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  1. Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.) (1996). Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.
    This volume contains essays by a range of distinguished philosophers on the problem of self-deception, or rather, self and deception.
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  2. Robert N. Audi (1982). Self-Deception, Action, and Will. Erkenntnis 18 (September):133-158.
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  3. Robert N. Audi (1976). Epistemic Disavowals and Self-Deception. Personalist 57:378-385.
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  4. Kent Bach (1985). More on Self-Deception: Reply to Hellman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (June):611-614.
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  5. Kent Bach (1981). An Analysis of Self-Deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.
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  6. David Baggett, Shawn E. Klein & William Irwin (eds.) (2004). Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts. Chicago: Open Court.
    Urging readers of the Harry Potter series to dig deeper than wizards, boggarts, and dementors, the authors of this unique guide collect the musings of seventeen ...
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  7. Maria Baghramian & Anna Nicholson (2013). The Puzzle of Self‐Deception. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1018-1029.
    It is commonly accepted that people can, and regularly do, deceive themselves. Yet closer examination reveals a set of conceptual puzzles that make self-deception difficult to explain. Applying the conditions for other-deception to self-deception generates what are known as the ‘paradoxes’ of belief and intention. Simply put, the central problem is how it is possible for me to believe one thing, and yet intentionally cause myself to simultaneously believe its contradiction. There are two general approaches taken by philosophers to account (...)
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  8. Annette C. Baier (1996). The Vital but Dangerous Art of Ignoring: Selective Attention and Self-Deception. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.
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  9. Annette Barnes (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the (...)
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  10. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):309-319.
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  11. Alexander Bird (1994). European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  12. Alexander Bird (1994). Rationality and the Structure of Self-Deception. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 19-38.
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  13. Steffen Borge (2003). The Myth of Self-Deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
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  14. Rachel Brown (2004). The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
    Abstract The principal aim of this paper is to give a positive analysis of self-deception. I argue that self-deception is a species ?self-emplotment?. Through narrative self-emplotment one groups the events of one's life thematically in order to understand and monitor oneself. I argue that self-emplotment is an unextraordinary feature of mental life that is a precondition of agency. Self-emplotment, however, proceeds according to certain norms, some of which provide apparent justification for self-deceptive activity. A secondary aim of the paper is (...)
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  15. John V. Canfield & Don F. Gustavson (1962). Self-Deception. Analysis 23 (December):32-36.
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  16. John V. Canfield & Patrick Mcnally (1961). Paradoxes of Self-Deception. Analysis 21 (June):140-144.
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  17. T. S. Champlin (1988). Reflexive Paradoxes. Routledge.
    Introduction At some point in your life you will have told a lie and have been believed. You will have deceived the person to whom you lied. ...
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  18. T. Stephen Champlin (1994). Deceit, Deception and the Self-Deceiver. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):53-58.
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  19. T. Stephen Champlin (1979). Self-Deception: A Problem About Autobiography. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:77-94.
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  20. T. Stephen Champlin (1976). Double Deception. Mind 85 (January):100-102.
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  21. Andrea Christofidou (1995). First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
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  22. J. Thomas Cook (1987). Deciding to Believe Without Self-Deception. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):441-446.
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  23. Dante A. Cosentino (1980). Self-Deception Without Paradox. Philosophy Research Archives 1388.
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  24. Tyler Cowen, Self-Deception as the Root of Political Failure.
    I consider models of political failure based on self-deception. Individuals discard free information when that information damages their self-image and thus lowers their utility. More specifically, individuals prefer to feel good about their previously chosen affiliations and shape their worldviews accordingly. This model helps explain the relative robustness of political failure in light of extensive free information, and it helps to explain the rarity of truth-seeking behavior in political debate. The comparative statics predictions differ from models of either Downsian or (...)
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  25. Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
    In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self-deception—instances in which one is self-deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self-deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self-deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self-deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two (...)
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  26. Charles B. Daniels (1974). Self-Deception and Interpersonal Deception. Personalist 55:244-252.
