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Siblings:History/traditions: Scientific Discovery
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  1. Howard Adelman & Allan Adelman (1977). The Logic of Discovery a Case Study of Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy. Acta Biotheoretica 26 (1):39-58.
    This paper examines the research leading from the initial discovery of a disease in 1957 to its complete description twenty years later. The analysis reveals four stages in the discovery process and attempts to pinpoint the key characteristics of each of those stages. It is suggested that the early stages in the process have some of the characteristics depicted by T. H. Kuhn about the logic of discovery whereas the later stages exemplify the characteristics of the logic of discovery propounded (...)
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  2. Jason McKenzie Alexander, Johannes Himmelreich & Christopher Thompson (2015). Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy of Science 82 (3):424-453.
    This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors (...)
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  3. Ignacio Angelelli (1983). MD Grmek, RS Cohen and G. Cimino, Eds., On Scientific Discovery. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 3 (3):122-124.
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  4. Francisco J. Ayala (1988). The Nature of Scientific Discovery. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 10 (1):129 - 136.
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  5. Greg Bamford (1996). Popper and His Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: A Close Shave for the Law of Gravitation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):207-232.
    Knowledge of residual perturbations in Uranus's orbit led to Neptune's discovery in 1846 rather than the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation. Karl Popper asserts that this case is untypical of science and that the law was at least prima facie falsified. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF), and that on the evidence the law was not, and was not considered, prima facie false. Many of Popper's commentators (...)
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  6. Diderik Batens (1990). Scientific Discovery. Philosophica 45 (1):3-113.
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  7. Michael Baumgartner (forthcoming). Detecting Causal Chains in Small-N Data. Field Methods.
    The first part of this paper shows that Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)--also in its most recent forms as presented in Ragin (2000, 2008)--, does not correctly analyze data generated by causal chains, which, after all, are very common among causal processes in the social sciences. The incorrect modeling of data originating from chains essentially stems from QCA’s reliance on Quine-McCluskey optimization to eliminate redundancies from sufficient and necessary conditions. Baumgartner (2009a,b) has introduced a Boolean methodology, termed Coincidence Analysis (CNA), that (...)
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  8. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Uncovering Deterministic Causal Structures: A Boolean Approach. Synthese 170 (1):71-96.
    While standard procedures of causal reasoning as procedures analyzing causal Bayesian networks are custom-built for (non-deterministic) probabilistic struc- tures, this paper introduces a Boolean procedure that uncovers deterministic causal structures. Contrary to existing Boolean methodologies, the procedure advanced here successfully analyzes structures of arbitrary complexity. It roughly involves three parts: first, deterministic dependencies are identified in the data; second, these dependencies are suitably minimalized in order to eliminate redundancies; and third, one or—in case of ambiguities—more than one causal structure is (...)
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  9. Jonathan Bennett (1960). Hesse Mary B.. Science and the Human Imagination. Aspects of the History and Logic of Physical Science. Philosophical Library, New York 1955, 171 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (1):74-75.
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  10. Richard J. Blackwell (1972). "Observation and Theory in Science," by Ernest Nagel, Sylvain Bromberger, and Adolf Grünbaum. Modern Schoolman 50 (1):135-135.
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  11. Richard J. Blackwell (1966). Approaches to the Explanation of Discovery in Science. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 40:181-190.
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  12. Peter J. Bowler (2000). Philosophy, Instinct, Intuition: What Motivates the Scientist in Search of a Theory? Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):93-101.
    This article questions whether philosophical considerations play any substantial role in the actual process of scientific research. Using examples mostly from the nineteenth century, it suggests that scientists generally choose their basic theoretical orientation, and their research strategies, on the basis of non-rationalized feelings which might be described as instinct or intuition. In one case where methodological principles were the driving force (Charles Lyell's uniformitarian geology), the effect was counterproductive.
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  13. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  14. Ingo Brigandt (2006). Philosophical Issues in Experimental Biology. Biology and Philosophy 21 (3):423–435.
    Review essay of The Philosophy of Experimental Biology by Marcel Weber (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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  15. Daniel C. Burnston, Benjamin Sheredos, Adele Abrahamsen & William Bechtel (2014). Scientists’ Use of Diagrams in Developing Mechanistic Explanations: A Case Study From Chronobiology. Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (2):224-243.
