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Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Self-Knowledge
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  1. R. I. Aaron & C. M. Campbell (1934). Is There an Element of Immediacy in Knowledge? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 13:203-236.
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  2. Malcolm Acock (1982). On Thinking. By Gilbert Ryle. Modern Schoolman 60 (1):64-65.
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  3. Joseph Agassi (1969). Privileged Access. Inquiry 12 (1-4):420 – 426.
    That everyone has some privileged access to some information is trivially true. The doctrine of privileged access is that I am the authority on all of my own experiences. Possibly this thesis was attacked by Wittgenstein (the thesis on the non?existence of private languages). The thesis was refuted by Freud (I know your dreams better than you), Duhem (I know your methods of scientific discovery better than you), Malinowski (I know your customs and habits better than you), and perception theorists (...)
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  4. I. Ahmad ibn Zayn al-din Ahsa (1993). Kitab Al- Ismah. Al-Dar Al- Alamiyah.
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  5. R. T. Allen (1990). The Paradoxes of Self-Deception. Irish Philosophical Journal 7 (1/2):160-170.
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  6. R. T. Allen (1990). The Paradoxes of Self-Deception. Irish Philosophical Journal 7 (1/2):160-170.
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  7. Marc Alspector-kelly (2006). Knowledge Externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
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  8. E. Ammereller (1999). The Authority of the First Person-Wittgenstein's Basic Insight. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):1-17.
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  9. Bruce Aune (2012). On Davidson's View of First-Person Authority. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press
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  10. Bruce Aune (2012). On Davidson's View of First—Person Authority. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press 214.
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  11. Anita Avramides (2002). Knowing Our Own Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):465-471.
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  12. R. J. B. (1968). Knowledge, Mind, and Nature. Review of Metaphysics 22 (2):371-372.
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  13. Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press
    As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These (...)
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  14. Maria Baghramian (1990). The Paradoxes of Self-Deception: A Reply to R. T. Allen. Irish Philosophical Journal 7 (1/2):171-179.
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  15. Maria Baghramian (1986). Strategies of Self-Deception. Irish Philosophical Journal 3 (2):83-97.
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  16. Derek Baker (2015). Why Transparency Undermines Economy. Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
    Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
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  17. Eivind Balsvik (2003). An Interpretation and Assessment of First-Person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  18. Eivind Balsvik (2002). Triangulation, Interpretation, and First-Person Authority: An Essay on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Dissertation, University of Miami
    This dissertation provides an interpretation and assessment of Donald Davidson's work on first-person authority. First-person authority is the thesis that subjects have a privileged non-evidence-based form of epistemic warrant for self-ascriptions of psychological concepts that does not attach to third-person evidence-based ascriptions of the same concepts. Davidson thinks the fact that we do have first-person authority over self-ascriptions of psychological concepts gives rise to two connected philosophical problems. The epistemic problem: How can non-evidence based self-ascriptions of psychological concepts be more (...)
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  19. Richard Baron (2013). The Self and Self-Knowledge Ed. By Annalisa Coliva. Philosophy Now 97:47-47.
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  20. Anne Bartsch & Christoph Jäger (2002). Privileged Access and Repression. In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter 59-80.
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  21. Wolfgang Barz (2012). Die Transparenz des Geistes. Suhrkamp.
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  22. Patrick K. Bastable (1969). Self-Deception. Philosophical Studies 18:254-256.
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  23. Kelly Becker (2002). Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):289 - 295.
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  24. David Beisecker (2003). Interpretation and First-Person Authority. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):89-96.
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  25. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo (2011). Epistemic Virtues and Transparency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):257-266.
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from (...)
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  26. Henning Bergenholtz & Rufus Gouws (2010). A New Perspective on the Access Process. Hermes 44:103-127.
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  27. Michael Bergmann (2000). Externalism and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
  28. Michael Berman (2009). Deception as the Self in Zamyatin's We. In Leslie Anne Boldt-Irons, Corrado Federici & Ernesto Virgulti (eds.), Disguise, Deception, Trompe-L'oeil: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peter Lang
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  29. J. L. Bermudez (2013). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements. Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
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  30. Luis Bermudez (1996). An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: The Authority of Knowledge. Philosophical Books 37 (2):124-125.
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  31. Sven Bernecker (2011). Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press 33-52.
    This paper ties in with my longstanding project of using representationalism to dispel Cartesian superstitions about the scope of first-person authority. While my earlier work dealt with privileged self-knowledge of one’s belief states, this paper is concerned with privileged self-knowledge of one’s knowledge states. Is it a priori knowable, from a first-person perspective, that one knows that p? I argue that one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; (...)
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  32. Rod Bertolet (1979). McKinsey, Causes and Intentions. Philosophical Review 88 (4):619-632.
  33. Carolyn Black (1983). Obvious Knowledge. Synthese 56 (3):373 - 385.
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  34. Michel J. Blais (1987). Epistemic Tit for Tat. Journal of Philosophy 84 (7):363-375.
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  35. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2006). Deception in Psychology : Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge. Accountability in Research 13:259-275.
    Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play (...)
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  36. Matthew Boyle (2015). Critical Study: Cassam on Self‐Knowledge for Humans. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):337-348.
    This paper is a critical study of Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford University Press, 2014). Cassam claims that theorists who emphasize the “transparency” of questions about our own attitudes to questions about the wider world are committed to an excessively rationalistic conception of human thought. I dispute this, and make some clarificatory points about how to understand the relevant notion of “transparency”. I also argue that Cassam’s own “inferentialist” account of attitudinal self-knowledge entails an unacceptable alienation from our own (...)
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  37. Matthew Boyle (2010). Review of Lucy O'Brien, Matthew Soteriou (Eds.), Mental Actions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (2).
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  38. Katrina A. Bramstedt & Robert Macauley (2005). A Case of Deception? Hastings Center Report 35 (6):13-14.
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  39. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Wright on the McKinsey Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385–391.
    The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright’s work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.
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  40. Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
  41. T. Burge (1998). Reason and the First Person U Knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. And Macdonald, C. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press
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  42. Tyler Burge (2011). The Dewey Lectures 2007: Self and Self-Understanding. Journal of Philosophy 108 (6).
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  43. Tyler Burge (2003). Davidson and Forms of Anti-Individualism: Reply to Hahn. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
  44. Tyler Burge (2003). Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.
  45. Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117 - 158.
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  46. Stephen Butterfill, Awareness of Belief.
    Are these different requirements, in the sense that someone could satisfy one without satisfying the other? No one could meet the Truth Requirement without meeting the Variation Requirement, because understanding that a belief is false involves realising one should not believe it and appreciating the possibility of having other beliefs in its place. But could someone meet the Variation Requirement without meeting the Truth Requirement? In other words, is it possible to be aware of beliefs which are inconsistent without being (...)
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  47. Stratford Caldecott (2003). The Age of Access: How the Shift From Ownership to Access is Transforming Modern Life, by Jeremy Rifkin. The Chesterton Review 29 (1/2):186-189.
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  48. Wolfgang Carl (2014). 4. Epistemic Asymmetry and First-Person Authority. In The First-Person Point of View. De Gruyter 101-120.
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  49. Quassim Cassam (2011). The Presidential Address: Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111:1 - 23.
    A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question 'Do I believe that P?' to the question 'Is it the case that P?' This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different (...)
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  50. Albert Casullo (2011). Reply to My Critics: Anthony Brueckner and Robin Jeshion. In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori? Open Court 111.
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