Related categories
Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Self-Knowledge
667 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 667
Material to categorize
  1. Wolfgang Barz (2012). Die Transparenz des Geistes. Suhrkamp.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. J. L. Bermudez (2013). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements. Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sven Bernecker (2008). Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Tyler Burge (2011). The Dewey Lectures 2007: Self and Self-Understanding. Journal of Philosophy 108 (6).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Frederick J. Crosson (1965). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Philosophical Studies 14:228-229.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. M. Engel (1993). The Problem of Other Minds: A Reliable Solution. Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. G. Rompp (1989). Self-Knowledge as Argument-on the Problem of the Theorizing of the Self-Consciousness in The'system Des Transzendentalen Idealismus'by Schelling. Kant-Studien 80 (3):303-323.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Self-Intimation. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):315-327.
    The sense in which having the available belief that P gives one a reason for believing that one believes that P is just that if one has that available belief one is thereby justified, or warranted, in believing that one has it. In explaining why it is so it helps to bring in the notion of rationality. We noted earlier that it is a requirement of full human rationality that one regularly revise one’s belief system in the direction of greater (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Carl N. Still (2001). Do We Know All After Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul's Knowledge. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:107-119.
    This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Observation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  1. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.
  2. J. L. Bermudez (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, by Peter Carruthers. Mind 122 (485):263-266.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate 'explanatory space'. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Steven M. Duncan, The Inescapable Self.
    In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David H. Finkelstein (1999). On Self-Blindness and Inner Sense. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):105-19.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Martin F. Fricke (2014). Transparency or Opacity of Mind? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon (2003). Solidity and Impediment. Analysis 63 (279):173–178.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Stan Klein (2014). Sameness and the Self: Philosophical and Psychological Considerations. Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception:1-15.
    NOTE: This paper is an expanded and more fully realized (mostly the philosophical end of things -- but also new empiricism) version of my paper from Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. -/- ABSTRACT In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries -- e.g.,how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self overtime in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Stan Klein (2014). The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Stan Klein (2012). The Self and its Brain. Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Stan Klein, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby & Sarah Chance (2002). Decisions and the Evolution of Memory: Multiple Systems, Multiple Functions. Psychological Review 109:306-329.
    Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stan Klein & Cynthia Gangi (2010). The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191:1-15.
    This paper examines the issue ofwhat the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the selfmay be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stan Klein & Cynthia Gangi (2010). The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191:1-15.
    This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.
    Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Introspective Misidentification. Philosophical Studies.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are “immune to error through misidentification” (IEM), relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection. Mind and Language 29 (5):511-533.
    Many theorists claim that inner speech is importantly linked to human metacognition (thinking about one's own thinking). However, their proposals all rely upon unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes. The core problem is that they require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content. Difficulties for the views emerge when we look closely at how such contents might be integrated into one or more states or processes. The result is that, if inner (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. William S. Larkin, A Broad Perceptual Model of Privileged Introspective Judgments.
  22. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "Inner Sense". Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Eric Lormand, Inner Sense Until Proven Guilty.
    Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Cynthia Macdonald (1999). Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38.
    What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye&Quot;. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gerald E. Myers (1986). Introspection and Self-Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.
    Since locke, introspection has been generally defined as a form of observation. this is true, for example, of the classical tradition in psychology exemplified by wundt and titchener. recent experimental work by cognitive psychologists continues to treat introspection as a mode of observation while denying its alleged success in identifying cognitive processes. besides psychologists, philosophers such as james, ryle, and quinton are discussed, and they, too, define introspection as a type of observation analogous to perception. the present article calls attention (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (2007). A Representational Account of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2):337 - 353.
    Self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own states (or processes) in an indexical mode of presentation. The philosophical debate is concentrating on mental states (or processes). If we characterize self-knowledge by natural language sentences, the most adequate utterance has a structure like “I know that I am in mental state M”. This common sense characterization has to be developed into an adequate description. In this investigation we will tackle two questions: (i) What precisely is the phenomenon referred to by “self-knowledge” and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Anne Newstead (2006). Evans's Anti-Cartesian Argument: A Critical Evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.
    In chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans claimed to have an argument that would present "an antidote" to the Cartesian conception of the self as a purely mental entity. On the basis of considerations drawn from philosophy of language and thought, Evans claimed to be able to show that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Uwe Peters (2013). Indirect Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-13.
    Indirect sensory-access theory and conscious intentions. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.749560.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Self-Recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.
  33. Michael Roche (2013). A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.
    A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Perception Vs. Inner Sense: A Problem About Direct Awareness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.
  35. Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
    This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314.
    Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counterexemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
  40. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):271 - 290.
  41. Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 115--138.
    An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 667