This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
71 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. Paul Bach-Y.-Rita, Mitchell Tyler & Kurt Kaczamarek (2003). Seeing with the Brain. International Journal Of Human-Computer Interaction 15 (2):285-295.
  2. Talis Bachmann (1998). Fast Dynamics of Visibility of Brief Visual Images: The Perceptual-Retouch Viewpoint. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Talis Bachmann (1997). Visibility of Brief Images: The Dual-Process Approach. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (4):491-518.
    If successive, brief visual images are exposed for recognition or for psychophysical ratings, various effects and phenomena of fast dynamics of conscious perception such as mutual masking, metacontrast, proactive enhancement of contrast, proactive speed-up of the latency of subjective visual experience, the Fröhlich Effect, the Tandem Effect, attentional facilitation by visuospatial precuing, and some others have been found. The theory proposed to deal with these phenomena proceeds from the assumption that two types of brain processes are necessary in order to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Werner Backhaus (ed.) (2001). Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.
  5. Dana Ballard (2002). Our Perception of the World has to Be an Illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):54-71.
    Our seamless perception of the world depends very much on the slow time scales used by conscious perception. Time scales longer than one second are needed to assemble conscious experience. At time scales shorter than one second, this seamlessness quickly deteriorates. Numerous experiments reveal the fragmentary nature of the visual information used to construct visual experience. Models of how the brain manages these fragments use the construct of a routine, which is a task-specific fragment of a sensory-motor program. This paper (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. N. Baxt (1982). On the Time Necessary for a Visual Impression to Come Into Consciousness. Psychological Research 44:1-12.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. J. Beeckmans (2004). Chromatically Rich Phenomenal Percepts. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):27-44.
    Visual percepts frequently appear chromatically rich, yet their paucity in reportable information has led to widely accepted minimalist models of vision. The discrepancy may be resolved by positing that the richness of natural scenes is reflected in phenomenal consciousness but not in detail in the phenomenal judgments upon which reports about qualia are based. Conceptual awareness (including phenomenal judgments) arises from neural mechanisms that categorize objects, and also from mechanisms that conceptually characterize textural properties of pre-categorically segmented regions in the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Artem V. Belopolsky, The Role of Awareness in the Error-Processing of Involuntary Eye Movements.
  9. Randolph Blake, Duje Tadin, Kenith V. Sobel, Tony A. Raissian & Sang Chul Chong (2006). Strength of Early Visual Adaptation Depends on Visual Awareness. Pnas Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (12):4783-4788.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Bruno G. Breitmeyer & Haluk Ögmen (2006). Visual Masking: Time Slices Through Conscious and Unconscious Vision (2nd Ed.). Oxford University Press.
    This new edition uses the technique of visual masking to explore temporal aspects of conscious and unconscious processes down to a resolution in the...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert Briscoe (2010). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Robert Briscoe (2008). Another Look at the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis: The Argument From Illusion Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):35-62.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend what I call the action-oriented coding theory (ACT) of spatially contentful visual experience. Integral to ACT is the view that conscious visual experience and visually guided action make use of a common subject-relative or 'egocentric' frame of reference. Proponents of the influential two visual systems hypothesis (TVSH), however, have maintained on empirical grounds that this view is false (Milner & Goodale, 1995/2006; Clark, 1999; 2001; Campbell, 2002; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Goodale & (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Briscoe & Rick Grush (2015). Action-Based Theories of Perception. In The Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy. 1-66.
    Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the environment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial relations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties you visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface enables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and walking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant smell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate useful sources of perceptual information (Gibson 1966, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. John R. Christie & John Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
    Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Austen Clark (2001). Some Logical Features of Feature Integration. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific 3-20.
    One of the biggest challenges in understanding perception is to understand how the nervous system manages to integrate the multiple codes it uses to represent features in multiple sensory modalities. From different cortical areas, which might separately register the sight of something red and the touch of something smooth, one effortlessly generates the perception of one thing that is both red and smooth. This process has been variously called "feature integration", "binding", or "synthesis". Citing some current models and some historical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. A. I. Cogan (1995). Vision Comes to Mind. Perception 24:811-26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Todd R. Davies, Donald D. Hoffman & Agustin M. G. Rodriguez (2002). Visual Worlds: Construction or Reconstruction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):72-87.
