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  1. Justin Broackes (2011). Where Do the Unique Hues Come From? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):601-628.
    Where are we to look for the unique hues? Out in the world? In the eye? In more central processing? 1. There are difficulties looking for the structure of the unique hues in simple combinations of cone-response functions like ( L − M ) and ( S − ( L + M )): such functions may fit pretty well the early physiological processing, but they don’t correspond to the structure of unique hues. It may seem more promising to look to, (...)
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  2. Thomas Busey, Chen Yu, Dean Wyatte & John Vanderkolk (2013). Temporal Sequences Quantify the Contributions of Individual Fixations in Complex Perceptual Matching Tasks. Cognitive Science 37 (4):731-756.
    Perceptual tasks such as object matching, mammogram interpretation, mental rotation, and satellite imagery change detection often require the assignment of correspondences to fuse information across views. We apply techniques developed for machine translation to the gaze data recorded from a complex perceptual matching task modeled after fingerprint examinations. The gaze data provide temporal sequences that the machine translation algorithm uses to estimate the subjects' assumptions of corresponding regions. Our results show that experts and novices have similar surface behavior, such as (...)
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  3. Boyd Millar (2006). The Conflicted Character of Picture Perception. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):471–477.
    It is often assumed that there is a perceptual conflict in looking at a picture since one sees both a two-dimensional surface and a three-dimensional scene simultaneously. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to think that looking at pictures requires the visual system to perform the special task of reconciling inconsistent impressions of space, or competing information from different depth cues. To the contrary, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that the perception of (...)
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Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  1. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4).
  2. William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert (2001). The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S176-S186.
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination (...)
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  3. Jerome S. Bruner (1957). On Perceptual Readiness. Psychological Review 64:123-52.
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  4. Philip Cam (1990). Insularity and the Persistence of Perceptual Illusion. Analysis 50 (October):231-5.
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  5. Lelio Camilleri (1992). On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. Minds and Machines 2 (4):365-377.
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the possibilities (...)
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  6. Patricia S. Churchland, V. S. Ramachandran & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). A Critique of Pure Vision. In Christof Koch & Joel L. David (eds.), Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain. MIT Press.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to (...)
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  7. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are (...)
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  8. Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    The present essay is addressed simultaneously to two distinct audiences.
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  9. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  10. William Cornwell (2004). Dr. In Marek, Johann Christian & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. niederosterreichkultur.
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  11. Parker Crutchfield (2011). Representing High-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294.
    High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not (...)
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  12. Ophelia Deroy (2013). Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.
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  13. P. DesAutels (1995). Two Types of Theories: The Impact of Churchland's Perceptual Plasticity. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33.
    In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of (...)
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  14. Zoe Drayson (2011). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy? [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):242-249.
  15. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Theory-Laden Experience and Illusions. Ethos 4 (2):58-67.
    The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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  16. Matthew H. Erdelyi (1974). A New Look at the New Look: Perceptual Defense and Vigilance. Psychological Review 81:1-25.
  17. Anna Estany (2001). The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul (...)
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1988). A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  19. Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  20. Jerry A. Fodor (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
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  21. Ellen Fridland (2010). Perception and Skill: Theoretical Foundations for a Science of Perception. Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
  22. Angus Gellatly (1999). Perception and Information Processing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):377-378.
    Perception and cognition can be understood either as conscious experience, thought, and behaviour or as bodily functions executed at the level of information processing. Whether or not they are cognitively penetrable depends on the level referred to. Selective attention is the mechanism by which cognition affects perception, theory influences observation and observational reports, culture biases experience, and current knowledge determines what inferences are made. Seeing must be distinguished from seeing as.
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  23. Philip Simon Gerrans & Jeanette M. Kennett, Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?
    The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Garrett Cullity on moral psychology and another by Richard Joyce on moral judgements.
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  24. Daniel J. Gilman (1991). The Neurobiology of Observation. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.
    Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself (...)
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  25. I. J. Good (1968). Creativity and Duality in Perception and Recall. In Proceedings of the Iee/Npl Conference on Pattern Recognition No. 42. Inst Elec Eng Npl.
