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  1. Kólá ABíMBÓLÁ (2010). Rationality and Methodological Change: Dudley Shapere's Conception of Scientific Development. Principia 10 (1):39-65.
    Over the last 4 or so decades, Dudley Shapere has developed a rich and interesting alternative to the Kuhnian “relativist” account of science and its development. This paper is a review of this alternative viewpoint. It is a critical evaluation of Shapere’s arguments in support of the claim that radical methodological change can be allowed in science without thereby embracing relativism (and without ending with an irrational account of scientific change).
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  2. Joseph Agassi (2003). Comparability and Incommensurability. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):93 – 94.
  3. Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe & Erik Steen Kristensen (2002). Towards a Systemic Research Methodology in Agriculture: Rethinking the Role of Values in Science. [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 19 (1):3-23.
    The recent drastic developmentof agriculture, together with the growingsocietal interest in agricultural practices andtheir consequences, pose a challenge toagricultural science. There is a need forrethinking the general methodology ofagricultural research. This paper takes somesteps towards developing a systemic researchmethodology that can meet this challenge – ageneral self-reflexive methodology that forms abasis for doing holistic or (with a betterterm) wholeness-oriented research and providesappropriate criteria of scientific quality.From a philosophy of research perspective,science is seen as an interactive learningprocess with both a cognitive (...)
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  4. Hanne Andersen (2010). Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study. Episteme 7 (3):248-265.
    Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses of joint (...)
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  5. Gunnar Andersson (1994). Criticism and the History of Science: Kuhn's, Lakatos's, and Feyrabend's Criticisms of Critical Rationalism. E.J. Brill.
    In "Criticism and the History of Science" Karl Popper's falsificationist conception of science is developed and defended against criticisms raised by Thomas ...
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  6. Theodore Arabatzis (2011). On the Historicity of Scientific Objects. Erkenntnis 75 (3):377-390.
    The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science (...)
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  7. Wolfgang Balzer, Bernhard Lauth & Gerhard Zoubek (1993). A Model for Science Kinematics. Studia Logica 52 (4):519 - 548.
    A comprehensive model for describing various forms of developments in science is defined in precise, set-theoretic terms, and in the spirit of the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. The model emends previous accounts in centering on single systems in a homogenous way, eliminating notions which essentially refer to sets of systems. This is achieved by eliminating the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as a primitive, and by introducing the notion of intended links. The force of the model (...)
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  8. Michael A. Bishop (1991). Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):343 - 356.
  9. O. Bueno (2000). Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of (...)
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  10. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). &Quot;merely a Logician's Toy?&Quot; Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian (Eds.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science .
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  11. Hasok Chang (2011). The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change. Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities (...)
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  12. Maurice René Charland (2003). The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge. Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (3):248-263.
  13. Brendan Clarke (2012). Causation in Medicine. In Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), Conceptual Revolutions: from Cognitive Science to Medicine. Netbiblo.
    In this paper, I offer one example of conceptual change. Specifically, I contend that the discovery that viruses could cause cancer represents an excellent example of branch jumping, one of Thagard’s nine forms of conceptual change. Prior to about 1960, cancer was generally regarded as a degenerative, chronic, non-infectious disease. Cancer causation was therefore usually held to be a gradual process of accumulating cellular damage, caused by relatively non-specific component causes, acting over long periods of time. Viral infections, on the (...)
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  14. Xavier de Donato Rodríguez (2007). Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change. Theoria 22 (3):331-338.
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as extraordinarily success-ful but (...)
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  15. Rogier De Langhe & Matthias Greiff, Standards and the Distribution of Cognitive Labour.
    We present a model of the distribution of labour in science. Such models tend to rely on the mechanism of the invisible hand (e.g. Hull 1988, Goldman & Shaked 1991 and Kitcher 1990). Our analysis starts from the necessity of standards in distributed processes and the possibility of multiple standards in science. Invisible hand models turn out to have only limited scope because they are restricted to describing the atypical single-standard case. Our model is a generalisation of these models to (...)
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  16. Paul Dumouchel (1991). Scrutinizing Science Scrutinized. Inquiry 34 (4):457-473.
    This essay argues that Laudan et al.?s (1986,1988) project of empirically testing philosophical models of scientific change was ill?conceived, thus the data brought to light by the historians had little bearing upon the original problem: testing philosophical models of scientific change. The project is internally inconsistent and the procedure relating the theses under scrutiny to the models of change is so undefined that the corroboration or falsification of the theses teaches us nothing about the models. Serious anomalies in Laudan et (...)
