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  1. Henk Aarts, Ruud Custers & Daniel M. Wegner (2005). On the Inference of Personal Authorship: Enhancing Experienced Agency by Priming Effect Information☆. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):439-458.
    Three experiments examined whether the mere priming of potential action effects enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur. In a computer task, participants and the computer independently moved a rapidly moving square on a display. Participants had to press a key, thereby stopping the movement. However, the participant or the computer could have caused the square to stop on the observed position, and accordingly, the stopped position of the square could be conceived of as the potential effect (...)
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  2. Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.) (2004). Insight And Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press, USA.
    These are integrated and synthesised bythe editors, both acknowledged experts in the field. The scope is truly international and spans theoretical perspectives, clinical practice, and consumer views.
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  3. Susan M. Andersen, Inga Reznik & Noah S. Glassman (2005). The Unconscious Relational Self. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 421-481.
  4. Alarik T. Arenander & Frederick T. Travis (2004). Brain Patterns of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co 112-126.
  5. J. B. Asendorpf, V. Warkentin & P. Baudonniere (1996). Self-Awareness and Other-Awareness. Ii 32.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (1998). Attention, Self, and Conscious Self-Monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press
    ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in (...)
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  7. Laura J. Bach & Anthony S. David (2006). Self-Awareness After Acquired and Traumatic Brain Injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.
  8. Kim A. Bard, Brenda K. Todd, Chris Bernier, Jennifer Love & David A. Leavens (2006). Self-Awareness in Human and Chimpanzee Infants: What is Measured and What is Meant by the Mark and Mirror Test? Infancy 9 (2):191-219.
  9. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  10. Sean E. Baumann (2005). The Schizophrenias as Disorders of Self Consciousness. South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.
  11. Mario Beauregard (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  12. Ansgar Beckermann (2003). Self-Consciousness in Cognitive Systems. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 31:174-188.
    Dualism, but he seems at least to have acknowledged the possibility that Descartes might be right on this issue, i.e., that the real self is a _res cogitans_. Maybe this is why talk of.
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  13. Colin Beer (1995). Mirror Images and Self-Images Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives Sue T. Parker Robert W. Mitchell Maria L. Boccia. [REVIEW] BioScience 45 (3):213-214.
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  14. Mark Beitel, Elena Ferrer & John J. Cecero (2005). Psychological Mindedness and Awareness of Self and Others. Journal of Clinical Psychology 61 (6):739-750.
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  15. Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (2004). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W.Norton.
  16. Bernard D. Beitman, Jyotsna Nair & George I. Viamontes (2004). Why Self-Awareness? In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co 3-23.
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  17. J. L. Bermudez (1998). Nelkin, N.-Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Philosophical Books 39:258-259.
  18. Jose Luis Bermudez (2007). Self-Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
  19. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
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  20. Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 10 (35).
  21. Jose Luis Bermudez (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.
  22. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  23. John Bickle (2003). Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
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  24. Alexandre Billon (2014). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  25. Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  26. James A. Blachowicz (2002). The Dialogue of the Soul with Itself. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 5-6.
    What is the cognitive significance of talking to ourselves? I criticize two interpretations of this function , and offer a third: I argue that inner speech is a genuine dialogue, not a monologue; that the partners in this dialogue represent the independent interests of experienced meaning and logical articulation; that the former is either silent or capable only of abbreviated speech; that articulation is a logical, not a social demand; and that neither partner is a full-time subordinate of the other. (...)
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  27. Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in Meme Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- sessions, leading (...)
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  28. Petr Bob (2006). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and Treatment. [REVIEW] Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.
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  29. Radu J. Bogdan (2010). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  30. Charles Booth (2003). The Missing Link. The Philosophers' Magazine 22:59-59.
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  31. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  32. Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2005). Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
  33. Miro Brada, The Existence.
    In 1995, I wrote an essay 'Existence'. From the analysis of the process of self-consciousness, I concluded: "All I know, only I know", because if YOU know 'what I know', only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know'', and if you know that 'only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know''', only I know that... etc. At every moment, I know something more (I know that YOU know), or something less (I don't know that YOU know that I (...)
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  34. Cordula Brand (2013). Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW] Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  35. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  36. A. S. Briskin (1974). A Developmental Model of Self-Awareness. Counseling and Values 18:79-85.
  37. Richard J. Burch (2004). Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Disorder of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co 229-254.
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  38. Tom Burke (2005). The Role of Abstract Reference in Mead's Account of Human Origins. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):567 - 601.
    This paper addresses issues regarding human origins, drawing particularly on George Herbert Mead's account of the emergence of self consciousness as a product of social and physical evolution. Some of John Dewey's ideas on the nature of thought and language are added to that account. The so called "great leap" in human evolution that occurred some 50,000 years ago is attributed not just to the emergence of symbols or language but to the development of fully recursive languages suited for reference (...)
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  39. Ian Burkitt (2013). Self and Others in the Field of Perception: The Role of Micro-Dialogue, Feeling, and Emotion in Perception. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):267.
  40. Tom R. Burns (1998). The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
  41. George Butterworth (1995). The Self as an Object of Consciousness in Infancy. In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier
  42. M. V. Butz (2008). How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self. Constructivist Foundations 4 (1):1-37.
    Purpose: Constructivism postulates that the perceived reality is a complex construct formed during development. Depending on the particular school, these inner constructs take on different forms and structures and affect cognition in different ways. The purpose of this article is to address the questions of how and, even more importantly, why we form such inner constructs. Approach: This article proposes that brain development is controlled by an inherent anticipatory drive, which biases learning towards the formation of forward predictive structures and (...)
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  43. Josep Call (2003). On Linking Comparative Metacognition and Theory of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):341-342.
    Smith et al.'s article provides a convincing argument for devoting increased research attention to comparative metacognition. However, this increased attention should be complemented with establishing links with comparative theory of mind (ToM) research, which are currently missing. I present a task in which pairs of subjects are presented with incomplete information in an object-choice situation that could be used to establish that link.
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  44. J. Campbell (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
  45. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Difficulties for Extending Wegner and Colleagues’ Model of the Sense of Agency to Deficits in Delusions of Alien Control. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    Wegner and colleagues have offered an explanation of the sense of agency over one’s bodily actions. If the orthodox view is correct and there is a sense of agency deficit associated with delusions of alien control, then Wegner and colleagues’ model ought to extend to an explanation of this deficit. Data from intentional binding studies opens up the possibility that an abnormality in representing the timing of mental events leads to a violation of the principle of priority in those suffering (...)
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  46. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). A Metacognitive Model of the Feeling of Agency Over Bodily Actions. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice.
    I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the (...)
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  47. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Difficulties for Extending Wegner and Colleagues’ Model of the Sense of Agency to Deficits in Delusions of Alien Control. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    Wegner and colleagues have offered an explanation of the sense of agency over one’s bodily actions. If the orthodox view is correct and there is a sense of agency deficit associated with delusions of alien control, then Wegner and colleagues’ model ought to extend to an explanation of this deficit. Data from intentional binding studies opens up the possibility that an abnormality in representing the timing of mental events leads to a violation of the principle of priority in those suffering (...)
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  48. Glenn Carruthers (2015). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is tied (...)
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  49. Glenn Carruthers (2013). Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3 - 4.
    The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an (...)
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  50. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
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