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  1. Semiha Akinci (2004). Popper's Conventionalism. In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge.
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  2. Theodore Arabatzis (2011). On the Historicity of Scientific Objects. Erkenntnis 75 (3):377-390.
    The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science (...)
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  3. R. Barney (1997). Plato on Conventionalism. Phronesis 42 (2):143 - 162.
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  4. Rachel Barney (1997). Plato on Conventionalism. Phronesis 42 (2):143-62.
    A new reading of Plato's account of conventionalism about names in the Cratylus. It argues that Hermogenes' position, according to which a name is whatever anybody 'sets down' as one, does not have the counterintuitive consequences usually claimed. At the same time, Plato's treatment of conventionalism needs to be related to his treatment of formally similar positions in ethics and politics. Plato is committed to standards of objective natural correctness in all such areas, despite the problematic consequences which, as he (...)
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  5. Rachel Barney (1992). Plato on Conventionalism. Phronesis 42 (2):143-62.
    A new reading of Plato's account of conventionalism about names in the Cratylus. It argues that Hermogenes' position, according to which a name is whatever anybody 'sets down' as one, does not have the counterintuitive consequences usually claimed. At the same time, Plato's treatment of conventionalism needs to be related to his treatment of formally similar positions in ethics and politics. Plato is committed to standards of objective natural correctness in all such areas, despite the problematic consequences which, as he (...)
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  6. Laurent A. Beauregard (1977). Reichenbach and Conventionalism. Synthese 34 (3):265 - 280.
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  7. Yemima Ben-Menahem (2006). Conventionalism. Cambridge University Press.
    The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This is the first comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincare;'s geometric conventionalism. She argues that the (...)
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  8. Max Black (1942). Conventionalism in Geometry and the Interpretation of Necessary Statements. Philosophy of Science 9 (4):335-349.
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  9. Thomas A. Blackson (1992). The Stuff of Conventionalism. Philosophical Studies 68 (1):65 - 81.
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  10. David Blinder (1983). The Controversy Over Conventionalism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41 (3):253-264.
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  11. Lawrence A. Boland (1970). Conventionalism and Economic Theory. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):239-248.
    Roughly speaking all economists can be divided into two groups--those who agree with Milton Friedman and those who do not. Both groups, however, espouse the view that science is a series of approximations to a demonstrated accord with reality. Methodological controversy in economics is now merely a Conventionalist argument over which comes first--simplicity or generality. Furthermore, this controversy in its current form is not compatible with one important new and up and coming economic (welfare) theory called "the theory of the (...)
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  12. E. Carson (2002). Poincare's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology. Philosophical Review 111 (4):579-582.
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  13. Richard Cole (1970). A Curious Consequence of Conventionalism in Geometry. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1/2):121-124.
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  14. By Crawford L. Elder (2006). Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1–15.
    Historically, opponents of realism have argued that the world’s objects are constructed by our cognitive activities—or, less colorfully, that they exist and are as they are only relative to our ways of thinking and speaking. To this realists have stoutly replied that even if we had thought or spoken in ways different from our actual ones, the world would still have been populated by the same objects as it actually is, or at least by most of them. (Our thinking differently (...)
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  15. Richard Creath (1992). Carnap's Conventionalism. Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
  16. Richard Creath (1986). Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  17. David De Vidi & Graham Solomon (1994). Geometric Conventionalism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (5):773-783.
    We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us (...)
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  18. Govert Den Hartogh (1993). Rehabilitating Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy 12 (2):233-247.
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  19. Robert Disalle (2002). Conventionalism and Modern Physics: A Re-Assessment. Noûs 36 (2):169–200.
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  20. Mauro Dorato, Philosophy of Physics Between Objectivism and Conventionalism.
    The paper is a review of Talal Debs and Michael Redhead's 2007 book, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention, Harvard, Harvard University Press.
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  21. Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
    We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, (...)
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  22. Crawford L. Elder (2006). Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1-15.
    Historically, opponents of realism have managed to slip beneath a key objection which realists raise against them. The opponents say that some element of the world is constructed by our cognitive practices; realists retort that the element would have existed unaltered, had our practices differed; the opponents sometimes agree, contending that we construct in just such a way as to render the counterfactual true. The contemporary instalment of this debate starts with conventionalism about modality, which holds that the borders of (...)
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  23. Hartry Field (1975). Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics. Noûs 9 (4):375-405.
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  24. Michael Friedman (1995). Poincaré's Conventionalism and the Logical Positivists. Foundations of Science 1 (2):299-314.
    The logical positivists adopted Poincare's doctrine of the conventionality of geometry and made it a key part of their philosophical interpretation of relativity theory. I argue, however, that the positivists deeply misunderstood Poincare's doctrine. For Poincare's own conception was based on the group-theoretical picture of geometry expressed in the Helmholtz-Lie solution of the space problem, and also on a hierarchical picture of the sciences according to which geometry must be presupposed be any properly physical theory. But both of this pictures (...)
