This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
78 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 78
  1. Kólá ABíMBÓLÁ (2010). Rationality and Methodological Change: Dudley Shapere's Conception of Scientific Development. Principia 10 (1):39-65.
    Over the last 4 or so decades, Dudley Shapere has developed a rich and interesting alternative to the Kuhnian “relativist” account of science and its development. This paper is a review of this alternative viewpoint. It is a critical evaluation of Shapere’s arguments in support of the claim that radical methodological change can be allowed in science without thereby embracing relativism (and without ending with an irrational account of scientific change).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Sérgio Pires Afonso, Is Methodological Naturalism Final?
    This paper explores whether methodological naturalism is the definitive method of science, since science has had astonishing success in explaining the natural world.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Joseph Agassi (2003). Comparability and Incommensurability. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):93 – 94.
  4. Jason McKenzie Alexander, Johannes Himmelreich & Christopher Thompson (2015). Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy of Science 82 (3):424-453.
    This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe & Erik Steen Kristensen (2002). Towards a Systemic Research Methodology in Agriculture: Rethinking the Role of Values in Science. [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 19 (1):3-23.
    The recent drastic developmentof agriculture, together with the growingsocietal interest in agricultural practices andtheir consequences, pose a challenge toagricultural science. There is a need forrethinking the general methodology ofagricultural research. This paper takes somesteps towards developing a systemic researchmethodology that can meet this challenge – ageneral self-reflexive methodology that forms abasis for doing holistic or (with a betterterm) wholeness-oriented research and providesappropriate criteria of scientific quality.From a philosophy of research perspective,science is seen as an interactive learningprocess with both a (...) and a socialcommunicative aspect. This means, first of all,that science plays a role in the world that itstudies. A science that influences its ownsubject area, such as agricultural science, isnamed a systemic science. From thisperspective, there is a need to reconsider therole of values in science. Science is notobjective in the sense of being value-free.Values play, and ought to play, an importantrole in science – not only in form ofconstitutive values such as the norms of goodscience, but also in the form of contextualvalues that enter into the very process ofscience. This goes against the traditionalcriterion of objectivity. Therefore, reflexive objectivity is suggested as a newcriterion for doing good science, along withthe criterion of relevance. Reflexiveobjectivity implies that the communication ofscience must include the cognitivecontext, which comprises the societal,intentional, and observational context. Inaccordance with this, the learning process ofsystemic research is shown as a self-reflexivecycle that incorporates both an involved actorstance and a detached observer stance. Theobserver stance forms the basis for scientificcommunication.To this point, a unitary view of science asa learning process is employed. A secondimportant perspective for a systemic researchmethodology is the relation between the actual,different, and often quite separate kinds ofscience. Cross-disciplinary research ishampered by the idea that reductive science ismore objective, and hence more scientific, thanthe less reductive sciences of complex subjectareas – and by the opposite idea thatreductive science is necessarilyreductionistic. Taking reflexive objectivity asa demarcator of good science, an inclusiveframework of science can be established. Theframework does not take the establisheddivision between natural, social, and humanscience as a primary distinction of science.The major distinction is made between theempirical and normative aspects of science,corresponding to two key cognitive interests.Two general methodological dimensions, thedegree of reduction of the research world andthe degree of involvement in the researchworld, are shown to span this framework. Theframework can form a basis fortransdisciplinary work by way of showing therelation between more and less reductive kindsof science and between more detached and moreinvolved kinds of science and exposing theabilities and limitations attendant on thesemethodological differences. (shrink)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2012). The Minimal Method of Descartes. Metatheoria 3 (1):1-18.
    What is, after all, the famous method of Descartes? The brief and vague passages devoted to this subject in Descartes’ corpus have always puzzled his readers. In this paper, I investigate not only the two essays in which it is directly addressed (the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, and the Discours de la Méthode), but also his scientific works and correspondence. I finally advocate an interpretation that makes the best sense of his overt comments as well as of his actual scientific (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Hanne Andersen (2010). Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study. Episteme 7 (3):248-265.
    Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses of joint (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  8. Gunnar Andersson (1994). Criticism and the History of Science: Kuhn's, Lakatos's, and Feyrabend's Criticisms of Critical Rationalism. E.J. Brill.
    In "Criticism and the History of Science" Karl Popper's falsificationist conception of science is developed and defended against criticisms raised by Thomas ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Theodore Arabatzis (2011). On the Historicity of Scientific Objects. Erkenntnis 75 (3):377-390.
    The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Wolfgang Balzer, Bernhard Lauth & Gerhard Zoubek (1993). A Model for Science Kinematics. Studia Logica 52 (4):519 - 548.
    A comprehensive model for describing various forms of developments in science is defined in precise, set-theoretic terms, and in the spirit of the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. The model emends previous accounts in centering on single systems in a homogenous way, eliminating notions which essentially refer to sets of systems. This is achieved by eliminating the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as a primitive, and by introducing the notion of intended links. The force of the model (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  11. Michael A. Bishop (1991). Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):343 - 356.
  12. Karim Bschir (2015). Feyerabend and Popper on Theory Proliferation and Anomaly Import: On the Compatibility of Theoretical Pluralism and Critical Rationalism. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):24-55.
    A fundamental tenet of Paul Feyerabend’s pluralistic view of science has it that theory proliferation, that is, the availability of theoretical alternatives, is of crucial importance for the detection of anomalies in established theories. Paul Hoyningen-Huene calls this the Anomaly Importation Thesis, according to which anomalies are imported, as it were, into well-established theories from competing alternatives. This article pursues two major objectives: (a) to work out the systematic details of Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly import as they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. O. Bueno (2000). Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. Richard M. Burian (2001). The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):383-404.
    Philosophers of science turned to historical case studies in part in response to Thomas Kuhn's insistence that such studies can transform the philosophy of science. In this issue Joseph Pitt argues that the power of case studies to instruct us about scientific methodology and epistemology depends on prior philosophical commitments, without which case studies are not philosophically useful. Here I reply to Pitt, demonstrating that case studies, properly deployed, illustrate styles of scientific work and modes of argumentation that are not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. Martin Carrier & Alfred Nordmann (2011). Science in the Context of Application: Methodological Change, Conceptual Transformation, Cultural Reorientation. In M. Carrier & A. Nordmann (eds.), Science in the Context of Application. Springer 1--7.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). "Merely a Logician's Toy?" Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian , Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Hasok Chang (2011). The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change. Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  18. Maurice René Charland (2003). The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge. Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (3):248-263.
  19. Valentin Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2011). POST-INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF XXI CENTURY – RATIONALISM VERSUS IRRATIONALISM: EVOLUTIONARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT. Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Herald 3:68-77.
    The phenomenon of rationalism and irrationalism, contextually related to the transformation methodology and the social function of modern (post-industrial) science – social verification, interpretation and knowledge, etc., are analyzes.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Brendan Clarke (2012). Causation in Medicine. In Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), Conceptual Revolutions: from Cognitive Science to Medicine. Netbiblo
    In this paper, I offer one example of conceptual change. Specifically, I contend that the discovery that viruses could cause cancer represents an excellent example of branch jumping, one of Thagard’s nine forms of conceptual change. Prior to about 1960, cancer was generally regarded as a degenerative, chronic, non-infectious disease. Cancer causation was therefore usually held to be a gradual process of accumulating cellular damage, caused by relatively non-specific component causes, acting over long periods of time. Viral infections, on the (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Xavier de Donato Rodríguez (2007). Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change. Theoria 22 (3):331-338.
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as extraordinarily success-ful but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Ute Deichmann (2011). Michael Polanyi on Scientific Authority and His Criticism of Popper and Russell. Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 56 (1):249-268.
    This article analyzes, Polanyi’s notion of authority in science and his criticism of Popper and Russell. It uses the history of early genetics and neo-Darwinism in order to examine the fruitfulness of Polanyi's concepts for an understanding of the history of biology. It discusses the responsibility of scientists in influential positions and shows that scientific authority is – as is criticism – indispensable for progress.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.) (2015). Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 311. Springer.
