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  1. H. A. Abramson (ed.) (1953). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
  2. Richard L. Amoroso (ed.) (2010). Complementarity of Mind and Body: Realizing the Dream of Descartes, Einstein, and Eccles. Nova Science Publishers.
  3. Bernard J. Baars (1994). A Thoroughly Empirical Approach to Consciousness. Psyche 1 (6).
    When are psychologists entitled to call a certain theoretical construct "consciousness?" Over the past few decades cognitive psychologists have reintroduced almost the entire conceptual vocabulary of common sense psychology, but now in a way that is tied explicitly to reliable empirical observations, and to compelling and increasingly adequate theoretical models. Nevertheless, until the past few years most cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists avoided dealing with consciousness. Today there is an increasing willingness to do so. But is "consciousness" different from other theoretical (...)
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  4. Imants Baruss & R. J. Moore (1992). Measurement of Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality. Psychological Reports 71:59-64.
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  5. J. R. Battista (1978). The Science of Consciousness. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum
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  6. Michel Bitbol (2002). Science as If Situation Mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):181-224.
    When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. (...)
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  7. N. Block (2001). Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1-2):197-219.
    Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and (...)
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  8. Richard Brown (2012). The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
    In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
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  9. David J. Chalmers (1998). The Problems of Consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven 29-59.
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
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  10. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  11. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  12. Natalie Depraz & Diego J. Cosmelli (2003). Empathy and Openness: Practices of Intersubjectivity at the Core of the Science of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (sup1):163-203.
  13. Eric Dietrich (2001). Banbury Bound, or Can a Machine Be Conscious? J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 13 (2):177-180.
    In mid-May of 2001, I attended a fascinating workshop at Cold Spring Harbor Labs. The conference was held at the lab's Banbury Center, an elegant mansion and its beautiful surrounding estate, located on Banbury Lane, in the outskirts of Lloyd Harbor, overlooking the north shore of Long Island in New York. The estate was formerly owned by Charles Sammis Robertson. In 1976, Robertson donated his estate, and an endowment for its upkeep, to the Lab. The donation included the Robertson's mansion, (...)
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  14. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  15. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). The “New Mind” Revisited, or Minding the Content/Vehicle Distinction: A Response to Manzotti and Pepperell. AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  16. Steven Ericsson-Zenith (forthcoming). Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension. Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering.
    At its core this book is concerned with logic and computation with respect to the mathematical characterization of sentient biophysical structure and its behavior. -/- Three related theories are presented: The first of these provides an explanation of how sentient individuals come to be in the world. The second describes how these individuals operate. And the third proposes a method for reasoning about the behavior of individuals in groups. -/- These theories are based upon a new explanation of experience in (...)
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  17. Paul Feyerabend (1966). Mind, Matter, and Method. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
    This volume of twenty-six essays by as many contributors is published in honor of Herbert Feigl, professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota and ...
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  18. Owen J. Flanagan (1995). Consciousness and the Natural Method. Neuropsychologia 33:1103-15.
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  19. Christopher D. Frith (2003). The Scientific Study of Consciousness. In Maria A. Ron & Trevor W. Robbins (eds.), Disorders of Brain and Mind 2. Cambridge University Press 197-222.
  20. M. Gell-Mann (2001). Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:41-49.
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  21. A. Goldman (2000). Can Science Know When You're Conscious? Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):3-22.
    Consciousness researchers standardly rely on their subjects’ verbal reports to ascertain which conscious states they are in. What justifies this reliance on verbal reports? Does it comport with the third-person approach characteristic of science, or does it ultimately appeal to first-person knowledge of consciousness? If first-person knowledge is required, does this pass scientific muster? Several attempts to rationalize the reliance on verbal reports are considered, beginning with attempts to define consciousness via the higher-order thought approach and functionalism. These approaches are (...)
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  22. Susan A. Greenfield (2002). Mind, Brain and Consciousness. British Journal of Psychiatry 181 (2):91-93.
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  23. R. R. Grinker (1953). Problems of Consciousness: A Review, an Analysis, and a Proposition. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation
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  24. Willis W. Harman (1987). Consciousness as Causal Reality: Towards a Complementary Science. In The Real and the Imaginary. New York: Paragon House
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  25. Willis W. Harman (1987). The Real And The Imaginary. New York: Paragon House.
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  26. Wolfgang Huemer & Christoph Landerer (2010). Mathematics, Experience, and Laboratories: Herbart's and Brentano's Role in the Rise of Scientific Psychology. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):72-94.
    In this article we present and compare two early attempts to establish psychology as an independent scientific discipline that had considerable influence in central Europe: the theories of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776—1841) and Franz Brentano (1838—1917). While both of them emphasize that psychology ought to be conceived as an empirical science, their conceptions show revealing differences. Herbart starts with metaphysical principles and aims at mathematizing psychology, whereas Brentano rejects all metaphysics and bases his method on a conception of inner perception (...)
