in favour of a formal analogue; so Carnap's notion of mathematical truth is not formalistic. I further argue that there is no conflict (...)
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  27. Gregory Lavers (2008). Review of Richard Creath, Michael Friedman (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).
  28. Gregory Lavers (2004). Carnap, Semantics and Ontology. Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
    This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...)
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  29. Eric J. Loomis (2006). Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
    Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, (...)
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  30. Toby Meadows (2012). Revising Carnap's Semantic Conception of Modality. Studia Logica 100 (3):497-515.
    I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision (...)
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  31. Thomas Mormann, Mathematical Aspects of Similarity and Quasi-Analysis - Order, Topology, and Sheaves.
    The concept of similarity has had a rather mixed reputation in philosophy and the sciences. On the one hand, philosophers such as Goodman and Quine emphasized the „logically repugnant“ and „insidious“ character of the concept of similarity that allegedly renders it inaccessible for a proper logical analysis. On the other hand, a philosopher such as Carnap assigned a central role to similarity in his constitutional theory. Moreover, the importance and perhaps even indispensibility of the concept of similarity for many empirical (...)
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  32. Thomas Mormann (2000). Rudolf Carnap. C.H. Beck.
    Einführung in die Philosophie Rudolf Carnaps.
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  33. Mauro Murzi, Carnap, Rudolf. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  34. D. J. O'Connor (1967). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Edited by P. A. Schilpp. (Open Court and Cambridge University Press. 1964. Pp. Xvi and 1,088. £9.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 42 (161):291-.
  35. Paul O'Grady (1999). Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027.
  36. Paul O'Grady (1999). Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027.
  37. Katarzyna Paprzycka (1994). How Carnap Should Bite Goodman's Bullet. Philosophia 24 (1-2):149-156.
  38. Álvaro J. Peláez Cedrés (2008). La Teoría de Los Invariantes y El Espacio Intuitivo En Der Raum de Rudolf Carnap. Análisis Filosófico 28 (2):175-203.
    La consecuencia más difundida de la revolución en la geometría del siglo XIX es aquella que afirma que después de dichos cambios ya nada quedaría de la vieja noción de espacio como "forma de la intuición sensible", ni de la geometría como "condición trascendental" de la posibilidad de la experiencia. Este artículo se ocupa del intento de Rudolf Carnap por articular una concepción del espacio intuitivo que, al tiempo que se mantiene dentro del paradigma kantiano se hace eco de algunos (...)
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  39. C. Pigden (1994). Review: Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Carnap to Kant: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):522-525.
  40. Stathos Psillos (2000). Rudolf Carnap's 'Theoretical Concepts in Science'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (1):151-172.
    Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on Theoretical Concepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. But although Carnap started (...)
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  41. Alan Richardson (1994). Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 61 (1):142-.
  42. Stefanie Rocknak (2010). Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology. In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
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  43. Markus Schrenk (2008). Verificationist Theory of Meaning. In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
    The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical (...)
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  44. Joshua Shepherd & James Justus (forthcoming). X-Phi and Carnapian Explication. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical (...)
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  45. Wolfgang Spohn, Carnap Versus Quine, or Aprioristic Versus Naturalized Epistemology, or a Lesson From Dispositions.
    In his influential paper "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine argues that Carnap's failure to define disposition predicates and his subsequent preference for reduction sentences naturally lead to an entirely naturalized epistemology. This conclusion is too hasty, I object. Applying the account of dispositional predicates developed in No. 26 I defend Carnap's aprioristic epistemology against Quine's attacks.
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  46. Thomas E. Uebel (1992). Rational Reconstruction as Elucidation? Carnap in the Early Protocol Sentence Debate. Synthese 93 (1-2):107 - 140.
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  47. [author unknown], Editorial: In Honour of Rudolf Carnap – Central Topics in Epistemology.
    The following four articles were awarded the Rudolf-Carnap-Essay Prize during an international graduate conference we organized at Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Germany) in February 2008. We received many excellent submissions not only from graduate students in Germany and other European countries, but also from the USA and Canada. All submissions were subjected to a double-blind review process. We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the scholars who supported us in this endeavour.
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Carnap: Ontology
  1. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). On Quine on Carnap on Ontology. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
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  2. Gilead Bar-Elli (1986). Identity, Semantics and Ontology in Carnap. Philosophia 16 (3-4):315-331.
  3. Rod Bertolet (1982). Merrill and Carnap on Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):277-287.
    G h merrill's recent attempt to sort out various versions of scientific realism and to impugn well-Known anti-Realist arguments turns crucially on carnap's distinction between internal and external statements of existence. Focusing on carnap's distinction, And the notion of a framework which underlies it, I attempt to show that carnap's work is far too unclear and unpersuasive to underwrite this effort.
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