Related categories
Subcategories:History/traditions: Scientific Realism
2282 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 2282
Material to categorize
  1. Evandro Agazzi (2016). Scientific Realism Within Perspectivism and Perspectivism Within Scientific Realism. Axiomathes 26 (4):349-365.
    Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in a way that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Feraz Azhar & Jeremy Butterfield, Scientific Realism and Primordial Cosmology.
    We discuss scientific realism from the perspective of modern cosmology, especially primordial cosmology: i.e. the cosmological investigation of the very early universe. We first state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss what insights about it cosmology might yield, as against "just" supplying scientific claims that philosophers can then evaluate. In particular, we discuss: the idea of laws of cosmology, and limitations on ascertaining the global structure of spacetime. Then we review some of what is now known about the early (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Wolfgang Balzer & C. Ulises Moulines (1999). Structuralist Theory of Science. Erkenntnis 51 (2):353-356.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. James Bogen (1989). On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. Philosophical Books 30 (2):92-94.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Donald T. Campbell (1974). Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery. In F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. University of California Press 139--161.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  6. N. Cartwright, P. Lipton, P. Menzies & La Paul (2002). CARTWRIGHT, N.-The Dappled World. Philosophical Books 43 (4):241-278.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Hasok Chang (2012). Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Phil Dowe (1994). John Dupré, The Disorder of Things. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 14:387-389.
  9. Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Understanding: Art and Science. Synthese 95 (1):196-208.
    The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding. This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields. Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features. They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection. Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light. Jackson Pollock'sNumber One exemplifies the viscosity of paint. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Milton Fisk (1974). Necessity As a Presupposition of Inductive Support. Idealistic Studies 4 (1):64-78.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. John Forge (1990). Theoretical Explanation and Errors of Measurement. Erkenntnis 33 (3):371 - 390.
    By using the concept of a uniformity, the Structuralists have given us a most useful means of representing approximations. In the second section of this paper, I have made use of this technique to show how we can deal with errors of measurement — imprecise explananda — in the context of theoretical explanation. As well as (I hope) providing further demonstration of the power of the Structuralist approach, this also serves to support the ontic conception of explanation by showing that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12. Malcolm Forster (2007). A Philosopher's Guide to Empirical Success. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
    The simple question, what is empirical success? turns out to have a surprisingly complicated answer. We need to distinguish between meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit', which is akin to the distinction between prediction and accommodation. The final proposal is that empirical success emerges in a theory dependent way from the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities. Implications for realism and Bayesianism are discussed. ‡This paper was written when I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  13. Robert L. Frazier (1996). Roger Trigg's Rationality And Science. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 37 (4):282-284.
  14. Richard Healey (1981). Reduction, Time and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Richard Healy (ed.) (1975). Reduction, Time, and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Luiz Henrique Dutra (2011). Natural Kinds as Scientific Models. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 290:141-150.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Rafaela Hillerbrand (2013). Order Out of Chaos? A Case Study in High Energy Physics. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):61-78.
    In recent years, computational sciences such as computational hydrodynamics or computational field theory have supplemented theoretical and experimental investigations in many scientific fields. Often, there is a seemingly fruitful overlap between theory, experiment, and numerics. The computational sciences are highly dynamic and seem a fairly successful endeavor---at least if success is measured in terms of publications or engineering applications. However, for theories, success in application and correctness are two very different things; and just the same may hold for "methodologies" like (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Nick Huggett (2000). Local Philosophies of Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):137.
    Since the collapse of the 'received view' consensus in the late 1960s, the question of scientific realism has been a major preoccupation of philosophers of science. This paper sketches the history of this debate, which grew from developments in the philosophy of language, but eventually took on an autonomous existence. More recently, the debate has tended towards more 'local' considerations of particular scientific episodes as a way of getting purchase on the issues. The paper reviews two such approaches, Fine's and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Nick Huggett, Steven French & Frederick Suppe (2000). Metaphilosophy and the History of the Philosophy of Science-The Structure of Scientific Theories Thirty Years On-Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
  20. Paul Humphreys (1988). Causal, Experimental, and Structural Realisms. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):241-252.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. R. H. K. (1970). Contemporary Philosophy (La Philosophie Contemporaine). Volume II, Philosophy of Science. Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):571-572.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Harmke Kamminga & Reza K. Tavakol (1993). How Untidy is God's Mind? A Note on the Dynamical Implications of Nancy Cartwright's Metaphysics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):549-553.