    Psychophysical studies of change blindness indicate that, at any instant, human observers are aware of detail in few parts of the visual field. Such results suggest, to some theorists, that human vision reconstructs only a few portions of the visual scene and that, to bridge the resulting representational gaps, it often lets physical objects serve as their own short-term memory. We propose that human vision reconstructs no portion of the visual scene, and that it never lets physical objects serve as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Liesbet De Kock (2014). Voluntarism in Early Psychology: The Case of Hermann von Helmholtz. History of Psychology 17 (2):105-28.
    The failure to recognize the programmatic similarity between (post-)Kantian German philosophy and early psychology has impoverished psychology's historical self-understanding to a great extent. This article aims to contribute to recent efforts to overcome the gaps in the historiography of contemporary psychology, which are the result of an empiricist bias. To this end, we present an analysis of the way in which Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of perception resonates with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Ego-doctrine. It will be argued that this indebtedness is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Daniel C. Dennett (1992). Filling in Versus Finding Out: A Ubiquitous Confusion in Cognitive Science. In H. Pick, P. Van den Broek & D. Knill (eds.), [Book Chapter]. American Psychological Association
    One of the things you learn if you read books and articles in (or about) cognitive science is that the brain does a lot of "filling in"--not filling in, but "filling in"--in scare quotes. My claim today will be that this way of talking is not a safe bit of shorthand, or an innocent bit of temporizing, but a source of deep confusion and error. The phenomena described in terms of "filling in" are real, surprising, and theoretically important, but it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. V. di Lollo, James T. Enns & R. Rensink (2000). Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Frank H. Durgin (2002). The Tinkerbell Effect: Motion, Perception and Illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):88-101.
    A new motion illusion is discussed in relation to the idea of vision as a Grand Illusion. An experiment shows that this 'Tinkerbell effect' is a good example of a visual illusion supported by low-level stimulus information, but resulting from integration principles probably necessary for normal perception.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Frank H. Durgin (2002). An Ostrich on a Rock: Commentary on Christie and Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):366-371.
    There are problems with both the theoretical logic and the interpretation of data in Christie and Barresi's interesting article. The general pattern of results is easily incorporated into an information-processing framework compatible with Dennett's analysis. In particular, different aspects of the illusory motion event are queried at different times and these aspects are not in conflict, so no revision of conscious content is necessary. Second, too much interpretive weight is placed on an anomalous pair of data points that do not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Frank H. Durgin (1995). On the Filling in of the Visual Blind Spot: Some Rules of Thumb. Perception 24:827-40.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David M. Eagleman & Terrence J. Sejnowski (2000). Motion Integration and Postdiction in Visual Awareness. Science 287 (5460):2036-2038.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. J. T. Enns, R. A. Rensink & V. Di Lollo (2000). Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology 129 (4):481-507.
    Advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have called attention to reentrant signalling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. We propose that explicit use be made of reentrant processing in theories of perception. To show that this can be done effectively in one domain, we report on a series of psychophysical experiments involving a new form of masking, which defies explanation by current feed-forward theories. This masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Susanne Ferber & Stephen M. Emrich (2007). Maintaining the Ties That Bind: The Role of an Intermediate Visual Memory Store in the Persistence of Awareness. Cognitive Neuropsychology 24 (2):187-210.
  29. Gregory Francis & Frouke Hermens (2002). Comment on Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes (di Lollo, Enns & Rensink, 2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 131 (4):590-593.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Harry Haroutioun Haladjian & Carlos Montemayor (2015). On the Evolution of Conscious Attention. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22 (3):595-613.
    This paper aims to clarify the relationship between consciousness and attention through theoretical considerations about evolution. Specifically, we will argue that the empirical findings on attention and the basic considerations concerning the evolution of the different forms of attention demonstrate that consciousness and attention must be dissociated regardless of which definition of these terms one uses. To the best of our knowledge, no extant view on the relationship between consciousness and attention has this advantage. Because of this characteristic, this paper (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Gary Hatfield (2012). Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors in Spatial Perception. In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. OUP Oxford 35.
  32. C. Hofstoetter, Christof Koch & D. C. Kiper (2004). Motion-Induced Blindness Does Not Affect the Formation of Negative Afterimages. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):691-708.
