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  1. Henk Aarts, Ruud Custers & Daniel M. Wegner (2005). On the Inference of Personal Authorship: Enhancing Experienced Agency by Priming Effect Information☆. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):439-458.
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  2. Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.) (2004). Insight And Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press, USA.
    These are integrated and synthesised bythe editors, both acknowledged experts in the field. The scope is truly international and spans theoretical perspectives, clinical practice, and consumer views.
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  3. Susan M. Andersen, Inga Reznik & Noah S. Glassman (2005). The Unconscious Relational Self. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 421-481.
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  4. Alarik T. Arenander & Frederick T. Travis (2004). Brain Patterns of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 112-126.
  5. J. B. Asendorpf, V. Warkentin & P. Baudonniere (1996). Self-Awareness and Other-Awareness. Ii 32.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (1998). Attention, Self, and Conscious Self-Monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in (...)
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  7. Laura J. Bach & Anthony S. David (2006). Self-Awareness After Acquired and Traumatic Brain Injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.
  8. Kim A. Bard, Brenda K. Todd, Chris Bernier, Jennifer Love & David A. Leavens (2006). Self-Awareness in Human and Chimpanzee Infants: What is Measured and What is Meant by the Mark and Mirror Test? Infancy 9 (2):191-219.
  9. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  10. Sean E. Baumann (2005). The Schizophrenias as Disorders of Self Consciousness. South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.
  11. Mario Beauregard (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  12. Ansgar Beckermann (2003). Self-Consciousness in Cognitive Systems. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 31:174-188.
    Dualism, but he seems at least to have acknowledged the possibility that Descartes might be right on this issue, i.e., that the real self is a _res cogitans_. Maybe this is why talk of.
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  13. Mark Beitel, Elena Ferrer & John J. Cecero (2005). Psychological Mindedness and Awareness of Self and Others. Journal of Clinical Psychology 61 (6):739-750.
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  14. Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (2004). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W.Norton.
  15. Bernard D. Beitman, Jyotsna Nair & George I. Viamontes (2004). Why Self-Awareness? In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 3-23.
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  16. Jose Luis Bermudez (2007). Self-Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
  17. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
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  18. Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 10 (35).
  19. Jose Luis Bermudez (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.
  20. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  21. John Bickle (2003). Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Alexandre Billon (2014). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  23. Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  24. James A. Blachowicz (2002). The Dialogue of the Soul with Itself. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 5-6.
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  25. Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in Meme Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- sessions, leading (...)
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  26. Petr Bob (2006). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and Treatment. [REVIEW] Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.
  27. Radu J. Bogdan (2010). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  28. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  29. Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2005). Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
  30. Cordula Brand (2013). Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW] Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  31. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  32. Peter Brugger, Bigna Lenggenhager & Melita J. Giummarra (2013). Xenomelia: A Social Neuroscience View of Altered Bodily Self-Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    Xenomelia, the "foreign limb syndrome", is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis. Formerly labeled 'body integrity identity disorder' (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus towards dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting (...)
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  33. Richard J. Burch (2004). Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Disorder of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 229-254.
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  34. Tom Burke (2005). The Role of Abstract Reference in Mead's Account of Human Origins. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):567 - 601.
    This paper addresses issues regarding human origins, drawing particularly on George Herbert Mead's account of the emergence of self consciousness as a product of social and physical evolution. Some of John Dewey's ideas on the nature of thought and language are added to that account. The so called "great leap" in human evolution that occurred some 50,000 years ago is attributed not just to the emergence of symbols or language but to the development of fully recursive languages suited for reference (...)
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  35. Ian Burkitt (2013). Self and Others in the Field of Perception: The Role of Micro-Dialogue, Feeling, and Emotion in Perception. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):267.
  36. Tom R. Burns (1998). The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
  37. George Butterworth (1995). The Self as an Object of Consciousness in Infancy. In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier.
  38. M. V. Butz (2008). How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self. Constructivist Foundations 4 (1):1-37.
    Purpose: Constructivism postulates that the perceived reality is a complex construct formed during development. Depending on the particular school, these inner constructs take on different forms and structures and affect cognition in different ways. The purpose of this article is to address the questions of how and, even more importantly, why we form such inner constructs. Approach: This article proposes that brain development is controlled by an inherent anticipatory drive, which biases learning towards the formation of forward predictive structures and (...)
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  39. Josep Call (2003). On Linking Comparative Metacognition and Theory of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):341-342.
    Smith et al.'s article provides a convincing argument for devoting increased research attention to comparative metacognition. However, this increased attention should be complemented with establishing links with comparative theory of mind (ToM) research, which are currently missing. I present a task in which pairs of subjects are presented with incomplete information in an object-choice situation that could be used to establish that link.
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  40. J. Campbell (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
  41. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience (OBE) may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is (...)
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  42. Glenn Carruthers (2013). Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3 - 4.
    The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an (...)
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  43. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
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  44. Glenn Carruthers (2011). The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  45. Glenn Carruthers (2010). A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues' Model of the Sense of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
    The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental (...)
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  46. Peter Carruthers (2009). Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence (...)
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  47. Charles S. Carver (2003). Self-Awareness. In Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney (eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity. Guilford Press. 179-196.
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  48. Charles S. Carver & M. F. Matthews Scheier (1983). Self-Awareness and the Self-Regulation of Behaviour. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.
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  49. Sibapada Chakravarti (1961). Philosophy and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 33 (January):223-229.
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  50. J. M. Cheeks & S. R. Briggs (1982). Self-Consciousness and Aspects of Personality. Journal of Research in Personality 16:401-8.
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1 — 50 / 302