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  17. R. P. Farrell & C. A. Hooker (2009). Error, Error-Statistics and Self-Directed Anticipative Learning. Foundations of Science 14 (4):249-271.
    Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of (...)
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  18. Marco Giunti (1988). Hattiangadi's Theory of Scientific Problems and the Structure of Standard Epistemologies. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):421-439.
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  19. Maya J. Goldenberg (2010). From Popperian Science to Normal Science. Commentary on Sestini (2010). Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):306-310.
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  20. Valentin Karpovitch (2008). Science, Objectivity, and Progress. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:89-93.
    Postpositivist epistemology treats science as merely a matter of consensus. The main reason for that is the lack of objectivity. We argue that objectivity is not an essential claim for a scientific methodology. Science as an institutional enterprise is characterized mainly by progressive discourse and not by objectivity. In turn, progressiveness depends on a set of norms and regulative principles. This view of science as progressive discourse provides a more adequate basis for dealing with opinion conflicts, scientific methodology, and questions (...)
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  21. Kyung-Man Kim (1992). Value Commitment and Scientific Change. Social Epistemology 6 (3):273 – 280.
  22. Noretta Koertge (2010). How Should We Describe Scientific Change? Or : A Neo-Popperian Reads Friedman. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
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  23. Wolfgang Krohn, Edwin T. Layton & Peter Weingart (eds.) (1978). The Dynamics of Science and Technology: Social Values, Technical Norms, and Scientific Criteria in the Development of Knowledge. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
  24. Sanford A. Lakoff (ed.) (1980). Science and Ethical Responsibility: Proceedings of the U.S. Student Pugwash Conference, University of California, San Diego, June 19-26, 1979. [REVIEW] Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..
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  25. J. Lalumia (1973). Saving the Phenomena and Scientific Change. Diogenes 21 (83):114-130.
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  26. Thomas H. Leith (1964). Scientific Change. Edited by A. C. Crombie. Toronto, British Book Service (Canada) Ltd. 1963. Pp. Xii, 883. $25.00. Dialogue 2 (04):473-474.
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  27. Matthew D. Lund (2010). N. R. Hanson: Observation, Discovery, and Scientific Change. Humanity Books.
    Biographical sketch -- Philosophical context -- Observation -- Logic of discovery -- Philosophy and history of science -- Quantum theory -- Conceptual structure, analogy, and the logic of discovery revisited.
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  28. Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.) (2000). Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Traditionally it has been thought that scientific controversies can always be resolved on the basis of empirical data. Recently, however, social constructionists have claimed that the outcome of scientific debates is strongly influenced by non-evidential factors such as the rhetorical prowess and professional clout of the participants. This volume of previously unpublished essays by well-known philosophers of science presents historical studies and philosophical analyses that undermine the plausibility of an extreme social constructionist perspective while also indicating the need for a (...)
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  29. Lorenzo Magnani (2004). Model-Based and Manipulative Abduction in Science. Foundations of Science 9 (3):219-247.
    What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides (...)
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  30. Lorenzo Magnani & Matteo Piazza (2005). Morphodynamical Abduction. Causation by Attractors Dynamics of Explanatory Hypotheses in Science. Foundations of Science 10 (1):107-132.
    Philosophers of science today by and large reject the cataclysmic and irrational interpretation of the scientific enterprise claimed by Kuhn. Many computational models have been implemented to rationally study the conceptual change in science. In this recent tradition a key role is played by the concept of abduction as a mechanism by which new explanatory hypotheses are introduced. Nevertheless some problems in describing the most interesting abductive issues rise from the classical computational approach. It describes a cognitive process (and so (...)
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  31. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...)
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  32. Thomas J. Misa (2009). Findings Follow Framings: Navigating the Empirical Turn. [REVIEW] Synthese 168 (3):357 - 375.
    In this paper, I outline several methodological questions that we need to confront. The chief question is how can we identify the nature of technological change and its varied cultural consequences—including social, political, institutional, and economic dimensions—when our different research methods, using distinct ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of analysis, yield contradictory results. What can we say, in other words, when our findings about technology follow from the framings of our inquiries? In slightly different terms, can we combine insights from the fine-grained (...)
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  33. Bence Nanay (2011). Popper's Darwinian Analogy. Perspectives on Science 19 (3):337-354.