  16. David Castle (2001). A Gradualist Theory of Discovery in Ecology. Biology and Philosophy 16 (4):547-571.
    The distinction between the context ofdiscovery and the context of justificationrestricts philosophy of science to the rationalreconstruction of theories, and characterizesscientific discovery as rare, theoreticalupheavals that defy rational reconstruction. Kuhnian challenges to the two contextsdistinction show that non-rational elementspersist in the justification of theories, butgo no further to provide a positive account ofdiscovery. A gradualist theory of discoverydeveloped in this paper shows, with supportfrom ecological cases, that discoveries areroutinely made in ecology by extending modelsto new domains, or by making additions (...)
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  17. Philip Catton (2004). Constructive Criticism. In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge 50-77.
    Aristarchus, Harvey, Wegener, Newton and Einstein all made significant scientific progress in which they overturned the thinking of their predecessors. But Popper’s model of conjectures and refutations is a poor guide to fathoming the accomplishment of these scientists. By now we have a better model, which I articulate. From its vantage point, I criticise Popper.
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  18. Andrea Cerroni (2002). Discovering Relativity Beliefs: Towards a Socio-Cognitive Model for Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation. Mind and Society 3 (1):93-109.
    The research on which the present paper makes a point in aimed at designing a cognitive model of Albert Einstein's discovery that is based on fundamental Einstein's publications and placed, ideally, at a meso-level, between macro-historical and micro-cognitive reconstructions (e.g. protocol analysis). As in a cognitive-historical analysis, we will trace some discovery heuristics in the construction of representations, that are on a continuum with those we employ in ordinary problem solving. Firstly, some theory-specific, reflexive heuristics—named orientative heuristics—are traced: inner perfection, (...)
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  19. Andrea Cerroni (2000). Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 5 (2):209-224.
    Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why (...)
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  20. Finnur Dellsén (2015). Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar -- eða eitt? Ritið -- Tímarit Hugvísindastofnunar 15 (1):135-155.
    There are two main approaches to the epistemology of science. On the one hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis explains the evidence better than alternative hypotheses concerning the same subject-matter. This idea is often referred to as Inference to the Best Explanation. On the other hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis is probable given the evidence. This idea is often associated with Bayesianism (...)
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  21. Caleb Dewey, Baconian Induction.
    Recently, Hattiangadi presented several historical and hermeneutic arguments for a novel interpretation of Francis Bacon's scientific method. In this essay, I provide a formalization of this new interpretation in order to adduce it to modern philosophical discourse. That is, Baconian induction is a semantically-guided meta-activity between multiple models: a function that maps first- and higher-order theories to even higher-order theories according to certain constraints. Once it is carefully defined as such, I show that induction becomes immune to some of its (...)
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  22. Gordana Dodig Crnkovic (2010). Constructivist Research and Info-Computational Knowledge Generation. In Lorenzo Magnani, Walter Carnielli & Claudio Pizzi (eds.), MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Springer
    It is usual when writing on research methodology in dissertations and thesis work within Software Engineering to refer to Empirical Methods, Grounded Theory and Action Research. Analysis of Constructive Research Methods which are fundamental for all knowledge production and especially for concept formation, modeling and the use of artifacts is seldom given, so the relevant first-hand knowledge is missing. This article argues for introducing of the analysis of Constructive Research Methods, as crucial for understanding of research process and knowledge production. (...)
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  23. Danny Frederick, Haack's Defective Discussion of Popper and the Courts.
    Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...)
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  24. Olival Freire (2009). Quantum Dissidents: Research on the Foundations of Quantum Theory Circa 1970. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 40 (4):280-289.
    This paper makes a collective biographical profile of a sample of physicists who were protagonists in the research on the foundations of quantum physics circa 1970. We study the cases of Zeh, Bell, Clauser, Shimony, Wigner, Rosenfeld, d’Espagnat, Selleri, and DeWitt, analyzing their training and early career, achievements, qualms with quantum mechanics, motivations for such research, professional obstacles, attitude towards the Copenhagen interpretation, and success and failures. Except for Rosenfeld, they were all dissidents, fighting against the dominant attitude among physicists (...)
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  25. Magiels Geerdt, Jan Ingenhousz, or Why Don't We Know Who Discovered Photosynthesis?
    Who discovered photosynthesis? Not many people know. Jan IngenHousz' name has been forgotten, his life and works have disappeared in the mists of time. Still, the tale of his scientific endeavour shows science in action. Not only does it open up an undisclosed chapter of the history of science, it is an ideal (as under researched) episode in the history of science that can help to shine some light on the ingredients and processes that shape the development of science. This (...)