  23. Vassilios Karakostas & Pandora Hadzidaki (2005). Realism Vs. Constructivism in Contemporary Physics: The Impact of the Debate on the Understanding of Quantum Theory and its Instructional Process. Science and Education 14 (7-8):607-629.
    In the present study we attempt to incorporate the philosophical dialogue about physical reality into the instructional process of quantum mechanics. Taking into account that both scientific realism and constructivism represent, on the basis of a rather broad spectrum, prevalent philosophical currents in the domain of science education, the compatibility of their essential commitments is examined against the conceptual structure of quantum theory. It is argued in this respect that the objects of science do not simply constitute ‘personal constructions’ of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, David Papineau, Stathis Psillos & Howard Sankey (2006). Scientific Realism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Theoria. Oxford University Press 35-54.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  25. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2009). Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method'. Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Ervin Laszlo (1974). Why Should I Believe in Science? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):477-488.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Bernhard Lauth (1995). Inductive Inference in the Limit of Empirically Adequate Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):525 - 548.
    Most standard results on structure identification in first order theories depend upon the correctness and completeness (in the limit) of the data, which are provided to the learner. These assumption are essential for the reliability of inductive methods and for their limiting success (convergence to the truth). The paper investigates inductive inference from (possibly) incorrect and incomplete data. It is shown that such methods can be reliable not in the sense of truth approximation, but in the sense that the methods (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Uskali Mäki (2005). Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism Be Informed About the Sciences? Erkenntnis 63 (2):231-251.
    In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Uskali Mäki (2001). Realisms and Their Opponents. In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. 19--12815.
    In everyday usage, ‘realism’ is often used as a name for a practically or epistemically low-ambition attitude, while ‘idealism’ is often taken to denote a highambition—if not utopian—attitude. In philosophcal usage, mostly, it is the other way around: those who are called realists tend to claim more than their opponents—they are the philosophical optimists. Within philosophy itself, ‘realism’ adopts a variety of interrelated and contested meanings. It is used as the name for doctrines about issues such as perceptual access to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30. Michele Marsonet (1993). Is Philosophy of Language Really Important for the Foundation of Scientific Realism? American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):283 - 301.
  31. Gregory J. Morgan (ed.) (2011). Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press.
    In this, the first book devoted to Peter Achinstein's influential work in philosophy of science, twenty distinguished philosophers, including four Lakatos award winners, address various aspects of Achinstein's influential views on the nature of scientific evidence, scientific explanation, and scientific realism. It includes short essays by Steve Gimbel and Jeff Maynes, Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Victor DiFate, Jerry Doppelt, Adam Goldstein, Philip Kitcher, Fred Kronz, Deborah Mayo, Greg Morgan, Helen Longino, John Norton, Michael Ruse, Bas van Fraassen, Stathis Psillos, Larry (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Margaret Morrison (1990). Unification, Realism and Inference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):305-332.
  33. Margaret Morrison (1988). Reduction and Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:286 - 293.
    In The Foundations of Space-Time Theories Friedman argues for a literal realistic interpretation about theoretical structures that participate in theory unification. His account of the relationship between observational and theoretical structure is characterized as that of model to submodel and involves a reductivist strategy that allows for the conjunction of certain theoretical structures with other structures which, taken together, form a truly unified theory. Friedman criticizes the representational account for its failure to allow for a literal interpretation and conjunction of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Ioan Muntean (2015). Structural Pluralism and S-Dualities: A Project in String Realism. In Iulian D. Toader, Gabriel Sandu & Ilie Pȃrvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer International Publishing 199-219.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Klaus Petrus (1996). Naturgemässe Klassifikation Und Kontinuität Wissenschaft Und Geschichte. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 27 (2):307 - 323.
