About this topic
Summary The topics dealt with under this category relate to the general nature of change in the sciences.  Most work in this area has addressed the topic of theory change, which was brought to the forefront of philosophical attention by the "historical turn", associated with such writers as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan.  A variety of philosophical problems arise in this area, including the question of whether science progresses toward truth, the rationality of choice between theories, the structure of theories, and the possibility of comparing alternative theories.
Key works Current thinking about scientific change may be traced back to  Kuhn 1962, or later editions, e.g. Kuhn 1996.  A valuable collection of essays on the topic is Lakatos & Musgrave 1970.  See, in particular, Lakatos 1970, for Lakatos's proposal of a methodology of scientific research programs.  Feyerabend 1974 is an influential discussion of the topic, including its implications for methodology.  Laudan 1977 is an important critical discussion of the works of Kuhn and Lakatos, which introduces Laudan's own positive account.  Kitcher 1993 continues the discussion, while introducing important proposals with respect to a realist account of scientific change.
Introductions Chalmers 1982 is an excellent introductory textbook which provides good general coverage of the issues relating to scientific change. See Nickles 2010 for an overview of topics relating to scientific revolutions.  Devitt 1979 is an incisive discussion of the claim that alternative theories are incommensurable.  See Bird 2007 for one proposal about the nature of scientific progress, and Sankey 1995 for some aspects of the problem of the rationality of the choice between theories.
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
1184 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 1184
Material to categorize
  1. Gunnar Andersson (1984). Rationality in Science and Politics.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  2. Roger Ariew (1987). From Myth to the Modern Mind. Review of Metaphysics 40 (4):792-793.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Philip Kitcher (2000). Patterns of Scientific Controversies. In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 21.
  4. Carl R. Kordig (1970). Objectivity, Scientific Change, and Self-Reference. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:519 - 523.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Larry Laudan (1981). Anomalous Anomalies. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):618-619.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Karlheinz Lüdtke (1995). Interdisziplinarität Und Wissensentwicklung. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):93 - 117.
    Interdisciplinarity and the Development of Knowledge. The author is engaged in the question how to explain the development of scientific meanings of facts which does not coincide with producing them rather with processes of the scientists' public communication. So long as the facts are adjustable to the conventional theories of those discipline which the researcher belongs to this connection does not reveal perfectly clear. More instructive is a consideration of so-called 'anomalies'. The author demonstrates with an example of the history (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.) (1999). Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum.
    The book Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, aims to explain how specific modeling practices employed by scientists are productive methods of ...
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  8. R. Niall & D. Martin (1982). The Edge of Contingency: French Catholic Reaction to Scientific Changes From Darwin to Duhem by Harry W. Paul. History of Science 20:64-74.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Alan W. Richardson (1992). Philosophy of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions: Remarks on the VPI Program for Testing Philosophies of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:36 - 46.
    In this paper I argue that the program of L. Laudan et al for empirically testing historiographical philosophies of science ("the VPI program") does not succeed in providing a consistent naturalist program in philosophy of science. In particular, the VPI program endorses a nonnaturalist metamethodology that insists on a hypothetico-deductive structure to scientific testing. But hypothetico-deductivism seems to be both inadequate as an account of scientific theory testing in general and fundamentally at odds with most of the historiographic philosophies under (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Alan J. Rocke (1985). Hypothesis and Experiment in the Early Development of Kekule's Benzene Theory. Annals of Science 42 (4):355-381.
