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Summary The idea that science advances by a series of fundamental upheavals known as scientific revolutions was made famous by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  A variety of philosophical questions arise in relation to this idea, including questions about relativism and the rationality of choice between theories, as well as issues to do with conceptual and meaning change in science.
Key works The key work in this area is Kuhn 1962, and later editions, e.g. Kuhn 1996
Introductions Nickles 2010; Bird 2008
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  1. Joseph Agassi (1966). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (4):351-354.
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  2. Joseph Agassi & John R. Wettersten (1980). Stegmüller Squared. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 11 (1):86-94.
    Wolfgang Stegmüller, the leading German philosopher of science, considers the status of scientific revolutions the central issue in the field ever since "the famous Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn discussion" of a decade and a half ago, comments on "almost all contributions to this problem", and offers his alternative solutions in a series of papers culminating with, and summarized in, his recent "A Combined Approach to Dynamics of Theories. How To Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change By Applying Set Theoretical Structures", published in Gerard (...)
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  3. Valia Allori (2015). Quantum Mechanics and Paradigm Shifts. Topoi 2015.
    It has been argued that the transition from classical to quantum mechanics is an example of a Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which there is a shift from the simple, intuitive, straightforward classical paradigm, to the quantum, convoluted, counterintuitive, amazing new quantum paradigm. In this paper, after having clarified what these quantum paradigms are supposed to be, I analyze whether they constitute a radical departure from the classical paradigm. Contrary to what is commonly maintained, I argue that, in addition to radical (...)
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  4. H. Andersen, P. Barker & X. Chen (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5-28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re?reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  5. Hanne Andersen (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cambridge University Press.
    Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the recent theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican (...)
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  6. Gavin Ardley (1980). Problems of Scientific Revolution. Philosophical Studies 27:417-419.
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  7. Gavin Ardley (1964). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Philosophical Studies 13:183-192.
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  8. Jürgen Audretsch (1981). Quantum Gravity and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 12 (2):322-339.
    Summary In a case study Kuhn's morphology of scientific revolutions is put to the test in confronting it with the contemporary developments in physics. It is shown in detail, that Kuhn's scheme is not compatible with the situation in physics today.
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  9. Aristides Baltas (2000). Classifying Scientific Controversies. In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 40.
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  10. Johannes Balthasar (1981). Revolutions in Science and Society. Philosophy and History 14 (1):27-29.
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  11. Greg Bamford (1989). Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation. Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
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  12. Peter Barker (2011). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
    For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...)
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  13. Mara Beller (1997). Criticism and Revolutions. Science in Context 10 (1).
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  14. Enrico Bellone (1980). A World on Paper: Studies on the Second Scientific Revolution. Mit Press.
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  15. William Berkson (1994). Some Practical Issues in the Recent Controversy on the Nature of Scientific Revolutions. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:197-210.
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  16. Richard J. Bernstein (1963). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Review of Metaphysics 16 (4):804-804.
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  17. Alexander Bird (2012). What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Scientific Revolutions? Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (3):293-321.
    Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic (...)
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  18. Alexander Bird (1999). Scientific Revolutions and Inference to the Best Explanation. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 34:25--42.
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  19. Richard J. Blackwell (2001). Osler, Margaret J., Ed. Rethinking the Scientific Revolution. Review of Metaphysics 54 (3):668-669.
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  20. Harold I. Brown (1976). Reduction and Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 10 (3):381 - 385.
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  21. Jerome Bruner (1997). Will Cognitive Revolutions Ever Stop. In David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling (eds.), The Future of the Cognitive Revolution. Oxford University Press. 279--292.
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  22. L. C. (1957). The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):539-539.
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  23. M. Capek (1968). The Second Scientific Revolution. Diogenes 16 (63):114-133.
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  24. Paul Caringella, Wayne Cristaudo & Glenn Hughes (eds.) (2012). Revolutions: Finished and Unfinished, From Primal to Final. Cambridge Scholars.
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  25. Martin Carrier (2002). Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change. In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer. 53--72.
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  26. Alan Chalmers (2012). Intermediate Causes and Explanations: The Key to Understanding the Scientific Revolution. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):551-562.