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  26. Michelle G. Gibbons (2012). Reassessing Discovery: Rosalind Franklin, Scientific Visualization, and the Structure of DNA. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):63-80.
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  27. Percy Hammond (2003). Personal Knowledge and Human Creativity. Tradition and Discovery 30 (2):24-34.
    The keystone of Polanyi’s epistemology is his idea that tacit knowing integrates subsidiary knowledge and creates personal meaning. However, Polanyi’s preoccupation with scientific discovery seems to have prevented him from developing the idea of tacit knowing in the context of human creativity. This omission leaves Polanyi with a static universe in which personal knowledge is subsumed under impersonal fields. This calls for further work.
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  28. Norwood Russell Hanson (1969/1970). Perception and Discovery. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.
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  29. Randall Harp & Kareem Khalifa (2015). Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (3):431-447.
    Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and decision-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community’s social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
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  30. Don Howard (2006). Lost Wanderers in the Forest of Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Discovery-Justification Distinction. In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Springer 3--22.
    Neo-positivism is dead. Let that imperfect designation stand for the project that dominated and defined the philosophy of science, especially in its Anglophone form, during the fifty or so years following the end of the Second World War. While its critics were many,1 its death was slow, and some think still to find a pulse.2 But die it did in the cul-de-sac into which it was led by its own faulty compass.
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  31. David L. Hull (1992). Discovering Discovery. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):501-505.
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  32. Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). La ruptura epsitemológica de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux. Estudios de Epistemología 10:09-33.
    Resumen: En el presente trabajo intentaremos analizar cierta serie o tradi-ción de reflexiones sobre el conocimiento científico que lo caracteri-zan por su discontinuidad en relación al conocimiento ordinario osentido común. El origen de esta serie puede localizarse en la obrade Gaston Bachelard y su peculiar estudio de los actos epistemológicoscon los que se rompe con el pasado en una disciplina científica. Estosactos contrastan con lo que este autor califica como el “mitocontinuista” del empirismo. Esta posición será apropiada porAlthusser y desarrollada (...)
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  33. Douglas B. Kell (2012). Scientific Discovery as a Combinatorial Optimisation Problem: How Best to Navigate the Landscape of Possible Experiments? Bioessays 34 (3):236-244.
    A considerable number of areas of bioscience, including gene and drug discovery, metabolic engineering for the biotechnological improvement of organisms, and the processes of natural and directed evolution, are best viewed in terms of a ‘landscape’ representing a large search space of possible solutions or experiments populated by a considerably smaller number of actual solutions that then emerge. This is what makes these problems ‘hard’, but as such these are to be seen as combinatorial optimisation problems that are best attacked (...)
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  34. Alexander Klein (2015). Science, Religion, and “The Will to Believe". Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):72-117.
    Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified by a unitary (...)
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  35. Scott A. Kleiner (1999). Serendipity and Vision: Two Methods for Discovery Comments on Nickles. Biology and Philosophy 14 (1):55-63.
    Thomas Nickles challenges my thesis that innovative discoveries can be based on deliberately chosen problems and research strategies. He suggests that all significant innovation can be seen as such only in retrospect and that its generation must be serendipitous. Here I argue in response that significant innovations can and do often arise from self conscious critical appraisal of orthodox practice combined with regulated though speculative abductive argumentation to alternative explanatory schemata. Orthodox practice is not based upon monolithic systems of belief (...)
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  36. Jeff Kochan (2015). Circles of Scientific Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, Denkstil. In Dimitri Ginev (ed.), Critical Science Studies after Ludwik Fleck. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press 83-99.
    Hermeneutic studies of science locate a circle at the heart of scientific practice: scientists only gain knowledge of what they, in some sense, already know. This may seem to threaten the rational validity of science, but one can argue that this circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one. A virtuous circle is one in which research conclusions are already present in the premises, but only in an indeterminate and underdeveloped way. In order to defend the validity of science, (...)
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  37. Jeff Kochan (2015). Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the Scientific Subject. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:103-107.
    Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's (...)
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  38. Jeff Kochan (2015). Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially inflected reliabilism as (...)
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  39. Jeff Kochan (2013). Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (3):354-362.
    A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion (...)
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  40. Jeff Kochan (2011). Review of Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 102 (3):594-595.