    In 1962, the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure ‘revolutionized’ the way one conducts philosophical and historical studies of science. Through the introduction of both memorable and controversial notions, such as paradigms, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability, Kuhn argued against the traditionally accepted notion of scientific change as a progression towards the truth about nature, and instead substituted the idea that science is a puzzle solving activity, operating under paradigms, which become discarded after it fails to respond accordingly to anomalous challenges and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Paul Dumouchel (1991). Scrutinizing Science Scrutinized. Inquiry 34 (4):457-473.
    This essay argues that Laudan et al.?s (1986,1988) project of empirically testing philosophical models of scientific change was ill?conceived, thus the data brought to light by the historians had little bearing upon the original problem: testing philosophical models of scientific change. The project is internally inconsistent and the procedure relating the theses under scrutiny to the models of change is so undefined that the corroboration or falsification of the theses teaches us nothing about the models. Serious anomalies in Laudan et (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. R. P. Farrell & C. A. Hooker (2009). Error, Error-Statistics and Self-Directed Anticipative Learning. Foundations of Science 14 (4):249-271.
    Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  26. Marco Giunti (1988). Hattiangadi's Theory of Scientific Problems and the Structure of Standard Epistemologies. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):421-439.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Maya J. Goldenberg (2010). From Popperian Science to Normal Science. Commentary on Sestini (2010). Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):306-310.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Jonathan Harwood (1998). Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars After 1933. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 31 (1):63-102.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Valentin Karpovitch (2008). Science, Objectivity, and Progress. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:89-93.
    Postpositivist epistemology treats science as merely a matter of consensus. The main reason for that is the lack of objectivity. We argue that objectivity is not an essential claim for a scientific methodology. Science as an institutional enterprise is characterized mainly by progressive discourse and not by objectivity. In turn, progressiveness depends on a set of norms and regulative principles. This view of science as progressive discourse provides a more adequate basis for dealing with opinion conflicts, scientific methodology, and questions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Dimitris Kilakos (2016). How Could Vygotsky Inform an Approach to Scientific Representations? Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 47 (1):140-152.
    In the quest for a new social turn in philosophy of science, exploring the prospects of a Vygotskian perspective could be of significant interest, especially due to his emphasis on the role of culture and socialisation in the development of cognitive functions. However, a philosophical reassessment of Vygotsky's ideas in general has yet to be done. -/- As a step towards this direction, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific representations by drawing inspirations from Vygotsky. Specifically, I work (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Kyung-Man Kim (1992). Value Commitment and Scientific Change. Social Epistemology 6 (3):273 – 280.
  32. Noretta Koertge (2010). How Should We Describe Scientific Change? Or : A Neo-Popperian Reads Friedman. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Wolfgang Krohn, Edwin T. Layton & Peter Weingart (eds.) (1978). The Dynamics of Science and Technology: Social Values, Technical Norms, and Scientific Criteria in the Development of Knowledge. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
  34. Sanford A. Lakoff (ed.) (1980). Science and Ethical Responsibility: Proceedings of the U.S. Student Pugwash Conference, University of California, San Diego, June 19-26, 1979. [REVIEW] Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. J. Lalumia (1973). Saving the Phenomena and Scientific Change. Diogenes 21 (83):114-130.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Thomas H. Leith (1964). Scientific Change. Edited by A. C. Crombie. Toronto, British Book Service Ltd. 1963. Pp. Xii, 883. $25.00. Dialogue 2 (4):473-474.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Robert W. P. Luk (2010). Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling. Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
    This paper argues that scientific studies distinguish themselves from other studies by a combination of their processes, their (knowledge) elements and the roles of these elements. This is supported by constructing a process model. An illustrative example based on Newtonian mechanics shows how scientific knowledge is structured according to the process model. To distinguish scientific studies from research and scientific research, two additional process models are built for such processes. We apply these process models: (1) to argue that scientific progress (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Matthew D. Lund (2010). N. R. Hanson: Observation, Discovery, and Scientific Change. Humanity Books.
