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Summary This sub-category contains works on self-knowledge that do not fall under other sub-categories, including introductions to and surveys of the whole topic.
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  1. Norberto Abreu E. Silva Neto, Facing Up to Wittgenstein"s Diaries of Cambridge and Skjolden: Notes on Self-Knowledge and Belief.
    This sentence was taken as a methodic procedure for investigating philosophical questions regarding scientific psychology. To accomplish such a proposal is a very hard task to our mentality dominated by a certain mechanical way of seeing and thinking the world, specially for psychologists because they do not usually consider their problems from a religious point of view, even those religiously oriented. They believe all matters are liable to be subject of scientific treatment and never think they are working with religious (...)
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  2. Sean Allen-Hermanson (forthcoming). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don’t know it, and people who echolocate, but don’t know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton’s syndrome, human echolocation, and “facial vision” suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  3. Leslie Armour (1980). The Conceptualization of the Inner Life: A Philosophical Exploration. Humanities Press.
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  4. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
    The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to avoid (...)
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  5. Mary Rose Barral (1964). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. International Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1):160-162.
  6. John Barresi (1987). Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain Limits on Human Self-Knowledge in the Cybernetic Age. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (March):19-46.
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  7. Steven J. Bartlett & Peter Suber (eds.) (1987). Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  8. Ralph Barton Perry (1909). The Mind's Familiarity with Itself. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (5):113-122.
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  9. John I. Beare (1896). Self-Knowledge. Mind 5 (18):227-235.
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  10. Kathy Behrendt (2003). The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  11. Harry Benjamin (1971). Basic Self-Knowledge. London: Samuel Weiser.
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  12. Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...)
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  13. José Luis Bermúdez (2008). Self-Knowledge and the Sense of "I". In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Kalidas Bhattacharya, Jitendranath Mohanty & S. P. Banerjee (eds.) (1978). Self, Knowledge, and Freedom: Essays for Kalidas Bhattacharyya. World Press.
    Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. (...)
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  15. Jeanette Bicknell (2004). Self-Knowledge and the Limitations of Narrative. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2):406-416.
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  16. Akeel Bilgrami (2005). Self-Knowledge, Intentionality, and Normativity. Iyyun 54 (January):5-24.
  17. Deborah L. Black (1993). Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3):349-385.
  18. Jan H. Blits (1989). Self-Knowledge and the Modern Mode of Learning. Educational Theory 39 (4):293-300.
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  19. James Bohman (2009). Pluralism, Pragmatism and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Human Studies 32 (3):375 - 381.
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  20. Derek Bolton (1995). Self-Knowledge, Error, and Disorder. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  21. Rob Brady (1981). Verdictives, Self-Presentation, and Self-Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):11-20.
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  22. Thomas C. Brickhouse (1992). Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):187-189.
  23. Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs (2012). Debating Self-Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner; 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner; 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner; 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs; 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner; 8. Is scepticism about (...)
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  24. Joseph A. Buckley & Lisa L. Hall (1999). Self-Knowledge and Embodiment. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):185-196.
    Donald Davidson has posed the problem of first-person authority and provided his own solution to it. He has argued that no epistemic theory of first-person authority can resolve the problem, but that a theory that appeals to constraints on interpreting speech can. We argue that Davidson is wrong about epistemic theories and that his own theory of first-person authority is inadequate. We propose an alternative based on the epistemic constraints associated with embodiment and argue that recognition of these constraints undermines (...)
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  25. Tyler Burge (2000). Reason and the First Person. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
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  26. Tyler Burge (1999). A Century of Deflation and a Moment About Self-Knowledge. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):25-46.
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  27. Alex Byrne, The Puzzle of Transparency.
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  28. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. Oup Oxford.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
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  29. Peter Carruthers (2008). Cartesian Epistemology: Is the Theory of the Self-Transparent Mind Innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):28-53.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  30. Peter Carruthers (1996). Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of the Theory-Theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 22--38.
    In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.
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  31. Quassim Cassam (1998). Self-Knowledge, A Priori Knowledge, and the Cognitive Structure of the Mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  32. Quassim Cassam (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of (...)
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  33. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1968). On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others. Journal of Philosophy 65 (15):439-456.
  34. Annalisa Coliva (ed.) (2012). The Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.
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  35. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person: Error Through Misidentification, the Split Between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.
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  36. Annalisa Coliva (2002). Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell (...)
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  37. Clinton D. Corcoran (1998). Self-Knowledge in the Age of Theory. Review of Metaphysics 51 (3):690-691.
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  38. William Lane Craig (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):291–295.
  39. Danilo Dantas (2009). What (and How) Was I Thinking?: On Memory of Past Thoughts. Intuitio 2 (2):103-107.
    Recent philosophical and psychological researches show that memory, not only stores information but also process it. It's possible one to have a meta-representational memory despite the propositional content and attitude of the present meta-representation being different from the propositional content and attitude of the thought that the meta-representation is causally derived. So, the question is: if we take for granted that this kind of memory doesn't require content or attitude identity, what is the permissible range of aberration between the original (...)
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  40. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell.
  41. Richard T. De George (1961). Psychoanalysis, Metaphysics and Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 35:197-204.
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  42. Daniel C. Dennett (2000). The Case for Rorts. In R.B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In the late 1960s, I created a joke dictionary of philosophers' names that circulated in samizdat form, picking up new entries as it went. The first few editions were on Ditto masters, in those pre-photocopy days. The 7th edition, entitled The Philosophical Lexicon , was the first properly copyrighted version, published for the benefit of the American Philosophical Association in 1978, and the 8th edition (brought out in 1987), is still available from the APA. I continue to receive submissions of (...)
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  43. John Dewey (1918). Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (2):29-35.
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  44. Reidar Due (2000). Self-Knowledge and Moral Properties in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Sartre Studies International 6 (1):61-94.
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  45. H. J. Easterling (1967). Self-Knowledge in Plato Edward G. Ballard: Socratic Ignorance. An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge. Pp. Ix+189. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965. Paper, Fl. 24. 30. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 17 (01):26-28.
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  46. J. Edwards (1999). Interpreted Logical Forms and Knowing Your Own Mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90.
    An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logical form constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. This definition is (...)
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  47. Jordi Fernandez (2007). Desire and Self-Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.
    In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...)
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  48. Manfred Frank (2002). Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: On Some Difficulties with the Reduction of Subjectivity. Constellations 9 (3):390-408.
  49. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  50. Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other (...)
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