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  27. Piet Hut (1999). Exploring Actuality Through Experiment and Experience. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press 391--405.
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  28. Robert G. Jahn & Brenda J. Dunne (1997). Science of the Subjective. Journal of Scientific Exploration 11 (2):201-224.
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  29. H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.) (1998). Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.
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  30. Sonya Jewkes & Imants Barušs (2000). Personality Correlates of Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality. Advanced Development 9:91-103.
  31. J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (2007). Stable Instabilities in the Study of Consciousness: A Potentially Integrative Prologue? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1).
    The purpose of this special issue and the conference that inspired it was to address the issue of conceptual integration in a science of consciousness. We felt this to be important, for while current efforts to scientifically investigate consciousness are taking place in an interdisciplinary context, it often seems as though the very terms being used to sustain a sense of interdisciplinary cooperation are working against it. This is because it is this very array of common concepts that generates a (...)
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  32. J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (2007). The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.
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  33. Brian Josephson & Beverly Rubik (1992). The Challenge of Consciousness Research. Frontier Perspectives 3 (1):15-19.
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  34. Sabine Maasen (2007). Selves in Turmoil. In J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Imprint Academic 252-270.
    As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. Outside (...)
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  35. George Mandler (2005). The Consciousness Continuum: From "Qualia" to "Free Will". Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung. Vol 69 (5-6):330-337.
  36. Christophe Menant, Evolution as Connecting First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives of Consciousness (2008).
    First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point (...)
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  37. Bjorn H. Merker, The Common Denominator of Conscious States: Implications for the Biology of Consciousness.
    In order to distinguish the conscious state itself from its aspects and contents we need an answer to the question "if there is something it is like to be conscious, what is it?" A succinct answer to this question is provided in the form of a common denominator of all conscious states. This characterization of the conscious state has implications for the systematic study of consciousness through its bearing on a number of concrete issues connected with the nature of consciousness (...)
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  38. David Midgley (2006). Intersubjectivity and Collective Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):99-109.
    This paper explores some connections between the philosophically central topic of intersubjectivity highlighted in John Ziman's article and the notion of collective consciousness, which has received very little formal attention in mainstream philosophy. The deconstruction of the Cartesian model of isolated spheres of consciousness which the intersubjective viewpoint brings about is supported by considerations from Kant's critical account of transcendental psychology. The phenomenon of empathy, an essential component in the achievement of intersubjective consensus, is related to the possibility of shared (...)
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  39. D. Miller (2000). Designing a Bridge for Consciousness: Are Criteria for a Unification of Approaches Feasible? Advances in Mind-Body Medicine 16 (2):82-89.
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  40. Jacob Needleman (1993). Inner Empiricism as a Way to a Science of Consciousness. Noetic Sciences Review.
  41. R. Nunez (1997). Eating Soup with Chopsticks: Dogmas, Difficulties, and Alternatives in the Study of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):143-66.
    The recently celebrated division into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems of consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds, it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have, rather, are ‘difficult’ problems of conscious experience, but problems that are not difficult per se. Their difficulty is relative, among other things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to accomplish the task. (...)
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  42. Rafael E. Núñez (1997). Eating Soup with Chopsticks: Dogmas, Difficulties and Alternatives in the Study of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):143-166.
    The recently celebrated division into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems of consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds, it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have, rather, are ‘difficult’ problems of conscious experience, but problems that are not difficult per se. Their difficulty is relative, among other things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to accomplish the task. (...)
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  43. Séan Ó Nualláin (2006). Inner and Outer Empiricism in Consciousness Research. New Ideas in Psychology 24 (1):30-40.
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  44. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
    Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
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  45. Morten Overgaard (2004). Confounding Factors in Contrastive Analysis. Synthese 141 (2):217-31.
    Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in (...)
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  46. David Papineau (2003). Could There Be a Science of Consciousness? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):205-20.
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  47. Kawalec Pawel (2010). Przyczynowość stanów mentalnych w modelach naukowych. Próba alternatywnego uzasadnienia antynaturalizmu eksplanacyjnego Urszuli Żegleń. In Muszyński Zbysław (ed.), Umysł. Natura i sposób istnienia. Wydawnictwo UMCS 45-57.
    An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, (...)
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  48. John Pickering (2000). Methods Are a Message. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins 279-300.
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  49. K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.) (1978). The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigations Into the Flow of Human Experience. Plenum Press.
  50. Sam S. Rakover (2002). Scientific Rules of the Game and the Mind/Body: A Critique Based on the Theory of Measurement. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):52-57.
1 — 50 / 72