    Biographical sketch -- Philosophical context -- Observation -- Logic of discovery -- Philosophy and history of science -- Quantum theory -- Conceptual structure, analogy, and the logic of discovery revisited.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.) (2000). Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Traditionally it has been thought that scientific controversies can always be resolved on the basis of empirical data. Recently, however, social constructionists have claimed that the outcome of scientific debates is strongly influenced by non-evidential factors such as the rhetorical prowess and professional clout of the participants. This volume of previously unpublished essays by well-known philosophers of science presents historical studies and philosophical analyses that undermine the plausibility of an extreme social constructionist perspective while also indicating the need for a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  40. Lorenzo Magnani (2004). Model-Based and Manipulative Abduction in Science. Foundations of Science 9 (3):219-247.
    What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41. Lorenzo Magnani & Matteo Piazza (2005). Morphodynamical Abduction. Causation by Attractors Dynamics of Explanatory Hypotheses in Science. Foundations of Science 10 (1):107-132.
    Philosophers of science today by and large reject the cataclysmic and irrational interpretation of the scientific enterprise claimed by Kuhn. Many computational models have been implemented to rationally study the conceptual change in science. In this recent tradition a key role is played by the concept of abduction as a mechanism by which new explanatory hypotheses are introduced. Nevertheless some problems in describing the most interesting abductive issues rise from the classical computational approach. It describes a cognitive process (and so (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  43. Thomas J. Misa (2009). Findings Follow Framings: Navigating the Empirical Turn. [REVIEW] Synthese 168 (3):357 - 375.
    In this paper, I outline several methodological questions that we need to confront. The chief question is how can we identify the nature of technological change and its varied cultural consequences—including social, political, institutional, and economic dimensions—when our different research methods, using distinct ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of analysis, yield contradictory results. What can we say, in other words, when our findings about technology follow from the framings of our inquiries? In slightly different terms, can we combine insights from the fine-grained (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. Bence Nanay (2011). Popper's Darwinian Analogy. Perspectives on Science 19 (3):337-354.
    One of the most deeply entrenched ideas in Popper's philosophy is the analogy between the growth of scientific knowledge and the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection. Popper gave his first exposition of these ideas very early on. In a letter to Donald Campbell, 1 Popper says that the idea goes back at least to the early thirties. 2 And he had a fairly detailed account of it in his "What is dialectic?", a talk given in 1937 and published in 1940: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Friday N. Ndubuisi (2008). Karl Popper on the Philosophy Of Dynamism in Science. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:67-82.
    There are a number of contentious issues in the study of philosophy of science. There is the issue of method, there is the issue of subject-matter, there is the issue of truth and certainty as well as the issue of rationality, and the utility of scientific discoveries. Popper demonstrated a lot of interest in the issue of method, stressing ways and means science as a living enterprise could make progress. His theory of conjecture and refutation, or falsifiability is in pursuance (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Alvin F. Nelson (1971). The HD Method and Scientific Change. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 2 (1/2):83-92.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) (1979). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Pub. Co..
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  48. J. M. Zyci Nski (1988). The Structure of the Metascientific Revolution an Essay on the Growth of Modern Science.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Oscar Nudler (ed.) (2011). Controversy Spaces: A Model of Scientific and Philosophical Change. John Benjamins Pub. Co..
    chapter 7. How DNA became an important molecule: Controversies at the origins of molecular biology Eleonora Cresto José María Gil Contributors Author index ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. R. M. Nugaev (2002). Basic Paradigm Change The Conception of Communicative Rationality. Russian Studies in Philosophy 41 (2):23-36.
    The problem of the theoretical reconstruction of the process of scientific paradigm change is by no means a new one in the philosophy and sociology of science. Nevertheless, one cannot say that its investigation has reached the point at which an overwhelming majority of specialists would agree at least about exactly how and in what directions it is necessary to move forward. Notwithstanding this circumstance, one can specify a certain set of basic questions that are recognized as such by the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 78