    Aftereffects induced by invisible stimuli constitute a powerful tool to investigate what type of neural information processing can occur in the absence of visual awareness. This approach has been successfully used to demonstrate that awareness of oriented gratings or translating stimuli is not necessary to obtain a robust orientation-specific or motion-specific aftereffect. We exploit motion-induced blindness to investigate the related question of the influence of visual awareness on the formation of negative afterimages. Our results show that MIB does not affect (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Janet H. Hsiao & Sze Man Lam (2013). The Modulation of Visual and Task Characteristics of a Writing System on Hemispheric Lateralization in Visual Word Recognition—A Computational Exploration. Cognitive Science 37 (5):861-890.
    Through computational modeling, here we examine whether visual and task characteristics of writing systems alone can account for lateralization differences in visual word recognition between different languages without assuming influence from left hemisphere (LH) lateralized language processes. We apply a hemispheric processing model of face recognition to visual word recognition; the model implements a theory of hemispheric asymmetry in perception that posits low spatial frequency biases in the right hemisphere and high spatial frequency (HSF) biases in the LH. We show (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Liqiang Huang, Anne Treisman & Harold Pashler (2007). Characterizing the Limits of Human Visual Awareness. Science 317 (5839):823-825.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. D. E. Irwin (1991). Information Integration Across Saccadic Eye Movements. Cognitive Psychology 23:420-56.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. J. Lachter, Frank H. Durgin & T. Washington (2000). Disappearing Percepts: Evidence for Retention Failure in Metacontrast Masking. Visual Cognition 7:269-279.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David A. Leopold (2003). Visual Perception: Shaping What We See. Current Biology 13 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. David A. Leopold, Melanie Wilke, Alexander Maier & Nikos K. Logothetis (2002). Stable Perception of Visually Ambiguous Patterns. Nature Neuroscience 5 (6):605-609.
    Correspondence should be addressed to David A. Leopold david.leopold@tuebingen.mpg.deDuring the viewing of certain patterns, widely known as ambiguous or puzzle figures, perception lapses into a sequence of spontaneous alternations, switching every few seconds between two or more visual interpretations of the stimulus. Although their nature and origin remain topics of debate, these stochastic switches are generally thought to be the automatic and inevitable consequence of viewing a pattern without a unique solution. We report here that in humans such perceptual alternations (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Daniel Levitin (ed.) (2002). Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings. MIT Press.
    An anthology of core readings on cognitive psychology.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Fiona Macpherson (2013). The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction. In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press
    An overview of the philosophy and psychology of hallucination and its relevance to the philosophy of perception.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
  42. A. D. Milner (2008). Conscious and Unconscious Visual Processing in the Human Brain. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  43. Stephen R. Mitroff, Brian J. Scholl & Karen Wynn (2005). The Relationship Between Object Files and Conscious Perception. Cognition 96 (1):67-92.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Thomas Natsoulas (1994). An Introduction to Reflective Seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):351-74.
    After two sections of background discussion regarding some views of inner some recent deployments of James J. Gibson's ecological approach to visual perception relevant to our understanding of reflective seeing, I present my own view of reflective seeing for the remainder of the present article. Although I include detailed references to Edmund Husserl's conception of straightforward perceptual consciousness and reflective perceptual consciousness, the present article is not about Husserl. Rather, I use quotations from and about Husserl to add resonance and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Thomas Natsoulas (1993). An Introduction to Reflective Seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):235-56.
    The human visual system allows a number of molar activities, among them straightforward seeing and reflective seeing. Both of these activities include, as product and part of them, a stream of first-order, visual perceptual consciousness of the ecological environment and of the perceiver himself or herself as inhabiting the environment and acting or moving within it. The two respective component streams of first-order consciousness both proceed at certain brain centers and, in Gibson's sense, they are resonatings to the stimulus energy (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. R. Nijhawan & B. Khurana (2000). Conscious Registration of Continuous and Discrete Visual Events. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Kevin J. O'Regan (1992). Solving the "Real" Mysteries of Visual Perception: The World as an Outside Memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology 46:461-88.
  48. Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.
  49. Scott D. Palmer (2002). Visual Awareness. In Daniel Levitin (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings. MIT Press
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Scott D. Palmer (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 71