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  1. Jan Almäng (2012). Russellian Propositions and Properties. Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
    This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The (...)
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  2. Joseph Almog (2006). Direct Reference and Significant Cognition: Any Paradoxes? Philosophical Books 47 (1):2-14.
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  3. C. Anthony Anderson (1986). Some Difficulties Concerning Russellian Intensional Logic. Noûs 20 (1):35-43.
  4. M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.) (1997). Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.
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  5. Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  6. Kent Bach, Comparing Frege and Russell.
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  7. Kent Bach (1987). Thought and Reference. Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a novel account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms, this book takes an original approach to the perennial problems of reference and singular terms by separating the underlying issues into different levels of analysis.
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  8. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
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  9. Victor H. Balowitz (1976). Meaning, Reference and Necessity. International Studies in Philosophy 8:216-217.
  10. George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
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  11. Jc Beall (2001). The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):308 – 309.
    Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.
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  12. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  13. David Bell (1990). How 'Russellian' Was Frege? Mind 99 (394):267-277.
  14. David Braun (2003). Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
  15. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  16. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  17. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  18. Berit Brogaard (2009). Review of Nicholas Griffin, Dale Jacquette (Eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
  19. Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...)
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  20. Ben Caplan (2007). Millian Descriptivism. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
    In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
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  21. Ben Caplan (2006). On Sense and Direct Reference. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):171-185.
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  22. Peter Carruthers (1987). Russellian Thoughts. Mind 96 (381):18-35.
  23. Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...)
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  24. Nino Cocchiarella (2005). Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups, and Plurals. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):135 - 179.
    Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...)
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  25. Sean Crawford (2004). Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
    Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this (...)
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  26. Florian Demont, Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  27. Harry Deutsch (1989). On Direct Reference. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 167-195.
  28. Michael Devitt (1989). Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
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  29. Kevan Edwards (2009). Referring When Push-Comes-to-Shove. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the motivations (...)
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  30. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Kripkean Externalism Versus Conceptual Analysis. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):75-86.
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  31. Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  32. Pierdaniele Giaretta (2006). Numbers, Reference and Russellian Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):95-110.
    Stewart Shapiro and John Myhill tried to reproduce some features of the intuitionistic mathematics within certain formal intensional theories of classical mathematics. Basically they introduced a knowledge operator and restricted the ways of referring to numbers and to finite hereditary sets. The restrictions are very interesting, both because they allow us to keep substitutivity of identicals notwithstanding the presence of an epistemic operator and, especially, because such restrictions allow us to see, by contrast, which ways of reference are not compatible (...)
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  33. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  34. Oswald Hanfling (1984). Scientific Realism and Ordinary Usage. Philosophical Investigations 7 (3):187-205.
  35. Robert Hanna (1993). Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive Theory of Demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.
  36. John Hawthorne (2007). Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  37. John Hawthorne (2006). Dancing Qualia and Direct Reference. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  38. John Hawthorne (ed.) (2003). Language and Mind. Blackwell.
  39. David Kaplan (1975). How to Russell a Frege-Church. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
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  40. Jeffrey C. King (2008). Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference. Philosophical Review 117 (1):99-117.
    result from combining the determiners `this' or `that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases such as `woman' or `woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, `this woman', and `that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex demonstratives (henceforth DRCD) and (...)
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  41. Jeffrey C. King (1999). Are Complex 'That' Phrases Devices of Direct Reference? Noûs 33 (2):155-182.
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  42. Kevin Klement, Frege and Russell on Logic and Language.
    Russell, and his German predecessor Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). Logicism is the position in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical truth is a species of logical truth.
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  43. Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. 239--83.
  44. John-Michael Kuczynski (2010). Intensionality, Modality, Rationality: Some Presemantic Considerations. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346.
    On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...)
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  45. W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.) (1997). Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Csli.
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  46. André Leclerc (2010). Fallibilism, Demonstrative Thoughts and Russellian Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):43-54.
    Russeilian or singular propositions are very useful in sernantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a dernonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. Based on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling dernonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend the principle (...)
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  47. Czesław Lejewski (1960). A Re-Examination of the Russellian Theory of Descriptions. Philosophy 35 (132):14-29.
  48. Chenyang Li (1993). Natural Kinds: Direct Reference, Realism, and the Impossibility of Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Review of Metaphysics 47 (2):261-76.
  49. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Direct Reference in Thought and Speech. Communication and Cognition 26 (1):49-76.
    I want to begin by distinguishing between what I will call a pure Fregean theory of reference and a theory of direct reference. A pure Fregean theory of reference holds that all reference to objects is determined by a sense or content. The kind of theory I have in mind is obviously inspired by Frege, but I will not be concerned with whether it is the theory that Frege himself held.1 A theory of direct reference, as I will understand it, (...)
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  50. David Lumsden (1996). How Well Does Direct Reference Semantics Fit with Pragmatics? Philosophical Papers 25 (2):139-148.
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