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  26. Richard Gray (2001). Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and the Constitution of Psychological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...)
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  27. John D. Greenwood (1999). Simulation, Theory-Theory and Cognitive Penetration: No 'Instance of the Fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.
  28. Alexander Grunewald (1999). Neurophysiology Indicates Cognitive Penetration of the Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.
    Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components.
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  29. Jane Heal (1996). Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
  30. Lester E. Krueger (1999). An Even Stronger Case for the Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):382-383.
    Pylyshyn could have strengthened his case by avoiding side issues and by taking a sterner, firmer line on the unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) problems plaguing the sensitivity (d') measure of top-down, cognitive effects, as well as the general (nearly utter!) lack of convincing evidence provided by proponents of the cognitive penetrability of visual perception.
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  31. Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, Cognitive Penetrability and the Turing Test. Psycoloquy.
    The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.
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  32. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  33. Neil A. Macmillan (1999). Better Ways to Study Penetrability with Detection Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):384-384.
    Signal detection theory (SDT) is best known as a method for separating sensitivity from bias. If sensitivity reflects early sensory processing and bias later cognition, then SDT can be use to study penetrability by asking whether cognitive manipulations affect sensitivity. This assumption is too simple, but SDT can nonetheless be helpful in developing specific methods of how sensory and cognitive information combine. Two such approaches are described.
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  34. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? Ifone thinks that this can happen [at least in certain ways that are identWed in the paper] then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitivelv impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case ofcognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can (...)
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  35. Eric Mandelbaum, Ballistic, Automatic, Mandatory: On An Ambiguity in Mandatory Perceptual Processing.
  36. Robert N. McCauley & J. Henrich (2006). Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):79-101.
    Jerry Fodor has consistently cited the persistence of illusions--especially the M.
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  37. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, (...)
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  38. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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  39. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S187-S199.
    In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...)
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  40. Gillian Rhodes & Michael L. Kalish (1999). Cognitive Penetration: Would We Know It If We Saw It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):390-391.
    How can the impenetrability hypothesis be empirically tested? We comment on the role of signal detection measures, suggesting that context effects on discriminations for which post-perceptual cues are irrelevant, or on neural activity associated with early vision, would challenge impenetrability. We also note the great computational power of the proposed pre-perceptual attention processes and consider the implications for testability of the theory.
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  41. Irvin Rock (1983). The Logic Of Perception. Cambridge: Mit Press.
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  42. Mark Rollins (1994). Deep Plasticity: The Encoding Approach to Perceptual Change. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):39-54.
    The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach to perception (...)
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  43. Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
    Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi.
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  44. Nicholas Shea (forthcoming). Distinguishing Top-Down From Bottom-Up Effects. In S. Biggs, M. Matthen & D. Stokes (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    The distinction between top-down and bottom-up effects is widely relied on in experimental psychology. However, there is an important problem with the way it is normally defined. Top-down effects are effects of previously-stored information on processing the current input. But on the face of it that includes the information that is implicit in the operation of any psychological process – in its dispositions to transition from some types of representational state to others. This paper suggests a way to distinguish information (...)
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  45. Susanna Siegel (2013). Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role? In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford.
    I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
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  46. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  47. Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  48. Susanna Siegel (2012). Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Noûs 46 (2):201-222.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  49. Barry Smith (1995). Common Sense. In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Can there be a theory-free experience? And what would be the object of such an experience. Drawing on ideas set out by Husserl in the “Crisis” and in the second book of his “Ideas”, the paper presents answers to these questions in such a way as to provide a systematic survey of the content and ontology of common sense. In the second part of the paper Husserl’s ideas on the relationship between the common-sense world (what he called the ‘life-world’) and (...)
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  50. Paul T. Sowden (1999). Expert Perceivers and Perceptual Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):396-397.
    Expert perceivers may learn more than just where to apply visual processing, or which part of the output from the visual system to attend to. Their early visual system may be modified, as a result of their specific needs, through a process of early visual learning. We argue that this is, in effect, a form of long-term, indirect cognitive penetration of early vision.
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  51. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1997). Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality, and Restricted Simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.