    It is instructive to view the scientific revolution from the point of view of Robert Boyle’s distinction between intermediate and ultimate causes. From this point of view, the scientific revolution involved the identification of intermediate causes and their investigation by way of experiment as opposed to the specification of ultimate causes of the kind involved in the corpuscular matter theories of the mechanical philosophers. The merits of this point of view are explored in this paper by focussing on the hydrostatics (...)
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  27. Hasok Chang (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
  28. Hasok Chang (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...)
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  29. Xiang Chen (2007). The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
    I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...)
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  30. Xiang Chen (1988). Reconstruction of the Optical Revolution: Lakatos Vs. Laudan. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:103 - 109.
    According to Lakatos's theory of scientific change, the victory of the wave theory in the nineteenth-century optical revolution was due to its empirical successes. However, historical facts do not support this opinion. Based on Laudan's theory of scientific change, this paper presents a different orientation to reconstruct the optical revolution. By comparing the conceptual problems that both optical theories had, this paper argues that it was the inferior status of the corpuscular theory in dealing with conceptual problems that constituted the (...)
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  31. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  32. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  33. H. F. Cohen & S. Gaukroger (1995). The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. Annals of Science 52 (5):503-508.
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  34. H. Floris Cohen (1999). The Scientific Revolution: Has There Been a British View?: A Personal Assessment. History of Science 37 (115):107-112.
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  35. R. Colodny (ed.) (1966). Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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  36. Leo Corry (1993). Kuhnian Issues, Scientific Revolutions and the History of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):95-117.
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  37. Rogier De Langhe (2013). The Kuhnian Paradigm. Topoi 32 (1):65-73.
    Kuhn wanted to install a new research agenda in philosophy of science. I argue that the tools are now available to better articulate his paradigm and let it guide philosophical research instead of itself remaining the object of philosophical debate.
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  38. Juan V. Mayoral de Lucas (2009). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Theoria 24 (3):355-357.
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  39. Allen Debus (1987). Myth, Allegory and Scientific Truth: An Alchemical Tradition in the Period of the Scientific Revolution. Nouvelles de la République des Lettres 1:13-35.
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  40. Anastasios Economou (1995). Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy Now 14:19-21.
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  41. Editor (1973). Is Mathematics an “Anomaly” in the Theory of “Scientific Revolutions” ? Philosophia Mathematica (1):92-101.
  42. Patrick Enfield (1991). Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):468-485.
    The logical empiricists knew that scientific theories sometimes arise out of the attempt to reconcile or unify two existing theories. They also thought that, at best, old theories would be retained as approximations to their successors. Kuhn lost both insights when he rejected the logical empiricists' formal approach in favor of an exclusively historical and psychological one. But when Putnam tried to restore such ideas he failed to provide them with the historical support they require. An account of revolutionary unifications (...)
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  43. P. Feyerabend (1979). Scientific Revolution. In Science in a Free Society. Routledge.
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  44. Paul Feyerabend (1981). Problems of Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
    Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume (...)
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  45. Paul Feyerabend (1974/1975). Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Humanities Press.
  46. J. V. Field (1994). The Heritage of Giotto's Geometry: Art and Science on the Eve of the Scientific Revolution. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 27 (2):225-226.
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  47. H. Floris Cohen (1999). The Scientific Revolution: Has There Been a British View?-A Personal Assessment. History of Science 37:79-106.
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  48. James Franklin (2000). Thomas Kuhn's Irrationalism. New Criterion 18 (10):29-34.
    Criticizes the irrationalist and social constructionist tendencies in Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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  49. Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
    This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...)
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  50. Aaron Gasparik (2013). “Science. Not Just For Scientists. A Historiographical Analysis of the Changing Interpretations of the Scientific Revolution”. Constellations 4 (2).
    Traditionally, the Scientific Revolution has been portrayed as an era in history when new developments in fields of ‘scientific’ thought eclipsed the long-held notions presented by religion and philosophy. Historical interpretations subscribing to this view have often presented the Scientific Revolution as a time when significant changes occurred in the way societies understood their world. These historical analyses have focused on a limited suite of ideas – the iconic figures of the Scientific Revolution, the intellectual, methodological and theoretical developments of (...)
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