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  27. Donald Davidson (2004). Problems of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    Problems of Rationality is the eagerly awaited fourth volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. From the 1960s until his death in August 2003 Davidson was perhaps the most influential figure in English-language philosophy, and his work has had a profound effect upon the discipline. His unified theory of the interpretation of thought, meaning, and action holds that rationality is a necessary condition for both mind and interpretation. Davidson here develops this theory to illuminate value judgements and how we understand them; (...)
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  28. Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...)
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  29. Robert Dunn (1995). Motivated Irrationality and Divided Attention. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):325 – 336.
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  30. Sophie Edwards (2013). Nondoxasticism About Self‐Deception. Dialectica 67 (3):265-282.
    The philosophical difficulties presented by self-deception are vexed and multifaceted. One such difficulty is what I call the ‘doxastic problem’ of self-deception. Solving the doxastic problem involves determining whether someone in a state of self-deception that ∼p both believes that p and believes that ∼p, simply holds one or the other belief, or, as I will argue, holds neither. This final option, which has been almost entirely overlooked to-date, is what I call ‘nondoxasticism’ about self-deception. In this article, I present (...)
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  31. R. Lance Factor (1977). Self-Deception and the Functionalist Theory of Mental Processes. Personalist 58 (April):115-123.
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  32. Rick Fairbanks (1999). The Availability of Self-Deception. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):335-340.
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  33. Rick Fairbanks (1995). Knowing More Than We Can Tell: Resolving the Dynamic Paradox of Self-Deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):431-459.
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  34. J. Fernandez & T. Bayne (eds.) (forthcoming). Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation. Psychology Press.
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  35. Jordi Fernández (2013). Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject (...)
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  36. Herbert Fingarette (1998). Self-Deception Needs No Explaining. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.
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  37. Herbert Fingarette (1969). Self-Deception. Humanities Press.
    With a new chapter This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by ...
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  38. Jeffrey E. Foss (1980). Rethinking Self-Deception. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (July):237-242.
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  39. Ellen Fridland (2011). Reviewing the Logic of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):22-23.
    I argue that framing the issue of motivated belief formation and its subsequent social gains in the language of self-deception raises logical difficulties. Two such difficulties are that (1) in trying to provide an evolutionary motive for viewing self-deception as a mechanism to facilitate other-deception, the ease and ubiquity of self-deception are undermined, and (2) because after one has successfully deceived oneself, what one communicates to others, though untrue, is not deceptive, we cannot say that self-deception evolved in order to (...)
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  40. Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
    Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.
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  41. P. L. Gardiner (1970). Error, Faith and Self-Deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70:197-220.
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  42. Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.
    Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some (...)
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  43. Simone Gozzano (1999). Davidson on Rationality and Irrationality. In Mario de Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
    The separation view of the mind, advanced by Davidson in order to face the problem of irrationality, is criticized. Against it, I argue that it is not consistent with Davidson's holism.
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  44. George Graham (1986). Russell's Deceptive Desires. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):223-229.
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  45. Amber L. Griffioen (2007). Truthiness, Self-Deception, and Intuitive Knowledge. In Jason Holt (ed.), The Daily Show and Philosophy: Moments of Zen in the Art of Fake News. Blackwell.
    There are at least three basic phenomena that philosophers traditionally classify as paradigm cases of irrationality. In the first two cases, wishful thinking and self-deception, a person wants something to be true and therefore ignores certain relevant facts about the situation, making it appear to herself that it is, in fact, true. The third case, weakness of will, involves a person undertaking a certain action, despite taking herself to have an all-things-considered better reason not to do so. While I think (...)
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  46. M. R. Haight (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.
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  47. Steven D. Hales (1994). Self-Deception and Belief Attribution. Synthese 101 (2):273-289.
    One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception (...)
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  48. David W. Hamlyn (1971). Self-Deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45 (4):45-60.
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  49. Carl R. Hausman (1967). Creativity and Self-Deception. Journal of Existentialism 7:295-308.
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  50. Nathan Hellman (1983). Bach on Self-Deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (September):113-120.
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