    In a series of recent papers, Jane Heal (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) has developed her own quite distinctive version of simulation theory and offered a detailed critique of the arguments against simulation theory that we and our collaborators presented in earlier papers. Heal's theory is clearly set out and carefully defended, and her critique of our arguments is constructive and well informed. Unlike a fair amount of what has been written in this area in recent years, her work is (...)
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  52. Neil Stillings (1987). Modularity and Naturalism in Theories of Vision. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation. Cambridge: Mit Press.
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  53. Neil Stillings (1987). Modularity In Knowledge Representation. Cambridge: Mit Press.
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  54. Dustin Stokes, Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art.
    There are good, even if inconclusive reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance—indeed some would argue, the essence—of this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. Intuition has it that knowledge about art changes how one aesthetically (...)
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  55. Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debateable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, (...)
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  56. Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
    This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of (...)
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  57. Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron, Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma.
    Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it (...)
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  58. John K. Tsotsos (1999). Attentive Selection Penetrates (Almost) the Entire Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):397-397.
    Pylyshyn claims that if a system is cognitively penetrable, its function depends in a semantically coherent way to the organism's goals and beliefs. He rejects evidence of attentional modulation observed in neurons within the visual system, claiming that any modulation seen is not logically related to goals and behavior. I present some of this evidence and claim that it is connected in exactly the way Pylyshyn requires and thus it refutes his main thesis.
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  59. L. M. Vaina (1990). What and Where in the Human Visual System: Two Hierarchies of Visual Modules. Synthese 83 (1):49-91.
    In this paper we focus on the modularity of visual functions in the human visual cortex, that is, the specific problems that the visual system must solve in order to achieve recognition of objects and visual space. The computational theory of early visual functions is briefly reviewed and is then used as a basis for suggesting computational constraints on the higher-level visual computations. The remainder of the paper presents neurological evidence for the existence of two visual systems in man, one (...)
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  60. Giorgio Vallortigara (1999). Segregation and Integration of Information Among Visual Modules. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):398-399.
    It is argued that the alleged cases of cognitive penetration of visual modules actually arise from the integration of information among different modules. This would reflect a general computational strategy according to which constraints to a particular module would be provided by information coming from different modules. Examples are provided from the integration of stereopsis and occlusion and from computation of motion direction.
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  61. Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels (1999). An Ecological Approach to Cognitive (Im)Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.
    We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.
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  62. Richard D. Wright & Michael R. W. Dawson (1994). To What Extent Do Beliefs Affect Apparent Motion? Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):471-491.
    A number of studies in the apparent motion literature were examined using the cognitive penetrability criterion to determine the extent to which beliefs affect the perception of apparent motion. It was found that the interaction between the perceptual processes mediating apparent motion and higher order processes appears to be limited. In addition, perceptual and inferential beliefs appear to have different effects on perceived motion optimality and direction. Our findings suggest that the system underlying apparent motion perception has more than one (...)
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  63. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? Philosophical Studies.
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I first explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals. I then provide a sufficient condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational condition for cognitive (...)
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Ecological Approaches to Perception
  1. Jan Alm (2008). Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161 – 177.
    According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell's position, Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, the (...)
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  2. Adrian Alsmith (2012). The Concept of a Structural Affordance. Avant 3 (2):94-107.
    I provide an analysis of the concept of an “affordance” that enables one to conceive of “structural affordance” as a kind of affordance relation that might hold between an agent and its body. I then review research in the science of humanoid bodily movement to indicate the empirical reality of structural affordance.
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  3. Berm (1998). Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View. In The Body and the Self. Cambridge: Mit Press.
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  4. Berm (1998). The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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  5. Mark H. Bickhard & D. Michael Richie (1983). On The Nature Of Representation: A Case Study Of James Gibson's Theory Of Perception. Ny: Praeger.
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  6. David M. Boynton (1993). Relativism in Gibson's Theory of Picture Perception. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):51-69.
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  7. Michael Braund (2008). The Structures of Perception: An Ecological Perspective. Kritike 2 (1).