    Review of: Isabelle Stengers (2010), Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Posthumanities, 9) (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press).
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  41. Carl R. Kordig (1978). Discovery and Justification. Philosophy of Science 45 (1):110-117.
    The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous. This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery. For the debate presupposes the distinction. Real discoveries are well established. What is well established is justified. The proper distinctions are three: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. Logic is not essential to initial thinking. We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis. Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable. Logic is essential, as Hanson noted, to both plausibility (...)
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  42. B. I. B. Lindahl, Aant Elzinga & Alfred Welljams-Dorof (1998). Credit for Discoveries: Citation Data as a Basis for History of Science Analysis. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (6):609-620.
    Citation data have become an increasingly significant source of information for historians, sociologists, and other researchers studying the evolution of science. In the past few decades elaborate methodologies have been developed for the use of citation data in the study of the modern history of science. This article focuses on how citation indexes make it possible to trace the background and development of discoveries as well as to assess the credit that publishing scientists assign to particular discoverers. Kuhn's notion of (...)
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  43. Lorenzo Magnani (2004). Conjectures and Manipulations. Computational Modeling and the Extra- Theoretical Dimension of Scientific Discovery. Minds and Machines 14 (4):507-538.
    Computational philosophy (CP) aims at investigating many important concepts and problems of the philosophical and epistemological tradition in a new way by taking advantage of information-theoretic, cognitive, and artificial intelligence methodologies. I maintain that the results of computational philosophy meet the classical requirements of some Peircian pragmatic ambitions. Indeed, more than a 100 years ago, the American philosopher C.S. Peirce, when working on logical and philosophical problems, suggested the concept of pragmatism(pragmaticism, in his own words) as a logical criterion to (...)
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  44. Lorenzo Magnani, Walter Carnielli & Claudio Pizzi (eds.) (2010). MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Springer.
    This volume is based on the papers presented at the international conference Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology (MBR09_BRAZIL), held at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas, Brazil, December 2009. The presentations given at the conference explored how scientific cognition, but several other kinds as well, use models, abduction, and explanatory reasoning to produce important or creative changes in theories and concepts. Some speakers addressed the problem of model-based reasoning in technology, and stressed the issue of science and technological innovation. (...)
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  45. Mauro Maldonato (2011). Phenomenology of Discovery: The Cognition of Complexity. World Futures 67 (4-5):372 - 379.
    The decline of classical epistemology on unity-identity-totality shows it becomes more urgent to leave formal conventionalism behind, and to use a new diverging language. Every scientist must feel the emotion of the beginner. Nevertheless, we must not have illusions. Pure observation does not exist. Moreover, there are no laws that can remove the asymmetries of a system. The knowledge and scientific practice free themselves from the obsession of clarity, of linearity and from the idea of evolution that follows and precedes (...)
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  46. James A. Marcum (2011). Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.
    In this article, I introduce the notion of horizon for scientific practice (HSP), representing limits or boundaries within which scientists ply their trade, to facilitate analysis of scientific discovery and progress. The notion includes not only constraints that delimit scientific practice, e.g. of bringing experimentation to a temporary conclusion, but also possibilities that open up scientific practice to additional scientific discovery and to further scientific progress. Importantly, it represents scientific practice as a dynamic and developmental integration of activities to investigate (...)
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  47. Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Wisdom and Curiosity? I Remember Them Well. The Times Higher Education Supplement (1,488):14.
    Academic inquiry has two basic inter-related aims. One is to explore intellectually aspects of our world of intrinsic interest and value, for its own sake, and to encourage non-academics to participate in such exploration, thus improving our knowledge and understanding. The other is, by intellectual means, to help humanity solve its problems of living, so that a more peaceful, just, democratic and environmentally enlightened world may be attained. Both are at present betrayed.
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  48. Nicholas Maxwell (1997). Must Science Make Cosmological Assumptions If It is to Be Rational?,. In T. Kelly (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Irish Philosophical Society Spring Conference. Irish Philosophical Society
    Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both these speculations may be false; in (...)
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  49. Joke Meheus (1999). The Positivists' Approach to Scientific Discovery. Philosophica 64.
    In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the?positivists? have been criticised for their neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the `friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what (...)
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  50. David Marshall Miller (2013). Seeing and Believing: Galileo, Aristotelians, and the Mountains on the Moon. In Daniel De Simone & John Hessler (eds.), The Starry Messenger. Levenger Press 131-145.
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