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Summary The idea that science advances by a series of fundamental upheavals known as scientific revolutions was made famous by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  A variety of philosophical questions arise in relation to this idea, including questions about relativism and the rationality of choice between theories, as well as issues to do with conceptual and meaning change in science.
Key works The key work in this area is Kuhn 1962, and later editions, e.g. Kuhn 1996
Introductions Nickles 2010; Bird 2008
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  1. Joseph Agassi (1966). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (4):351-354.
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  2. H. Andersen, P. Barker & X. Chen (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5-28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re?reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  3. Hanne Andersen (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cambridge University Press.
    Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the recent theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican (...)
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  4. Gavin Ardley (1964). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Philosophical Studies 13:183-192.
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  5. Jürgen Audretsch (1981). Quantum Gravity and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 12 (2):322-339.
    Summary In a case study Kuhn's morphology of scientific revolutions is put to the test in confronting it with the contemporary developments in physics. It is shown in detail, that Kuhn's scheme is not compatible with the situation in physics today.
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  6. Greg Bamford (1989). Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation. Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
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  7. Peter Barker (2011). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
    For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...)
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  8. Enrico Bellone (1980). A World on Paper: Studies on the Second Scientific Revolution. Mit Press.
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  9. William Berkson (1994). Some Practical Issues in the Recent Controversy on the Nature of Scientific Revolutions. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:197-210.
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  10. Richard J. Bernstein (1963). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Review of Metaphysics 16 (4):804-804.
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  11. Alexander Bird (2012). What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Scientific Revolutions? Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (3):293-321.
    Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic (...)
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  12. Alexander Bird (1999). Scientific Revolutions and Inference to the Best Explanation. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 34:25--42.
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  13. Harold I. Brown (1976). Reduction and Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 10 (3):381 - 385.
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  14. Paul Caringella, Wayne Cristaudo & Glenn Hughes (eds.) (2012). Revolutions: Finished and Unfinished, From Primal to Final. Cambridge Scholars.
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  15. Martin Carrier (2002). Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change. In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer. 53--72.
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  16. Hasok Chang (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
  17. Xiang Chen (2007). The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
    I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...)
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  18. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  19. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  20. Leo Corry (1993). Kuhnian Issues, Scientific Revolutions and the History of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):95-117.
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  21. Rogier De Langhe (2013). The Kuhnian Paradigm. Topoi 32 (1):65-73.
    Kuhn wanted to install a new research agenda in philosophy of science. I argue that the tools are now available to better articulate his paradigm and let it guide philosophical research instead of itself remaining the object of philosophical debate.
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  22. Juan V. Mayoral de Lucas (2009). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Theoria 24 (3).
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  23. Anastasios Economou (1995). Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy Now 14:19-21.
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  24. Editor (1973). Is Mathematics an “Anomaly” in the Theory of “Scientific Revolutions” ? Philosophia Mathematica (1):92-101.
  25. Patrick Enfield (1991). Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):468-485.
    The logical empiricists knew that scientific theories sometimes arise out of the attempt to reconcile or unify two existing theories. They also thought that, at best, old theories would be retained as approximations to their successors. Kuhn lost both insights when he rejected the logical empiricists' formal approach in favor of an exclusively historical and psychological one. But when Putnam tried to restore such ideas he failed to provide them with the historical support they require. An account of revolutionary unifications (...)
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  26. Paul Feyerabend (1981). Problems of Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
    Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume (...)
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  27. Paul Feyerabend (1974/1975). Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Humanities Press.
  28. James Franklin (2000). Thomas Kuhn's Irrationalism. New Criterion 18 (10):29-34.
    Criticizes the irrationalist and social constructionist tendencies in Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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  29. Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
    This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...)
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  30. Aaron Gasparik (2013). “Science. Not Just For Scientists. A Historiographical Analysis of the Changing Interpretations of the Scientific Revolution”. Constellations 4 (2).
    Traditionally, the Scientific Revolution has been portrayed as an era in history when new developments in fields of ‘scientific’ thought eclipsed the long-held notions presented by religion and philosophy. Historical interpretations subscribing to this view have often presented the Scientific Revolution as a time when significant changes occurred in the way societies understood their world. These historical analyses have focused on a limited suite of ideas – the iconic figures of the Scientific Revolution, the intellectual, methodological and theoretical developments of (...)