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  8. Robert Briscoe (2010). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
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  9. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  10. Vicki Bruce & Patrick Green (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  11. Anthony Chemero (2003). An Outline of a Theory of Affordances. Ecological Psychology 15 (2):181-195.
    The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend (...)
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  12. Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey, Gibsonian Affordances for Roboticists.
    Using hypersets as an analytic tool, we compare traditionally Gibsonian (Chemero 2003; Turvey 1992) and representationalist (Sahin et al. this issue) understandings of the notion ‘affordance’. We show that representationalist understandings are incompatible with direct perception and erect barriers between animal and environment. They are, therefore, scarcely recognizable as understandings of ‘affordance’. In contrast, Gibsonian understandings are shown to treat animal-environment systems as unified complex systems and to be compatible with direct perception. We discuss the fruitful connections between Gibsonian affordances (...)
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  13. Tony Chemero (forthcoming). Information and Direct Perception: A New Approach. In Priscila Farias & Jo (eds.), Advanced Issues in Cognitive Science and Semiotics.
    Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson.
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  14. Tony Chemero (2003). Review of Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James' Radical Empiricism. [REVIEW] Contemporary Psychology.
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  15. Tony Chemero (2001). What We Perceive When We Perceive Affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action. Ecological Psychology 13 (2):111-116.
    In her essay --?Information, Perception and Action--, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances.
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  16. Alan Costall (2012). Canonical Affordances in Context. Avant 3 (2):85-93.
    James Gibson’s concept of affordances was an attempt to undermine the traditional dualism of the objective and subjective. Gibson himself insisted on the continuity of “affordances in general” and those attached to human artifacts. However, a crucial distinction needs to be drawn between “affordances in general” and the “canonical affordances” that are connected primarily to artifacts. Canonical affordances are conventional and normative. It is only in such cases that it makes sense to talk of the affordance of the object. Chairs, (...)
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  17. Adrian Cussins (2012). Environmental Representation of the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
  18. John Dilworth (2006). A Reflexive Dispositional Analysis of Mechanistic Perception. Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493.
    The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably (...)
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  19. John Dilworth (2005). A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
    This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...)
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  20. John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33:17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
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  21. John Dilworth (2004). Naturalized Perception Without Information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
    The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...)
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  22. Priscila Farias & Jo (eds.) (forthcoming). Advanced Issues in Cognitive Science and Semiotics.
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  23. Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1981). How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'. Cognition 9:139-96.
  24. James J. Gibson (1976). The Myth of Passive Perception: A Reply to Richards. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):234-238.
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  25. James J. Gibson (1968). The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems. Allen & Unwin.
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  26. James J. Gibson (1950). The Perception Of The Visual World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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  27. David A. Givner (1982). Concepts, Percepts and Perceptal Systems: The Relevance of Psychology to Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 13 (July-October):209-216.
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  28. David A. Givner (1982). Direct Perception, Misperception and Perceptual Systems: J. J. Gibson and the Problem of Illusion. Nature and System 4 (September):131-142.
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  29. Philip A. Glotzbach (1992). Determining the Primary Problem of Visual Perception: A Gibsonian Response to the Correlation' Objection. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):69-94.
    Fodor & Pylyshyn (1981) criticize J. J. Gibson's ecological account of perception for failing to address what I call the 'correlation problem' in visual perception. That is, they charge that Gibson cannot explain how perceivers learn to correlate detectable properties of the light with perceptible properties of the environment. Furthermore, they identify the correlation problem as a crucial issue for any theory of visual perception, what I call a 'primary problem'—i.e. a problem which plays a definitive role in establishing the (...)
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  30. Philip A. Glotzbach & Harry Heff (1982). Ecological and Phenomenological Contributions to the Psychology of Perception. Noûs 16 (March):108-121.
  31. Gary Hatfield (1990). Gibsonian Representations and Connectionist Symbol-Processing: Prospects for Unification. Psychological Research 52:243-52.
  32. John Heil (1981). Gibsonian Sins of Omission. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (3):307–311.
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  33. John Heil (1979). What Gibson's Missing. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):265–269.
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  34. Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.) (2012). Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
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