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  1. Kent Bach (2007). Reflections on Reference and Reflexivity. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 395--424.
    In Reference and Reflexivity, John Perry tries to reconcile referentialism with a Fregean concern for cognitive significance. His trick is to supplement referential content with what he calls ‘‘reflexive’’ content. Actually, there are several levels of reflexive content, all to be distinguished from the ‘‘official,’’ referential content of an utterance. Perry is convinced by two arguments for referentialism, the ‘‘counterfactual truth-conditions’’ and the ‘‘same-saying’’ arguments, but he also acknowledges the force of two Fregean arguments against it, arguments that pose the (...)
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  2. Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel (2013). One Dogma of Millianism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  3. Wolfgang Barz (2010). Arten von Propositionen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):289-309.
    Das Ziel des Aufsatzes besteht darin, den Streit zwischen Fregeanern und Direktreferentialisten zu schlichten. Dieser Streit dreht sich um die Frage, wie wir uns die Proposition zurecht legen sollen, die durch einen Satz der Form „a ist F“ zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Fregeaner vertreten die Auffassung, daß es sich bei dieser Proposition um einen Komplex handelt, der sich aus der Eigenschaft F und dem Sinn von „a“ zusammensetzt. Direktreferentialisten hingegen nehmen an, daß die betreffende Proposition anstelle des Sinns von „a“ (...)
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  4. Arvid Båve (2008). A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...)
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  5. George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
    Direct reference theory faces serious prima facie counterexamples which must be explained away (e.g., that it is possible to know a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus). This is done by means of various forms of pragmatic explanation. But when those explanations that provisionally succeed are generalized to deal with analogous prima facie counterexamples concerning the identity of propositions, a fatal dilemma results. Either identity must be treated as a four-place relation (contradicting what just about everyone, including direct reference theorists, takes (...)
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  6. João Branquinho (2008). On the Persistence and Re-Expression of Indexical Belief. Manuscrito 31 (2).
    This paper is devoted to an examination of issues concerning the persistence and linguistic re-expression of indexical singular belief. I discuss two approaches to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan's views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans's views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan's account and Evans's account are on the whole defective. On the other, (...)
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  7. João Branquinho (1998). The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 56:29-56.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the interesting topic of Cognitive Dynamics as it has been introduced by David Kaplan in his seminal essay ‘Demonstratives’ and further exploited in the sequel ‘Afterthoughts’. I discuss two main sorts of approach to cognitive dynamics: the neo-Millian (or directly referential) approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion (...)
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  8. Ingar Brinck (2005). Critical Review of John Campbell: Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Theoria 3:266-276.
  9. Ingar Brinck (1997). The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in (...)
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  10. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquiantance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Russell 20 (1):33-65.
    In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell defends a version of semantic empiricism according to which direct acquaintance with logical atoms is the source of our semantic capacities. Previous commentators have construed Russellian acquaintance in one of two ways: either as an act of de re designation involving neither conceptualization nor propositional content, or as a species of belief de re, which does involve conceptualization or classification. I argue that two further, interim possibilities have been overlooked: that direct acquaintance involves (...)
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  11. Ray Buchanan (forthcoming). Schiffer's Puzzle: A Kind of Fregean Response. In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meaning and Other Things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press
    In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or Russellian (...)
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  12. Ray Buchanan (2014). Names, Descriptions, and Assertion. In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer 03-15.
    According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun (2006), that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way (...)
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  13. Tom Burke (2009). Pragmatism and Reference. [REVIEW] Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 37 (108):22-25.
  14. Antonio Capuano (2012). The Ground Zero of Semantics. In J. - Leonardi Almog (ed.), Having In Mind. Oxford University Press
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  15. Sean Crawford (2004). A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief. Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
  16. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2010). Do Object-Dependent Properties Threaten Physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):610-614.
    Thomas Hofweber argues that the thesis of direct reference is incompatible with physicalism, the claim that the nonphysical supervenes on the physical. According to Hofweber, direct reference implies that some physical objects have object-dependent properties, such as being Jones’s brother, which depend on particular objects for their existence and identity. Hofweber contends that if some physical objects have object-dependent properties, then Local-Local Supervenience (the physicalist doctrine on which he concentrates) fails. In this note, we argue that Hofweber has failed to (...)
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  17. Lieven Decock (1999). Quine on Names. Logique Et Analyse 167:373-379.
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  18. Erhan Demircioglu (2014). Gareth Evans on Proper Names. Felsefe Tartismalari 50:1-9.
    The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.
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  19. Michael Devitt, Meaning: Truth-Referential or Use?
    In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argued for a certain truth-referential theory of meaning and against various other theories, both truth-referential and not.[1] In this paper I shall consider some subsequent developments. I shall start by summarizing my theory. I will then consider some of the latest from direct-reference theorists, particularly from Scott Soames. Finally, I will consider the use theory proposed by Paul Horwich.