    This article attempts a contextual study of the origin and early development of August Kekulé's theory of aromatic compounds. The terminus a quo is essentially August Hofmann's coining of the modern chemical denotation of ‘aromatic’ in 1855; the terminus ad quem is the first full codification of Kekulé's theory in the sixth fascicle of his Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie, published in the summer of 1866. Kekulé's theory is viewed in context with the earlier and concurrent experimental work of such chemists (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  11. Richard Louis Schanck (1954). The Permanent Revolution in Science. New York, Philosophical Library.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Gregor Schiemann (2008). Experimental Knowledge and the Theory of Producing It: Hermann von Helmholtz. In U. Feest & G. Hon (eds.), Generating Experimental Knowledge. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
    Helmholtz's public reflection about the nature of the experiment and its role in the sciences is a historically important description, which also helps to analyze his own works. It is a part of his conception of science and nature, which can be seen as an ideal type of science and its goals. But its historical reach seems to be limited in an important respect. Helmholtz's understanding of experiments is based on the idea that their planning, realization and evaluation lies in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Gregor Schiemann (1997). Phänomenologie versus Naturwissenschaft - Zum Verhältnis zweier Erkenntnisarten. In Gregor Schiemann & Gernot Böhme (eds.), Phänomenologie der Natur. Suhrkamp
    Im letzten Viertel dieses Jahrhunderts mehren sich die Anzeichen für einen wissenschaftstheoretischen Wandlungsprozeß von weitreichender Bedeutung. Zu seinen hervorstechenden Merkmalen gehört die Kritik an den vormals dominierenden Abgrenzungen der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis gegenüber anderen Erkenntnisformen. Beanstandet wird hauptsächlich die traditionell unzureichende Berücksichtigung der praktischen Dimensionen der Forschung und die bisher einseitige Konzentration auf mathematisch-physikalische Disziplinen. Daß die Naturwissenschaften ihre Fähigkeiten zur Naturbeherrschung und -veränderung bis in unsere Gegenwart hinein unablässig erweitert haben, geht vermutlich nur partiell auf die erfolgreiche Anwendung theoretischer Axiomensysteme (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Gregor Schiemann (1994). Die Hypothetisierung des Mechanismus Bei Hermann von Helmholtz. Ein Beitrag Zum Wandel der Wissenschafts- Und Naturauffassung Im 19. Jahrhundert. In Lorenz Krüger (ed.), Universalgenie Helmholtz. Rückblick nach 100 Jahren. Akademie-Verlag
    Die Entwicklung von HeImholtz' Mechanismus ist durch einen Wandel im Geltungsanspruch gekennzeichnet und läßt sich in einer noch sehr groben Übersicht in zwei Perioden einteilen. Auf die erste Periode bis etwa zum Ende der 60er Jahre werde ich im ersten Teil meines Beitrages eingehen. Hier rekonstruiere ich umrißhaft die empiristische Begründung, die Helmholtz für den Wahrheitsanspruch seiner Naturauffassung gegeben hat. Im zweiten Teil werde ich dann die wichtigsten Merkmale der im Verlauf der 70er Jahre hervortretenden Hypothetisierungstendenz charakterisieren. Abschliessend will ich (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Warren D. Siemens (1970). A Logical Empiricist Theory of Scientific Change? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:524 - 535.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Miriam Solomon (1994). Multivariate Models of Scientific Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:287 - 297.
    Social scientists regularly make use of multivariate models to describe complex social phenomena. It is argued that this approach is useful for modelling the variety of cognitive and social factors contributing to scientific change, and superior to the integrated models of scientific change currently available. It is also argued that care needs to be taken in drawing normative conclusions: cognitive factors are not instrinsically more "rational" than social factors, nor is it likely that social factors, by some "invisible hand of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. John J. Sung (2008). Embodied Anomaly Resolution in Molecular Genetics: A Case Study of RNAi. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 13 (2):177-193.
    Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements (“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Paul Thagard (1992). Conceptual Revolutions. Princeton University Press.
    In this path-breaking work, Paul Thagard draws on history and philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and the field of artificial intelligence to develop a ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   109 citations  
  19. Keith Vernon (1989). Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 22 (4):461-462.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. F. W. Westaway (1921). Scientific Method: Its Philosophy and Practice. Journal of Philosophy 18 (17):472-475.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. J. M. Ziman (1987). Knowing Everything About Nothing Specialization and Change in Scientific Careers. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
Incommensurability in Science
  1. Peter Achinstein (1964). On the Meaning of Scientific Terms. Journal of Philosophy 61 (17):497-509.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  2. Joseph Agassi (2003). Comparability and Incommensurability. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):93 – 94.
