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Siblings:History/traditions: Scientific Discovery
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  1. Howard Adelman & Allan Adelman (1977). The Logic of Discovery a Case Study of Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy. Acta Biotheoretica 26 (1):39-58.
    This paper examines the research leading from the initial discovery of a disease in 1957 to its complete description twenty years later. The analysis reveals four stages in the discovery process and attempts to pinpoint the key characteristics of each of those stages. It is suggested that the early stages in the process have some of the characteristics depicted by T. H. Kuhn about the logic of discovery whereas the later stages exemplify the characteristics of the logic of discovery propounded (...)
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  2. Jason McKenzie Alexander, Johannes Himmelreich & Christopher Thompson (2015). Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy of Science 82 (3):424-453,.
    This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...)
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  3. Ignacio Angelelli (1983). MD Grmek, RS Cohen and G. Cimino, Eds., On Scientific Discovery. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 3 (3):122-124.
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  4. Francisco J. Ayala (1988). The Nature of Scientific Discovery. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 10 (1):129 - 136.
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  5. Greg Bamford (1996). Popper and His Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: A Close Shave for the Law of Gravitation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):207-232.
    Knowledge of residual perturbations in Uranus's orbit led to Neptune's discovery in 1846 rather than the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation. Karl Popper asserts that this case is untypical of science and that the law was at least prima facie falsified. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF), and that on the evidence the law was not, and was not considered, prima facie false. Many of Popper's commentators (...)
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  6. S. Bangu (2006). Steiner on the Applicability of Mathematics and Naturalism. Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1):26-43.
    Steiner defines naturalism in opposition to anthropocentrism, the doctrine that the human mind holds a privileged place in the universe. He assumes the anthropocentric nature of mathematics and argues that physicists' employment of mathematically guided strategies in the discovery of quantum mechanics challenges scientists' naturalism. In this paper I show that Steiner's assumption about the anthropocentric character of mathematics is questionable. I draw attention to mathematicians' rejection of what Maddy calls ‘definabilism’, a methodological maxim governing the development of mathematics. I (...)
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  7. Sorin Bangu (2008). Reifying Mathematics? Prediction and Symmetry Classification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (2):239-258.
    In this paper I reconstruct and critically examine the reasoning leading to the famous prediction of the ‘omega minus’ particle by M. Gell-Mann and Y. Ne’eman (in 1962) on the basis of a symmetry classification scheme. While the peculiarity of this prediction has occasionally been noticed in the literature, a detailed treatment of the methodological problems it poses has not been offered yet. By spelling out the characteristics of this type of prediction, I aim to underscore the challenges raised by (...)
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  8. Diderik Batens (1990). Scientific Discovery. Philosophica 45 (1):3-113.
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  9. Michael Baumgartner (forthcoming). Detecting Causal Chains in Small-N Data. Field Methods.
    The first part of this paper shows that Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)--also in its most recent forms as presented in Ragin (2000, 2008)--, does not correctly analyze data generated by causal chains, which, after all, are very common among causal processes in the social sciences. The incorrect modeling of data originating from chains essentially stems from QCA’s reliance on Quine-McCluskey optimization to eliminate redundancies from sufficient and necessary conditions. Baumgartner (2009a,b) has introduced a Boolean methodology, termed Coincidence Analysis (CNA), that (...)
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  10. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Uncovering Deterministic Causal Structures: A Boolean Approach. Synthese 170 (1):71-96.
    While standard procedures of causal reasoning as procedures analyzing causal Bayesian networks are custom-built for (non-deterministic) probabilistic struc- tures, this paper introduces a Boolean procedure that uncovers deterministic causal structures. Contrary to existing Boolean methodologies, the procedure advanced here successfully analyzes structures of arbitrary complexity. It roughly involves three parts: first, deterministic dependencies are identified in the data; second, these dependencies are suitably minimalized in order to eliminate redundancies; and third, one or—in case of ambiguities—more than one causal structure is (...)
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  11. Jonathan Bennett (1960). Hesse Mary B.. Science and the Human Imagination. Aspects of the History and Logic of Physical Science. Philosophical Library, New York 1955, 171 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (1):74-75.