    Natural classification and continuity, science and history. Some Reflections on Pierre Duhem. Duhem is commonly held to have founded his view of history of science as continuous on the 'metaphysical assertion' of natural classification. With the help of a strict distinction between formal and material characterization of natural classification I try to show that this imputation is problematic, if not simply incorrect. My analysis opens alternative perspectives on Duhem's talk of continuity, the ideal form of theories, and the rôle of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Andy Pickering (1986). Against Correspondence: A Constructivist View of Experiment and the Real. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:196 - 206.
    Contemporary philosophical debate on realism revolves around the interpretation of theories well confirmed by experiment. This paper seeks to rebalance the debate by focussing attention upon experimental practice itself. It argues that the production of observation reports entails the interactive stabilisation of three elements: material experimental practice, instrumental modelling of that practice, and phenomenal modelling of the material world. The entanglement of these three elements is exemplified in a historical case study. Such entanglements block correspondence realism and point, instead, to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Chris Pincock (2005). Overextending Partial Structures: Idealization and Abstraction. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1248-1259.
    The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construct abstract, mathematical models of physical systems. These problems show that da Costa and French have not overcome the objections raised by Cartwright and Suárez to using model-theoretic techniques in the philosophy of science. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38. Daniel Attala Pochon (1997). Dos Escepticismos Y Desafío Escéptico En the Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher's the Advancement of Science). Theoria 12 (2):317-335.
    En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Stathis Psillos (2011). Making Contact with Molecules: On Perrin and Achinstein. In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press 177.
  40. Juha Saatsi (2009). Form Vs. Content-Driven Arguments for Realism. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan
    I offer a meta-level analysis of realist arguments for the reliability of ampliative reasoning about the unobservable. We can distinguish form-driven and content-driven arguments for realism: form-driven arguments appeal to the form of inductive inferences, whilst content-driven arguments appeal to their specific content. After regimenting the realism debate in these terms, I will argue that the content-driven arguments are preferable. Along the way I will discuss how my analysis relates to John Norton’s recent, more general thesis that the grounds for (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41. Robert John Schwartz (1990). Approximate Truth, Idealization, and Ontology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):409-425.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Markus Seidel (2013). Scylla and Charybdis of the Epistemic Relativist: Why the Epistemic Relativist Still Cannot Use the Sceptic's Strategy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):145-149.
    In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Harry Settanni (1992). Scientific Knowledge: Discovery of Nature or Mental Construction? Upa.
    This book defends the constructivist view of science, namely, the view that scientific theories are mental constructions in the mind of the scientist, rather than the realist view that scientific theories are accounts of what nature itself is like.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. George Sexton (1879). The Baseless Fabric of Scientific Scepticism.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. S. B. Sinclair (1974). Molecular Reality. A Perspective on the Scientific Work of Jean Perrin. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 7 (3):300-301.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Elliott Sober, Empiricism.
    In S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. David J. Stump (2015). Introduction - Forum: Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Science. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):70-71.
  48. Mauricio Suárez (2005). The Semantic View, Empirical Adequacy, and Application (Concepción Semántica, Adecuación Empírica y Aplicación). Critica 37 (109):29 - 63.
    It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory's domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation. \\\ Existe en la filosofía de (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  49. J. D. Trout (1999). Measured Realism and Statistical Inference: An Explanation for the Fast Progress of "Hard" Psychology. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):272.
    The use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in psychology has been under sustained attack, despite its reliable use in the notably successful, so-called "hard" areas of psychology, such as perception and cognition. I argue that, in contrast to merely methodological analyses of hypothesis testing (in terms of "test severity," or other confirmation-theoretic notions), only a patently metaphysical position can adequately capture the uneven but undeniable successes of theories in "hard psychology." I contend that Measured Realism satisfies this description, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 2282