  3. Evandro Agazzi (1985). Commensurability, Incommensurability, and Cumulativity in Scientific Knowledge. Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):51-77.
    Until the middle of the present century it was a commonly accepted opinion that theory change in science was the expression of cumulative progress consisting in the acquisition of new truths and the elimination of old errors. Logical empiricists developed this idea through a deductive model, saying that a theory T superseding a theory T must be able logically to explain whatever T explained and something more as well. Popper too shared this model, but stressed that T explains the old (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Juan Carlos Aguirre García (2008). Reply To: Is Incommensurability Incomparability? Discusiones Filosóficas 9 (13):113 - 125.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Amani Albedah (2006). A Gadamerian Critique of Kuhn's Linguistic Turn: Incommensurability Revisited. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):323 – 345.
    In this article, I discuss Gadamer's hermeneutic account of understanding as an alternative to Kuhn's incommensurability thesis. After a brief account of Kuhn's aesthetic account and arguments against it, I argue that the linguistic account faces a paradox that results from Kuhn's objectivist account of understanding, and his lack of historical reflexivity. The statement 'Languages are incommensurable' is not a unique view of language, and is thus subject to contest by incommensurable readings. Resolving the paradox requires an account of incommensurability (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Maria Alegre (2001). On the Distinction Between Incommensurability and Inconsistency. Logica Trianguli 5:3-18.
    The aim of this paper is to analyse the differences between the notions of incommensurability and inconsistency. The concept of incommensurability taken into account is restricted to the one of non-trivial incommensurability, which, in turn, will be associated with local untranslatability. Logical, ontological, and epistemological differences between the two former notions will be depicted. It will be shown that incommensurability consists of a sort of non-contradictory opposition relation.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Douglas Allchin (1994). The Super Bowl and the Ox-Phos Controversy: "Winner-Take-All" Competition in Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:22 - 33.
    Several diagrams and tables from review articles during the Ox-Phos Controversy serve as an occasion to assess the nature of competition in models of theory choice in science. Many models follow "Super-Bowl" principles of polar, either-or, winner-take-all competition. A significant alternative highlighted by this episode, however, is the differentiation of domains. Incommensurability and the partial divergence of overlapping domains serve both as signals and context for shifting frameworks of competition. Appropriate strategies may thus help researchers diagnose the status of competition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  8. Valer Ambrus (1999). Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):1-16.
    Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Hanne Andersen (2010). Edwin H.-C. Hung Beyond Kuhn. Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability and Physical Necessity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):237-239.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Hanne Andersen (2004). Incommensurability and Dynamic Conceptual Structures. Philosophia Scientiae 8 (1):153-168.
    One important problem concerning incommensurability is to explain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses of feature correlations, and that it is necessary to include explanations of these feature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Hanne Andersen (2000). Learning by Ostension: Thomas Kuhn on Science Education. Science and Education 9 (1-2):91-106.
    Significant claims about science education form an integral part of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy. Since the late 1950s, when Kuhn started wrestling with the ideas of ‘normal research’ and ‘convergent thought’, the nature of science education has played an important role in his argument. Hence, the nature of science education is an essential aspect of the phase-model of scientific development developed in his famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, just as his later work on categories and conceptual structures takes its starting (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cambridge University Press.
    Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican revolution, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (1996). Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  14. G. Andersson, Die Wissenschaft Als Objektive Erkenntnis & In E. Agazzi (2001). Incommensurability Bibliography. In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer 303.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Will Angelette (2002). Rationality, Emotion, and Belief Revision: Waller's Move Beyond CBT & REBT. International Journal of Philosophical Practice 1 (3).
    Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Theodore Arabatzis (2001). Can a Historian of Science Be a Scientific Realist? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S531-.
    In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. George Argyrous (1992). Kuhn's Paradigms and Neoclassical Economics. Economics and Philosophy 8 (2):231-248.
    Thirty years after its publication, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is still the source of much discussion in economics. Its rel-ativistic tone has often been used to fuel the claims of dissident traditions against the prevailing orthodoxy, or at least to plead the case for intellectual pluralism. Through his arguments regarding the incommensurability of different theoretical approaches to a particular subject, Kuhn's work has allowed many to argue that dissident traditions are just as legitimate as orthodoxy for analyzing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18. S. K. Arun Murthi & Sundar Sarukkai (2009). Multisemiosis and Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):297-311.
    Central to Kuhn's notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. Such a notion of incommensurability is based on a particular understanding of what a scientific language is. In this paper we first attempt to understand this notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability. We consider the consequences of the essential multisemiotic character of scientific theories and show how this leads to even a single theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Warren Oliver Asher (1985). Reference and Theory Change: The Impact of the Theory of Reference on the Incommensurability Problem. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    The thesis concerns the claim that competing scientific theories are, in important cases, "incommensurable". It has been argued that since theoretical terms derive their meaning from the theory in which they occur, the transition from one theory to another involves significant changes in the meanings of terms. The absence of common meanings has been taken to preclude the possibility of logical and evidential comparisons between competing theories. Furthermore, since such theories are not then alternative accounts of the same domain, standard (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Babette Babich (2003). Paradigms and Thought Styles: Incommensurability and its Cold War Discontents From Kuhn's Harvard to Fleck's Unsung Lvov. Social Epistemology 17:97-107.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Babette E. Babich (2003). From Fleck's Denkstil to Kuhn's Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes and Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):75 – 92.
    This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  22. Babette E. Babich (2003). Kuhn's Paradigm as a Parable for the Cold War: Incommensurability and its Discontents From Fuller's Tale of Harvard to Fleck's Unsung Lvov. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):99 – 109.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Anthony Dominick Baldino (1996). Incommensurability and Epistemology: An Essay on Scientific Theory Choice. Dissertation, Columbia University
    The thesis of the incommensurability of competing scientific theories, as it has been formulated and defended by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, implies the following: there will be competing scientific theories between which there will exist no neutral perspective from which to evaluate the merits of those theories with regards to truth. If this thesis were true, it would threaten what I take to be basic epistemic values, the values of seeking truth and avoiding error. To pass from one theory (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Franz Balsiger & Alex Burri (1990). Sind Die Klassische Mechanik Und Die Spezielle Relativitätstheorie Kommensurabel? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21 (1):157-162.
    In its first part, this paper shows why a recently made attempt to reduce the special theory of relativity to Newtonian kinematics is bound to fail. In the second part, we propose a differentiated notion of incommensurability which enables us to amend the contention that the special theory of relatively and Newtonian kinematics are “incommensurable”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Aristides Baltas (2004). On the Grammatical Aspects of Radical Scientific Discovery. Philosophia Scientiae 8 (1):169-201.
    Radical scientific discovery and the associated radical “paradigm change” are treated here as following from the disclosure of what I call background ‘assumptions’. These are taken as more or less equivalent to the “hinge propositions” that Wittgenstein discusses in his On Certainty. On this basis, various issues connected to meaning variance, theory change, incommensurability and so forth, are discussed. It is shown that Kuhn’s overall account need not, with qualifications, imply either idealism or relativism while rationality and scientific progress can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. W. Balzer (1989). On Incommensurability in Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 111:287-304.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. W. Balzer (1985). Incommensurability, Reduction, and Translation. Erkenntnis 23 (3):255 - 267.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. W. Balzer (1985). What is Incommensurability. Kant-Studien 76 (2):196-213.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Nimrod Bar-Am (2003). The Dusk of Incommensurability. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):111 – 114.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1184