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  12. Richard J. Blackwell (1972). "Observation and Theory in Science," by Ernest Nagel, Sylvain Bromberger, and Adolf Grünbaum. Modern Schoolman 50 (1):135-135.
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  13. Richard J. Blackwell (1966). Approaches to the Explanation of Discovery in Science. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 40:181-190.
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  14. Peter J. Bowler (2000). Philosophy, Instinct, Intuition: What Motivates the Scientist in Search of a Theory? Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):93-101.
    This article questions whether philosophical considerations play any substantial role in the actual process of scientific research. Using examples mostly from the nineteenth century, it suggests that scientists generally choose their basic theoretical orientation, and their research strategies, on the basis of non-rationalized feelings which might be described as instinct or intuition. In one case where methodological principles were the driving force (Charles Lyell's uniformitarian geology), the effect was counterproductive.
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  15. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  16. Ingo Brigandt (2006). Philosophical Issues in Experimental Biology. Biology and Philosophy 21 (3):423–435.
    Review essay of The Philosophy of Experimental Biology by Marcel Weber (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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  17. James Robert Brown & Michael T. Stuart (2013). Katerina Ierodiakonou and Sophie Roux, Eds.Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. Vii+233. €99.00. [REVIEW] Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):154-157.
  18. Daniel C. Burnston, Benjamin Sheredos, Adele Abrahamsen & William Bechtel (2014). Scientists’ Use of Diagrams in Developing Mechanistic Explanations: A Case Study From Chronobiology. Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (2):224-243.
  19. David Castle (2001). A Gradualist Theory of Discovery in Ecology. Biology and Philosophy 16 (4):547-571.
    The distinction between the context ofdiscovery and the context of justificationrestricts philosophy of science to the rationalreconstruction of theories, and characterizesscientific discovery as rare, theoreticalupheavals that defy rational reconstruction. Kuhnian challenges to the two contextsdistinction show that non-rational elementspersist in the justification of theories, butgo no further to provide a positive account ofdiscovery. A gradualist theory of discoverydeveloped in this paper shows, with supportfrom ecological cases, that discoveries areroutinely made in ecology by extending modelsto new domains, or by making additions (...)
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  20. Philip Catton (2004). Constructive Criticism. In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge 50-77.
    Aristarchus, Harvey, Wegener, Newton and Einstein all made significant scientific progress in which they overturned the thinking of their predecessors. But Popper’s model of conjectures and refutations is a poor guide to fathoming the accomplishment of these scientists. By now we have a better model, which I articulate. From its vantage point, I criticise Popper.
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  21. Andrea Cerroni (2002). Discovering Relativity Beliefs: Towards a Socio-Cognitive Model for Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation. Mind and Society 3 (1):93-109.
    The research on which the present paper makes a point in aimed at designing a cognitive model of Albert Einstein's discovery that is based on fundamental Einstein's publications and placed, ideally, at a meso-level, between macro-historical and micro-cognitive reconstructions (e.g. protocol analysis). As in a cognitive-historical analysis, we will trace some discovery heuristics in the construction of representations, that are on a continuum with those we employ in ordinary problem solving. Firstly, some theory-specific, reflexive heuristics—named orientative heuristics—are traced: inner perfection, (...)
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  22. Andrea Cerroni (2000). Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 5 (2):209-224.
    Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why (...)
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  23. Antoine Cornuéejols, Andrée Tiberghien & Gérard Collet (2000). A New Mechanism for Transfer Between Conceptual Domains in Scientific Discovery and Education. Foundations of Science 5 (2):129-155.
    Confronted with problems or situations that do not yield toknown theories and world views, scientists and students are alike. Theyare rarely able to directly build a model or a theory thereof. Rather,they must find ways to make sense of the circumstances using theircurrent knowledge and adjusting what is recognized in the process. Thisway of thinking, using past ways of perceiving the physical world tobuild new ones does not follow a logical path and cannot be described astheory revision. Likewise, in many (...)
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  24. Finnur Dellsén (2015). Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar -- eða eitt? Ritið -- Tímarit Hugvísindastofnunar 15 (1):135-155.
