Scientific Revolutions Edited by Howard Sankey (University of Melbourne)

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  • Joseph Agassi (1966). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (4).
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  • Hanne Andersen (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cambridge University Press.
    Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the recent theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican (...)
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  • Harold I. Brown (1976). Reduction and Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 10 (3).
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  • Xiang Chen (2007). The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
    I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...)
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  • Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  • Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
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  • Patrick Enfield (1991). Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):468-485.
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  • Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1995). Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):353-387.
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  • Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the (Ch. 9 Only).
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  • Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
    Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index. "A landmark in intellectual history which has attracted attention far beyond its own immediate field. . . . It is written with a combination of depth and clarity that make it an almost unbroken series of aphorisms. . . . Kuhn does not permit truth to be a criterion of scientific theories, he would presumably not claim his own theory to be true. But if causing a revolution is (...)
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  • Ladislav Kvasz (1999). On Classification of Scientific Revolutions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (2).
    The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions (...)
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  • Itamar Pitowsky, On Kuhnʼs the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
    Kuhnʼs influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 is often viewed as a revolt against empiricist philosophy of science. However, Friedman has reminded us lately2 that the book was commissioned by logical positivists, who were delighted with the result. In fact, the book was part of the International Encyclopedia of United Science initiated by members of the Vienna Circle, whose first volumes were published in 1938.3 The project aimed at providing a systematic positivist perspective on all the sciences, from logic (...)
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  • Richard L. Purtill (1967). Kuhn on Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 34 (1):53-58.
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  • Eric Schliesser (2005). Wonder in the Face of Scientific Revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton's 'Proof' of Copernicanism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (4):697 – 732.
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  • Dudley Shapere (1964). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Philosophical Review 73 (3):383-394.
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  • Paul Thagard (2009). Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker and Xian Chen the Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4).
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  • Jonathan Y. Tsou (2003). Reconsidering Feyerabend's 'Anarchism'. Perspectives on Science 11 (2):208-235.
    This paper explores Paul Feyerabend's (1924-1994) skeptical arguments for "anarchism" in his early writings between 1960 to 1975. Feyerabend's position is encapsulated by his well-known suggestion that the only principle for scientific method that can be defended under all circumstances is: "anything goes." I present Feyerabend's anarchism as a recommendation for pluralism that assumes a realist view of scientific theories. The aims of this paper are threefold: (1) to present a defensible view of Feyerabend's anarchism and its motivations, (2) to (...)
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  • Bernhard Wieland (1985). Towards an Economic Theory of Scientific Revolutions — a Cynical View? Erkenntnis 23 (1).
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  • K. Brad Wray (2007). Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited. Synthese 158 (1):61-73.
    I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared standards. I argue (...)
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