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  20. Heimir Geirsson (1994). Necessity, Apriority, and True Identity Statements. Erkenntnis 40 (2):227 - 242.
    The thesis that the necessary and the a priori are extensionally equivalent consists of two independent claims: 1) All a priori truths are necessary and 2) all necessary truths are a priori. In Naming and Necessity1 Saul A. Kripke gives examples of necessary but a posteriori truths, so he disagrees with the second leg of the thesis.2 His examples are of two types; on the one hand statements involving essential properties and on the other hand true identity statements. My concern (...)
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  21. Brie Gertler (2012). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press 89-123.
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...)
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  22. William J. Greenberg (1996). The Paradox of Identity. Epistemologia 2:207-226.
    Call a semantics for singular terms *extensionalist* if it embraces and *classical* if it embraces. -/- 1. The meaning of a singular term is exhausted by its reference. 2. The reference of a singular term is an entity that is logically simple. -/- Call a semantics *adequate* if it distinguishes material identity from formal identity. -/- Frege reacts to the inadequacy of classical extensionalist semantics by rejecting. This he does without a sideways glance at, whose background ontology, an "ontology of (...)
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  23. Ilhan Inan (2011). Unanswerable Questions for Millians. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):279-83.
    I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.
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  24. David Kaplan (1973). Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Approaches to Natural Language. D. Reidel Publishing 490--518.
  25. Jerrold J. Katz (1997). Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):1-28.
    Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning. This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke concerning natural kind terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the (...)
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  26. Kevin C. Klement (2014). The Paradoxes and Russell's Theory of Incomplete Symbols. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):183-207.
    Russell claims in his autobiography and elsewhere that he discovered his 1905 theory of descriptions while attempting to solve the logical and semantic paradoxes plaguing his work on the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I hope to make the connection between his work on the paradoxes and the theory of descriptions and his theory of incomplete symbols generally clearer. In particular, I argue that the theory of descriptions arose from the realization that not only can a class not be (...)
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  27. Koskinen (ed.) (forthcoming). Categories of Being.
  28. Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski (2014). Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege. Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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  29. John-Michael Kuczynski (2004). A Non-Russellian Analysis of the Referential-Attributive Distinction. Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (2):253-294.
    Kripke made a good case that “…the phi…” is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings, and many semanticists agree with Kripke. Russell says that “…the phi…” is always to be analyzed attributively. Agreeing with Kripke that “…the phi…” is not ambiguous, many semanticists have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “…the phi..”, on the one hand, and what Russell’s theory says it literally means, on the other, (...)
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  30. Siu-Fan Lee (2014). Who Wants To Be a Russellian About Names? In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. De Gruyter 161-180.
    Russell had two theories of names and one theory of description. Logically proper names are Millian names, which have only denotation but no connotation. Ordinary names are not genuine names but disguised definite descriptions subject to quantificational analyses. Only by asserting that ordinary names are definite descriptions could Russell motivate his theory of description to solve three problems for Millian names, namely, Frege’s puzzle, empty reference and negative existentials. Critics usually discuss Russell’s theories of names and his theory of description (...)
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  31. Mohan Matthen (2008). Review of Tyler Burge,, Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
    Review of collected papers on philosophy of mind by Tyler Burge.
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  32. Mohan Matthen (1984). Ostension, Names and Natural Kind Terms. Dialogue 23 (1):44-58.
    It has been suggested that the theory of reference advanced by Kripke and Putnam implies, or presupposes, an aristotelian vision of natural kinds and essences. I argue that what is in fact established is that there are degrees of naturalness among kinds. A parallel argument shows that there are degrees of naturalness among individuals. A subsidiary theme of the paper is that the definition of "natural kind term" as "rigid designator of a natural kind" is mistaken. Names and natural kind (...)
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  33. Graham Oppy (1994). Salmon on the Contingent a Priori and the Necessary a Posteriori. Philosophical Studies 73 (1):5 - 33.
    This paper is an examination of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori. In particular, it considers -- and assesses -- the criticisms that Nathan Salmon makes of the views of Saul Kripke.
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  34. Graham Oppy (1994). A Note About a Quinean Argument Against Direct Reference. Philosophia 24 (1-2):157-170.
    In this paper, I argue -- against Steven Wagner -- that Nathan Salmon's semantic theory is not refuted by a suitable variant of Quine's slingshot (Word and Object, 148-9).
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  35. Graham Oppy (1992). Why Semantic Innocence? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):445 – 454.
    This paper rejects the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories. In particular, it argues that recent attempts to justify the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories fail.
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  36. T. Parent, Conservative Meinongianism.