    There are two main approaches to the epistemology of science. On the one hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis explains the evidence better than alternative hypotheses concerning the same subject-matter. This idea is often referred to as Inference to the Best Explanation. On the other hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis is probable given the evidence. This idea is often associated with Bayesianism (...)
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  25. Gordana Dodig Crnkovic (2010). Constructivist Research and Info-Computational Knowledge Generation. In Lorenzo Magnani, Walter Carnielli & Claudio Pizzi (eds.), MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Springer
    It is usual when writing on research methodology in dissertations and thesis work within Software Engineering to refer to Empirical Methods, Grounded Theory and Action Research. Analysis of Constructive Research Methods which are fundamental for all knowledge production and especially for concept formation, modeling and the use of artifacts is seldom given, so the relevant first-hand knowledge is missing. This article argues for introducing of the analysis of Constructive Research Methods, as crucial for understanding of research process and knowledge production. (...)
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  26. Michael Eckert (2015). The Multiple Faces of X-Ray Crystallography. Metascience 24 (1):95-97.
    Since its discovery in 1912, X-ray crystallography has become a most useful tool in physics, chemistry, material science, mineralogy, metallurgy, and even in the biological sciences. In 1914, Max von Laue was awarded the Nobel Prize “for the discovery of X-ray diffraction by crystals,” followed by the 1915 Nobel Prize to William Henry Bragg and William Lawrence Bragg “for their services in analysis of crystal structure by means of X-rays.” And these early Nobel prizes marked only the beginning of X-ray (...)
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  27. George L. Farre (1968). On the Linguistic Foundations of the Problem of Scientific Discovery. Journal of Philosophy 65 (24):779-794.
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  28. Allan Franklin, Are the Laws of Physics Inevitable?
    Social constructionists believe that experimental evidence plays a minimal role in the production of scientific knowledge, while rationalists such as myself believe that experimental evidence is crucial in it. As one historical example in support of the rationalist position, I trace in some detail the theoretical and experimental research that led to our understanding of beta decay, from Enrico Fermi’s pioneering theory of 1934 to George Sudarshan and Robert Marshak’s and Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann’s suggestion in 1957 and 1958, (...)
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  29. Danny Frederick, Haack's Defective Discussion of Popper and the Courts.
    Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...)
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  30. Olival Freire (2009). Quantum Dissidents: Research on the Foundations of Quantum Theory Circa 1970. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 40 (4):280-289.
    This paper makes a collective biographical profile of a sample of physicists who were protagonists in the research on the foundations of quantum physics circa 1970. We study the cases of Zeh, Bell, Clauser, Shimony, Wigner, Rosenfeld, d’Espagnat, Selleri, and DeWitt, analyzing their training and early career, achievements, qualms with quantum mechanics, motivations for such research, professional obstacles, attitude towards the Copenhagen interpretation, and success and failures. Except for Rosenfeld, they were all dissidents, fighting against the dominant attitude among physicists (...)
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  31. Magiels Geerdt, Jan Ingenhousz, or Why Don't We Know Who Discovered Photosynthesis?
    Who discovered photosynthesis? Not many people know. Jan IngenHousz' name has been forgotten, his life and works have disappeared in the mists of time. Still, the tale of his scientific endeavour shows science in action. Not only does it open up an undisclosed chapter of the history of science, it is an ideal (as under researched) episode in the history of science that can help to shine some light on the ingredients and processes that shape the development of science. This (...)
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  32. Michelle G. Gibbons (2012). Reassessing Discovery: Rosalind Franklin, Scientific Visualization, and the Structure of DNA. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):63-80.
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  33. Gary Gutting (1980). Science as Discovery. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 131 (1):26-48.
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  34. Percy Hammond (2003). Personal Knowledge and Human Creativity. Tradition and Discovery 30 (2):24-34.
    The keystone of Polanyi’s epistemology is his idea that tacit knowing integrates subsidiary knowledge and creates personal meaning. However, Polanyi’s preoccupation with scientific discovery seems to have prevented him from developing the idea of tacit knowing in the context of human creativity. This omission leaves Polanyi with a static universe in which personal knowledge is subsumed under impersonal fields. This calls for further work.
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  35. Norwood Russell Hanson (1969). Perception and Discovery. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.
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  36. Randall Harp & Kareem Khalifa (2015). Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (3):431-447.
    Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and decision-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community’s social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
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  37. Vincent F. Hendricks & Jan Faye (1999). Abduting Explanation. In L. Magnini, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publisher 271--292.
  38. Don Howard (2006). Lost Wanderers in the Forest of Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Discovery-Justification Distinction. In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Springer 3--22.
    Neo-positivism is dead. Let that imperfect designation stand for the project that dominated and defined the philosophy of science, especially in its Anglophone form, during the fifty or so years following the end of the Second World War. While its critics were many,1 its death was slow, and some think still to find a pulse.2 But die it did in the cul-de-sac into which it was led by its own faulty compass.
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  39. David L. Hull (1992). Discovering Discovery. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):501-505.
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  40. Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). La ruptura epistemológica de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux. Estudios de Epistemología 10:09-33.
    Resumen: En el presente trabajo intentaremos analizar cierta serie o tradi-ción de reflexiones sobre el conocimiento científico que lo caracteri-zan por su discontinuidad en relación al conocimiento ordinario osentido común. El origen de esta serie puede localizarse en la obrade Gaston Bachelard y su peculiar estudio de los actos epistemológicoscon los que se rompe con el pasado en una disciplina científica. Estosactos contrastan con lo que este autor califica como el “mitocontinuista” del empirismo. Esta posición será apropiada porAlthusser y desarrollada (...)
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  41. Douglas B. Kell (2012). Scientific Discovery as a Combinatorial Optimisation Problem: How Best to Navigate the Landscape of Possible Experiments? Bioessays 34 (3):236-244.
    A considerable number of areas of bioscience, including gene and drug discovery, metabolic engineering for the biotechnological improvement of organisms, and the processes of natural and directed evolution, are best viewed in terms of a ‘landscape’ representing a large search space of possible solutions or experiments populated by a considerably smaller number of actual solutions that then emerge. This is what makes these problems ‘hard’, but as such these are to be seen as combinatorial optimisation problems that are best attacked (...)
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  42. Alexander Klein (2015). Science, Religion, and “The Will to Believe". Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):72-117.
    Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified by a unitary (...)
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  43. Scott A. Kleiner (1999). Serendipity and Vision: Two Methods for Discovery Comments on Nickles. Biology and Philosophy 14 (1):55-63.
    Thomas Nickles challenges my thesis that innovative discoveries can be based on deliberately chosen problems and research strategies. He suggests that all significant innovation can be seen as such only in retrospect and that its generation must be serendipitous. Here I argue in response that significant innovations can and do often arise from self conscious critical appraisal of orthodox practice combined with regulated though speculative abductive argumentation to alternative explanatory schemata. Orthodox practice is not based upon monolithic systems of belief (...)
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  44. Jeff Kochan (2015). Circles of Scientific Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, Denkstil. In Dimitri Ginev (ed.), Critical Science Studies after Ludwik Fleck. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press 83-99.
    Hermeneutic studies of science locate a circle at the heart of scientific practice: scientists only gain knowledge of what they, in some sense, already know. This may seem to threaten the rational validity of science, but one can argue that this circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one. A virtuous circle is one in which research conclusions are already present in the premises, but only in an indeterminate and underdeveloped way. In order to defend the validity of science, (...)
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  45. Jeff Kochan (2015). Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the Scientific Subject. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:103-107.
    Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's (...)
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  46. Jeff Kochan (2015). Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially inflected reliabilism as (...)
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  47. Jeff Kochan (2013). Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (3):354-362.
    A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion (...)
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  48. Jeff Kochan (2011). Review of Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 102 (3):594-595.
    Review of: Isabelle Stengers (2010), Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Posthumanities, 9) (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press).
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  49. Carl R. Kordig (1978). Discovery and Justification. Philosophy of Science 45 (1):110-117.
    The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous. This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery. For the debate presupposes the distinction. Real discoveries are well established. What is well established is justified. The proper distinctions are three: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. Logic is not essential to initial thinking. We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis. Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable. Logic is essential, as Hanson noted, to both plausibility (...)
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  50. Maria Kronfeldner (2010). Darwinian 'Blind' Hypothesis Formation Revisited. Synthese 175 (2):193--218.
    Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...)
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