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  25. Carlo Borromeo Giannoni (1971). Conventionalism in Logic. The Hague,Mouton.
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  26. Jerzy Giedymin (1992). Conventionalism, the Pluralist Conception of Theories and the Nature of Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (3):423-443.
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  27. Jerzy Giedymin (1991). Geometrical and Physical Conventionalism of Henri Poincar'e in Epistemological Formulation. Studies in the History and Philsophy of Science 22 (1):1-22.
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  28. Jerzy Giedymin (1982). Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré's Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition. Pergamon Press.
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  29. Jerzy Giedymin (1977). On the Origin and Significance of Poincaré's Conventionalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (4):271-301.
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  30. Steven Gimbel (2004). Un-Conventional Wisdom: Theory-Specificity in Reichenbach's Geometric Conventionalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (3):457-481.
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  31. Hans-Johann Glock (2008). Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism. Philosophical Investigations 31 (1):24–47.
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  32. Nathaniel Jason Goldberg (2009). Historicism, Entrenchment, and Conventionalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):259 - 276.
    W. V. Quine famously argues that though all knowledge is empirical, mathematics is entrenched relative to physics and the special sciences. Further, entrenchment accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Michael Friedman challenges Quine’s view by appealing to historicism, the thesis that the nature of science is illuminated by taking into account its historical development. Friedman argues on historicist grounds that mathematical claims serve as principles constitutive of languages within which empirical claims in physics and the (...)
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  33. J. A. Gould (1961). The Origin of Poincaré's Conventionalism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 15 (55):115-118.
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  34. Galina Granek (2001). Poincaré's Ether: C. Conventionalism Revisited. Apeiron 8 (2):46.
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  35. Rudolph Haller (1998). Conventionalism and It's Impact on Logical Empiricism. Philosophia Scientiae 3 (2):95-108.
  36. Henry Jackman (2001). Ordinary Language, Conventionalism and a Priori Knowledge. Dialectica 55 (4):315–325.
    This paper examines popular 'conventionalist' explanations of why philosophers need not back up their claims about how 'we' use our words with empirical studies of actual usage. It argues that such explanations are incompatible with a number of currently popular and plausible assumptions about language's 'social' character. Alternate explanations of the philosopher's purported entitlement to make a priori claims about 'our' usage are then suggested. While these alternate explanations would, unlike the conventionalist ones, be compatible with the more social picture (...)
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  37. Henry Jackman, Conventionalism, Objectivity, and Constitution.
    John Haugeland has recently attempted to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality that explains how we can (collectively) misidentify objects in the world in terms of the interplay of two types of 'recognitional' skill. Nevertheless, it is argued here that his inegalitarian conception of the two sorts of skill leaves him with a quasi-conventionalist account of our relation to the world which lacks the more robust sort of objectivity that a more holistic theory could provide.
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  38. Geoffrey Joseph (1979). Riemannian Geometry and Philosophical Conventionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):225 – 236.
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  39. Geoffrey Joseph (1977). Conventionalism and Physical Holism. Journal of Philosophy 74 (8):439-462.
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  40. Richard J. Ketchum (1979). Names, Forms and Conventionalism: "Cratylus", 383-395. Phronesis 24 (2):133 - 147.
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  41. Richard J. Ketchum (1979). Names, Forms and Conventionalism: Cratylus, 383-395. Phronesis 24 (2):133-147.
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  42. Carsten Klein (2001). Conventionalism and Realism in Hans Reichenbach's Philosophy of Geometry. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):243 – 251.
    Hans Reichenbach's so-called geometrical conventionalism is often taken as an example of a positivistic philosophy of science, based on a verificationist theory of meaning. By contrast, we shall argue that this view rests on a misinterpretation of Reichenbach's major work in this area, the Philosophy of Space and Time (1928). The conception of equivalent descriptions, which lies at the heart of Reichenbach's conventionalism, should be seen as an attempt to refute Poincaré's geometrical relativism. Based upon an examination of the reasons (...)
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  43. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1977). A Defense of Conventionalism. Noûs 11 (2):75-95.
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  44. M. Leng (2010). Conventionalism, by Yemima Ben-Menahem. Mind 118 (472):1111-1115.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  45. Sebastian Lutz, Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories.
    I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for the analytic and the synthetic component of a theory and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy need not be supplemented by another condition. This has immediate implications for the analytic component of reduction sentences.
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  46. Roberto Maiocchi (1990). Pierre Duhem's the Aim and Structure of Physical Theory: A Book Against Conventionalism. Synthese 83 (3):385 - 400.
    I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of (...)
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  47. Johnr Mckie (1988). Conventionalism, Realism, and Spacetime Structure. Theoria 54 (2):81-101.
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  48. Todd C. Moody (1985). Drawing Conclusions Against Conventionalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):337-345.
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  49. Thomas Mormann (1988). Are All False Theories Equally False? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):505-519.
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  50. W. T. Morris (1989). Conventionalism in Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):135-136.
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