    David Lewis acclimated us to talk of “nonactual concreta that exist,” regarding talking donkeys and the like. I shall argue that this was not for the best, and try to normalize a way of describing them as “actual concreta that do not exist.” The basis of this is a defense of the Meinongian thesis “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,” re: fictitious and illusory objects. I first formulate the problem of negative existentials (...)
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  37. T. Parent, Modal Realism and the Meaning of 'Exist'.
    Here I first raise an argument purporting to show that Lewis’ Modal Realism ends up being entirely trivial. But although I reject this line, the argument reveals how difficult it is to interpret Lewis’ thesis that possibilia “exist.” Five natural interpretations are considered, yet upon reflection, none appear entirely adequate. On the three different “concretist” interpretations of ‘exist’, Modal Realism looks insufficient for genuine ontological commitment. Whereas, on the “multiverse” interpretation, Modal Realism acknowledges physical possibilities only--and worse, (assuming either axiom (...)
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  38. Alik Pelman (2015). Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’. Ratio 28 (1):302-317.
    Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. (...)
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  39. Consuelo Preti (1995). Externalism and Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):213 - 236.
    Semantic externalism is the view that meaning is at least partly determined by reference. This suggests that the classic philosophical distinction between truth in virtue of meaning alone and truth in virtue of the world may need reconsideration. If all sentences are true in virtue of reference it is difficult to see how we can distinguish some sentences from others as true in virtue of the world-independent, purely semantic entities that their truth-conditions involve. I argue, to the contrary, that semantic (...)
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  40. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...)
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  41. Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106–126.
    The *Tractatus* contains an argument that there are simple, necessarily existent objects, which, being simple, are suited to be the referents of the names occuring in the final analysis of propositions. The argument is perplexing in its own right, but also for its invocation of the notion of "substance". I argue that if one locates Wittgenstein's conception of substance in the Kantian tradition to which his talk of "substance" alludes, what emerges is an argument that is very nearly--but not quite--cogent.
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  42. Olga Ramirez (2012). ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL. Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose (...)
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  43. Erich Rast (2007). Reference and Indexicality. Logos.
    Reference and indexicality are two central topics in the Philosophy of Language that are closely tied together. In the first part of this book, a description theory of reference is developed and contrasted with the prevailing direct reference view with the goal of laying out their advantages and disadvantages. The author defends his version of indirect reference against well-known objections raised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and his successors, and also addresses linguistic aspects like compositionality. In the second part, (...)
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  44. Andrew P. Rebera (2009). The Gray's Elegy Argument: Denoting Concepts, Singular Terms, and Truth-Value Dependence. Prolegomena 8 (2):207-232.
    In the notoriously obscure “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (GEA) of “On Denoting”, Russell argues against the theory of denoting concepts which he had set out in his earlier work The Principles of Mathematics (PoM). Nathan Salmon has argued that the GEA is intended to demonstrate the falsity of the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms, a view which he attributes to the Russell of PoM. In a similar vein, Peter Hylton has argued that we can make sense of the GEA (...)
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  45. Manuel Rebuschi (2008). Qu’est-ce que la signification? Vrin.
    Quand nous utilisons le langage, nous nous appuyons sur le fait que les expressions linguistiques ont une signification. Comment cela fonctionne-t-il? La signification se réduit-elle à l’information? Y a-t-il un intermédiaire entre le langage et le monde? Les significations sont-elles dans la tête? Ces questions sont abordées en partant des conceptions héritées de Frege et de Russell jusqu’à la sémantique bidimensionnelle de Chalmers, en passant par les débats sur la référence des noms propres et des termes d’espèce naturelle. Le livre (...)
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  46. François Recanati (2012). Mental Files. Oxford University Press.
    Over the past fifty years the philosophy of language and mind has been dominated by a nondescriptivist approach to content and reference. This book attempts to recast and systematize that approach by offering an indexical model in terms of mental files. According to Recanati, we refer through mental files, the function of which is to store information derived through certain types of contextual relation the subject bears to objects in his or her environment. The reference of a file is determined (...)
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  47. François Recanati (2009). Anti-Descriptivism, Mental Files, And The Communication Of Singular Thoughts. Manuscrito 32 (1):7-32.
    In this paper, I argue that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation I analyse as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. I show that the mental -file approach provides a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: If singular (...)
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  48. François Recanati (2009). Singular Thought: In Defense of Acquaintance. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. OUP Oxford 141.
    This paper is about the Descriptivism/Singularism debate, which has loomed large in 20-century philosophy of language and mind. My aim is to defend Singularism by showing, first, that it is a better and more promising view than even the most sophisticated versions of Descriptivism, and second, that the recent objections to Singularism (based on a dismissal of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought) miss their target.
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  49. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals. Analysis 59 (262):106–112.
  50. Jennifer M. Saul (1997). Reply to Forbes. Analysis 57 (2):114–118.
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