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Subcategories:History/traditions: Scientific Method
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  1. Peter Achinstein (1986). Theoretical Derivations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (4):375-414.
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  2. Peter Achinstein (1969). Studies in the Philosophy of Science Essays by Peter Achinstein [and Others]. --. Blackwell.
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  3. Robert John Ackermann (1960). Simplicity and the Acceptability of Scientific Theories. Dissertation, Michigan State University
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  4. Avshalom M. Adam (2000). Farewell to Certitude: Einstein's Novelty on Induction and Deduction, Fallibilism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):19-37.
    In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, (...)
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  5. Ernest W. Adams (1993). Probability and the Art of Judgement by Richard Jeffrey. Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):154-157.
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  6. T. R. Addis & D. C. Gooding (2008). Simulation Methods for an Abductive System in Science. Foundations of Science 13 (1):37-52.
    We argue that abduction does not work in isolation from other inference mechanisms and illustrate this through an inference scheme designed to evaluate multiple hypotheses. We use game theory to relate the abductive system to actions that produce new information. To enable evaluation of the implications of this approach we have implemented the procedures used to calculate the impact of new information in a computer model. Experiments with this model display a number of features of collective belief-revision leading to consensus-formation, (...)
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  7. Jonathan E. Adler (1982). Jennifer Trusted, "The Logic of Scientific Inference". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 32 (28):291.
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  8. Joseph Agassi (1973). Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (1):1-24.
    Science uses its firmest conclusions to arrive at new ones which may well completely destroy these, previously firmest, conclusions. The perceptive may notice that when the previously firmest conclusions are demolished we may remain in the dark with no conclusion worth replacing it with. But only when we replace it with a firmer conclusion can we speak of a bootstrap operation rather than of a refutations. Often, to conclude, the ad hoc nature of a fact-like statement is rooted in the (...)
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  9. E. Agazzi & S. Walker (1978). Is Scientific Objectivity Possible Without Measurements? Diogenes 26 (104):93-111.
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  10. F. Michael Akeroyd (1990). The Challenge to Lakatos Restated. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):437-439.
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  11. F. Michael Akeroyd (1986). A Challenge to the Followers of Lakatos. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):359-362.
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  12. Atocha Aliseda (2007). Abductive Reasoning: Challenges Ahead. Theoria 22 (3):261-270.
    The motivation behind the collection of papers presented in this THEORIA forum on Abductive reasoning is my book Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into the Processes of Discovery and Explanation. These contributions raise fundamental questions. One of them concerns the conjectural character of abduction. The choice of a logical framework for abduction is also discussed in detail, both its inferential aspect and search strategies. Abduction is also analyzed as inference to the best explanation, as well as a process of epistemic change, (...)
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  13. Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss (2014). Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis. Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I (...)
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  14. Lennart Åqvist (2007). An Interpretation of Probability in the Law of Evidence Based on Pro-Et-Contra Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.
    The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis (...)
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  15. Chris Argyris (1987). Seeking Truth and Actionable Knowledge: How the Scientific Method Inhibits Both. Philosophica 40.
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  16. Jerrold L. Aronson (1991). Scientific Reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3):120-121.
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  17. Francisco J. Ayala (1994). On the Scientific Method, Its Practice and Pitfalls. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):205 - 240.
    This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...)
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  18. A. J. Ayer (2004). The Problem of Knowledge , and, Probability and Evidence. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  19. D. P. B. (1961). The Scientific Art of Logic. Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):346-346.
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  20. L. K. B. (1957). La Nature Et la Portée de la Méthode Scientifique. Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):545-545.
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  21. M. B. (1973). Scientific Method. Review of Metaphysics 26 (3):534-534.
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  22. Arunasalam Balasubramaniam (1983). Epistemic Complementarity and Scientific Rationality. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Classical empiricism raised epistemological issues within a framework of dichotomies that were rarely questioned. It was assumed that statements were either normative or descriptive ; terms were either observational or theoretical; meaning is either given atomically or holistically; truth was either radically independent of language or radically dependent upon it ; and the entities postulated by scientific theories are constructed or are theory-independent . Modern philosophers have questioned the tenability of these distinctions and attempts have been made to relinquish many (...)
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  23. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan (2006). Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity. Synthese 148 (2):259 - 293.
    The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate (...)
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  24. Maya Bar-Hillel (1982). Ideal Evidence, Relevance and Second-Order Probabilities. Erkenntnis 17 (3):273 - 290.
    The concepts of supportive evidence and of relevant evidence seem very closely related to each other. Supportive evidence is clearly always relevant as well. But must relevant evidence be defined as evidence which is either supportive or weakeking? In an explicit or implicit manner, this is indeed the position of many philosophers. The paradox of ideal evidence, however, shows us that this is to restrictive. Besides increasing or decreasing the probability attached to some hypothesis, evidence can alter or interact with (...)
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  25. Gillian Abernathy Barker (1997). Abstraction, Analogy and Induction: Toward a General Account of Ampliative Inference. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    My central concern is with the epistemological status of ampliative inference. Three sorts of ampliative inference are initially distinguished: enumerative induction, analogical reasoning, and abstraction. Philosophers of science have generally treated these separately, and in particular have often divorced the familiar problem of induction from equally fundamental questions concerning the use of analogy and abstraction: What kinds of similarity can support inference? How can we pick out those features of a system that are essential for the purposes of understanding, and (...)
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  26. Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.
    Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provides stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and then confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and 'used', in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting attempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain conditions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism (...)
