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  1. Jan Almäng (2012). Russellian Propositions and Properties. Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
    This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The (...)
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  2. Joseph Almog (2006). Direct Reference and Significant Cognition: Any Paradoxes? Philosophical Books 47 (1):2-14.
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  3. C. Anthony Anderson (1986). Some Difficulties Concerning Russellian Intensional Logic. Noûs 20 (1):35-43.
  4. M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.) (1997). Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.
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  5. Philip Atkins (2014). How to Become an Enlightened Millian Heir. Philosophia 42 (4):927-934.
    Tiddy Smith, Philosophia, 42, 173–179 has recently argued that there is an enlightenment problem for Millianism. In this paper I show that Smith’s argument rests on a misunderstanding, and that the enlightenment problem can be solved according to standard versions of Millianism. In fact, the problem can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s version of Millianism, which is one of Smith’s main targets.
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  6. Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  7. Kent Bach, Comparing Frege and Russell.
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  8. Kent Bach (1987). Thought and Reference. Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a novel account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms, this book takes an original approach to the perennial problems of reference and singular terms by separating the underlying issues into different levels of analysis.
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  9. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
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  10. Victor H. Balowitz (1976). Meaning, Reference and Necessity. International Studies in Philosophy 8:216-217.
  11. George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
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  12. Jc Beall (2001). The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):308 – 309.
    Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.
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  13. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  14. David Bell (1990). How 'Russellian' Was Frege? Mind 99 (394):267-277.
  15. David Braun (2003). Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
  16. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  17. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  18. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  19. Berit Brogaard (2009). Review of Nicholas Griffin, Dale Jacquette (Eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
  20. Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...)
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  21. Ben Caplan (2007). Millian Descriptivism. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
    In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
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  22. Ben Caplan (2006). On Sense and Direct Reference. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):171-185.
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  23. Ben Caplan & Chris Tillman (2013). Benacerraf's Revenge. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):111-129.
    In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257–277, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces (...)
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  24. Peter Carruthers (1987). Russellian Thoughts. Mind 96 (381):18-35.
  25. Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...)
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  26. Nino Cocchiarella (2005). Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups, and Plurals. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):135 - 179.
    Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...)
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  27. Sean Crawford (2004). Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
    Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this (...)
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  28. Florian Demont, Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  29. Harry Deutsch (1989). On Direct Reference. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 167-195.
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  30. Max Deutsch (2006). The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.
    Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth-value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, (...)
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  31. Michael Devitt (1989). Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
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  32. Kevan Edwards (2009). Referring When Push-Comes-to-Shove. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the motivations (...)
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  33. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Kripkean Externalism Versus Conceptual Analysis. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):75-86.
  34. Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  35. Pierdaniele Giaretta (2006). Numbers, Reference and Russellian Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):95-110.
    Stewart Shapiro and John Myhill tried to reproduce some features of the intuitionistic mathematics within certain formal intensional theories of classical mathematics. Basically they introduced a knowledge operator and restricted the ways of referring to numbers and to finite hereditary sets. The restrictions are very interesting, both because they allow us to keep substitutivity of identicals notwithstanding the presence of an epistemic operator and, especially, because such restrictions allow us to see, by contrast, which ways of reference are not compatible (...)
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  36. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  37. Oswald Hanfling (1984). Scientific Realism and Ordinary Usage. Philosophical Investigations 7 (3):187-205.
  38. Robert Hanna (1993). Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive Theory of Demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.
  39. John Hawthorne (2007). Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  40. John Hawthorne (2006). Dancing Qualia and Direct Reference. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  41. John Hawthorne (ed.) (2003). Language and Mind. Blackwell.
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  42. David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan (eds.) (2015). New Essays on the Nature of Propositions. Routledge.
    These are exciting times for philosophical theorizing about propositions, with the last 15 years seeing the development of new approaches and the emergence of new theorists. Propositions have been invoked to explain thought and cognition, the nature and attribution of mental states, language and communication, and in philosophical treatments of truth, necessity and possibility. According to Frege and Russell, and their followers, propositions are structured mind- and language-independent abstract objects which have essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Some recent theorizing doubts whether (...)
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  43. Leo Iacono (2008). Beyond Millianism. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.
    In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent with Millianism.
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  44. David Kaplan (2011). An Idea of Donnellan. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. Oxford, but (c) David Kaplan. 122-175.
    This is a story about three of my favorite philosophers—Donnellan, Russell, and Frege—about how Donnellan’s concept of having in mind relates to ideas of the others, and especially about an aspect of Donnellan’s concept that has been insufficiently discussed: how this epistemic state can be transmitted from one person to another.
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  45. David Kaplan (1975). How to Russell a Frege-Church. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
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  46. Jerrold J. Katz (2001). The End of Millianism. Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):137 - 166.
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  47. Jeffrey King (1996). Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5):495 - 521.
    It is argued that taken together, two widely held claims ((i) sentences express structured propositions whose structures are functions of the structures of sentences expressing them; and (ii) sentences have underlying structures that are the input to semantic interpretation) suggest a simple, plausible theory of propositional structure. According to this theory, the structures of propositions are the same as the structures of the syntactic inputs to semantics they are expressed by. The theory is defended against a variety of objections.
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  48. Jeffrey C. King (2008). Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference. Philosophical Review 117 (1):99-117.
    result from combining the determiners `this' or `that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases such as `woman' or `woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, `this woman', and `that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex demonstratives (henceforth DRCD) and (...)
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  49. Jeffrey C. King (1999). Are Complex 'That' Phrases Devices of Direct Reference? Noûs 33 (2):155-182.
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  50. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (2014). New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions--things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate.
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