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  31. Greg Goodale (2010). The Biomedical Research Industry and the End of Scientific Revolutions. In Greg Goodale & Jason Edward Black (eds.), Arguments About Animal Ethics. Lexington Books.
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  32. Ian Hacking (ed.) (1981). Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press.
    Bringing together important writings not easily available elsewhere, this volume provides a convenient and stimulating overview of recent work in the philosophy of science. The contributors include Paul Feyerabend, Ian Hacking, T.S. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Laurens Laudan, Karl Popper, Hilary Putnam, and Dudley Shapere. In addition, Hacking provides an introductory essay and a selective bibliography.
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  33. C. Hasok (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...)
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  34. Gary Hatfield, Was the Scientific Revolution Really a Revolution in Science?
    In Tradition, Transmission, Transformation, ed. by Jamil Ragep and Sally Ragep, Collection de travaux de l’Academie internationale d’histoire des sciences (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 489–525. Key words: new science, natural philosophy, physics as a discipline, historiography of the scientific revolution, history of early modern philosophy.
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  35. Sandra Herbert (2005). The Darwinian Revolution Revisited. Journal of the History of Biology 38 (1):51 - 66.
    The "Darwinian revolution" remains an acceptable phrase to describe the change in thought brought about by the theory of evolution, provided that the revolution is seen as occurring over an extended period of time. The decades from the 1790s through the 1850s are at the focus of this article. Emphasis is placed on the issue of species extinction and on generational shifts in opinion.
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  36. Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Thomas Kuhn and the Chemical Revolution. Foundations of Chemistry 10 (2):101-115.
    The paper discusses how well Kuhn’s general theory of scientific revolutions fits the particular case of the chemical revolution. To do so, I first present condensed sketches of both Kuhn’s theory and the chemical revolution. I then discuss the beginning of the chemical revolution and compare it to Kuhn’s specific claims about the roles of anomalies, crisis and extraordinary science in scientific development. I proceed by comparing some features of the chemical revolution as a whole to Kuhn’s general account. The (...)
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  37. Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1995). Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):353-387.
  38. Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1993). Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. University of Chicago Press.
    Few philosophers of science have influenced as many readers as Thomas S. Kuhn. Yet no comprehensive study of his ideas has existed--until now. In this volume, Paul Hoyningen-Huene examines Kuhn's work over four decades, from the days before The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to the present, and puts Kuhn's philosophical development in a historical framework. Scholars from disciplines as diverse as political science and art history have offered widely differing interpretations of Kuhn's ideas, appropriating his notions of paradigm shifts and (...)
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  39. Tadeusz M. Jaroszewski & Stefan Piekarczyk (1979). The Scientific and Technological Revolution in the Light of Historical Materialist Theory. Dialectics and Humanism 6 (2):23-32.
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  40. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (1999). Incommensurability. In W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. 172-80.
  41. Vasso Kindi (2011). The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):327-349.
    This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at (...)
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  42. Vasso Kindi (2005). The Relation of History of Science to Philosophy of Science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Kuhn's Later Philosophical Work. Perspectives on Science 13 (4):495-530.
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  43. Vasso P. Kindi (1995). Kuhn'sthe Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):75 - 92.
    The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis and it does (...)
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  44. Ursula Klein (2007). Styles of Experimentation and Alchemical Matter Theory in the Scientific Revolution. Metascience 16 (2):247-256.
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  45. Joseph Kockelmans (1972). On the Meaning of Scientific Revolutions. World Futures 11 (3):243-264.
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  46. John Krige (1980). Science, Revolution, and Discontinuity. Humanities Press.
  47. Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the (Ch. 9 Only).
  48. Thomas S. Kuhn (1996/2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
    . Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . . . has clearly emerged as just such a work." —Ron Johnston, Times Higher Education Supplement "Among the most influential academic books in this century." —Choice One of "The ...
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  49. Thomas S. Kuhn (1977). The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press.
  50. Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. The University of Chicago Press.
    A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...)
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