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  27. Paul Bartha (1998). Domenico Costantini and Maria Carla Galavotti, Eds., Probability, Dynamics and Causality: Essays in Honour of Richard C. Jeffrey Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 18 (5):321-323.
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  28. K. K. Baublys (1973). ACHINSTEIN, P. - "Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis". [REVIEW] Mind 82:463.
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  29. Darrin W. Belousek (1998). Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal. Synthese 115 (1):71-98.
    Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may pose for scientific realism. The Husserlian phenomenological framework is (...)
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  30. Avner Ben-Zaken (2011). Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 44 (4):585-587.
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  31. Seth Benardete (1983). Gott Und "Theoria" Bei Aristoteles. Review of Metaphysics 37 (1):112-113.
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  32. Geneviève Benezra (1979). External Pressures on Scientific Evaluation in a Politically Oriented Support Program. In János Farkas (ed.), Sociology of Science and Research. Akadémiai Kiadó 61.
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  33. Russell Berg (2009). Evaluating Scientific Theories. Philosophy Now 74:14-17.
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  34. Arianna Betti (2010). Leśniewski's Characteristica Universalis. Synthese 174 (2):295-314.
    Leśniewski’s systems deviate greatly from standard logic in some basic features. The deviant aspects are rather well known, and often cited among the reasons why Leśniewski’s work enjoys little recognition. This paper is an attempt to explain why those aspects should be there at all. Leśniewski built his systems inspired by a dream close to Leibniz’s characteristica universalis: a perfect system of deductive theories encoding our knowledge of the world, based on a perfect language. My main claim is that Leśniewski (...)
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  35. Arianna Betti & Willem R. de Jong (2010). Introduction. Synthese 174 (2):181-183.
  36. Rabi Bhattacharya & Edward C. Waymire (forthcoming). A Basic Course in Probability Theory. Analysis.
    The book develops the necessary background in probability theory underlying diverse treatments of stochastic processes and their wide-ranging applications. With this goal in mind, the pace is lively, yet thorough. Basic notions of independence and conditional expectation are introduced relatively early on in the text, while conditional expectation is illustrated in detail in the context of martingales, Markov property and strong Markov property. Weak convergence of probabilities on metric spaces and Brownian motion are two highlights. The historic role of size-biasing (...)
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  37. Lukáš Bielik (2013). Theory-Laden Observations and Empirical Equivalence of Theories. Filozofia 68 (7).
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  38. Lukas Bielik (2012). The Abductive Model of (Scientific) Explanation. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1).
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  39. Erwin Biser & Enos E. Witmer (1947). Methodology of Research and Progress in Science. Philosophy of Science 14 (4):275-288.
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  40. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. OUP Usa.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  41. James Blachowicz (1989). Discovery and Ampliative Inference. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):438-462.
    An inference to a new explanation may be both logically non-ampliative and epistemically ampliative. Included among the premises of the latter form is the explanadum--a unique premise which is capable of embodying what we do not know about the matter in question, as well as legitimate aspects of what we do know. This double status points to a resolution of the Meno paradox. Ampliative inference of this sort, it is argued, has much in common with Nickles' idea of discoverability and, (...)
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  42. Richard J. Blackwell (1974). The Inductivist Model of Science. Modern Schoolman 51 (3):197-212.
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  43. Richard J. Blackwell (1972). "Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis," by Peter Achinstein. Modern Schoolman 50 (1):131-131.
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  44. Ralph M. Blake (1960/1989). Theories of Scientific Method: The Renaissance Through the Nineteenth Century. Gordon and Breach.
    This historical compendium investigates scientific methods conceived between the Renaissance and the nineteenth century. Beginning with attacks on Scholasticism and the rist of the New Science, the authors explain the roles of both major andminor figures in describing scientific methods. Although the chapters are interrelated and contain explicit comparisons, each chapter is a complete study in itself. The authors' emphasis on writing for the non-specialist and their liberal use of primary sources make this an outstanding textbook.
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  45. Walter Block (2010). Is There an "Anomalous" Section of the Laffer Curve? Libertarian Papers 2.
    When an economy is at the upper part of the Laffer curve, a reduction in tax rates will, somewhat paradoxically, lead to a rise in the amount of money, both relatively and absolutely, the taxpayer will retain, but, also, to an increase in government revenues collected. The former result is a welcome one, from the libertarian perspective, not so the latter. Does this example exhibit a slight anomaly for the free enterprise philosophy , or does it furnish a true conundrum. (...)
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  46. David Bloor (1982). Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 15 (3):306-309.
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  47. Stuart S. Blume & Ruth Sinclair (1974). Aspects of the Structure of a Scientific Discipline. In Richard Whitley (ed.), Social Processes of Scientific Development. Routlege & K. Paul 224--241.
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  48. James Bogen & Jim Woodward (2005). Evading the Irs. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):233-268.
    'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the (...)
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  49. Richard Bohms (unknown). Inference to the Best Explanation and Empirically Equivalent Theories. Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 20.
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  50. Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (2002). Scientific Inference and the Pursuit of Fame: A Contractarian Approach. Philosophy of Science 69 (2):300-323.
    Methodological norms are seen as rules defining a competitive game, and it is argued that rational recognition‐seeking scientists can reach a collective agreement about which specific norms serve better their individual interests, especially if the choice is made 'under a veil of ignorance', i.e. , before knowing what theory will be proposed by each scientist. Norms for theory assessment are distinguished from norms for theory choice (or inference rules), and it is argued that pursuit of recognition only affects this second (...)
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