    One of the most deeply entrenched ideas in Popper's philosophy is the analogy between the growth of scientific knowledge and the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection. Popper gave his first exposition of these ideas very early on. In a letter to Donald Campbell, 1 Popper says that the idea goes back at least to the early thirties. 2 And he had a fairly detailed account of it in his "What is dialectic?", a talk given in 1937 and published in 1940: (...)
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  34. Friday N. Ndubuisi (2008). Karl Popper on the Philosophy Of Dynamism in Science. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:67-82.
    There are a number of contentious issues in the study of philosophy of science. There is the issue of method, there is the issue of subject-matter, there is the issue of truth and certainty as well as the issue of rationality, and the utility of scientific discoveries. Popper demonstrated a lot of interest in the issue of method, stressing ways and means science as a living enterprise could make progress. His theory of conjecture and refutation, or falsifiability is in pursuance (...)
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  35. Alvin F. Nelson (1971). The HD Method and Scientific Change. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 2 (1/2):83-92.
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  36. Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) (1979). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Pub. Co..
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  37. Oscar Nudler (ed.) (2011). Controversy Spaces: A Model of Scientific and Philosophical Change. John Benjamins Pub. Co..
    chapter 7. How DNA became an important molecule: Controversies at the origins of molecular biology Eleonora Cresto José María Gil Contributors Author index ...
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  38. Lydia Patton (2011). Review of Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    That the history and the philosophy of science have been united in a form of disciplinary marriage is a fact. There are pressing questions about the state of this union. Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science is a state of the union address, but also an articulation of compelling and well-defended positions on strategies for making progress in the history and philosophy of science.
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  39. Mark Risjord (2007). Scientific Change as Political Action: Franz Boas and the Anthropology of Race. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):24-45.
    A theory is value-neutral when no constitutive values are part of its content. Nonneutral theories seem to lack objectivity because it is not clear how the constitutive values could be empirically confirmed. This article analyzes Franz Boas’s famous arguments against nineteenth-century evolutionary anthropology and racial theory. While he recognized that talk of "higher civilizations" encoded a constitutive, political value with consequences for slavery and colonialism, he argued against it on empirical and methodological grounds. Boas’s arguments thus provide a model of (...)
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  40. Bernard E. Rollin (1986). Animal Consciousness and Scientific Change. New Ideas in Psychology 4:141-52.
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  41. Howard Sankey (1997). Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability. Ashgate.
  42. Michael J. Shaffer (2008). Re-Formulating the Correspondence Principle: Problems and Prospects. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):99-115.
    The generalized correspondence principle is the assertion of something like the following methodological norm: successor theories ought to incorporate precursor theories as special cases. However, the actual core connotation of this principle seems to be that when we are constructing new theories in some domain of application we ought to retain as much of prior but refuted theories as is possible while eliminating inconsistency with the data. As a result, it is argued here that the correspondence principle has not been (...)
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  43. Michael J. Shaffer (2008). Re-Formulating The Generalized Correspondence Principle. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):99-115.
    This paper presents a more clear formulation of the correspondence principle and explores its justification.
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  44. Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Springer.
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of (...)
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  45. Edith Dudley Sylla (1993). Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies. Vivarium 31 (1):37-83.
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  46. Irena Szumilewicz (1977). Incommensurability and the Rationality of the Development of Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (4):345-350.
  47. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2010). Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest. Synthese 176 (3):429-445.
    In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In (...)
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  48. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2003). A Role for Reason in Science. Dialogue 42 (3):573-598.
    In "Dynamics of Reason" (2001), Michael Friedman advocates a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that addresses the problem of scientific change and opposes both Quine's naturalism and Kuhn's relativism. This critical notice of Friedman's book focuses on the "relativized a priori" principles articulated by Friedman. Friedman's arguments against Quine and Kuhn are subsequently evaluated. It is concluded that Friedman succeeds in illustrating deficiencies of Quine's naturalism, however, he fails to sufficiently establish a "rational" basis for theory-choice and, hence, his (...)
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  49. John S. Wilkins (1998). The Evolutionary Structure of Scientific Theories. Biology and Philosophy 13 (4):479–504.
    David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to reconstruct (...)
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  50. George Windholz & P. A. Lamal (1991). Pavlov's View of the Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics as It Relates to Theses Concerning Scientific Change. Synthese 88 (1):97 - 111.
    Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a popularized version (...)
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