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  1. J. L. Bermudez (2013). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements. Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
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  2. Sven Bernecker (2008). Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Tyler Burge (2011). The Dewey Lectures 2007: Self and Self-Understanding. Journal of Philosophy 108 (6).
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  4. M. Engel (1993). The Problem of Other Minds: A Reliable Solution. Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.
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  5. G. Rompp (1989). Self-Knowledge as Argument-on the Problem of the Theorizing of the Self-Consciousness in The'system Des Transzendentalen Idealismus'by Schelling. Kant-Studien 80 (3):303-323.
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  6. Carl N. Still (2001). Do We Know All After Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul's Knowledge. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:107-119.
    This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much (...)
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Observation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  1. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.
  2. J. L. Bermudez (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, by Peter Carruthers. Mind 122 (485):263-266.
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  3. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
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  4. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate 'explanatory space'. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness (...)
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  5. Steven M. Duncan, The Inescapable Self.
    In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.
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  6. David H. Finkelstein (1999). On Self-Blindness and Inner Sense. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):105-19.
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  7. Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon (2003). Solidity and Impediment. Analysis 63 (279):173–178.
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  8. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  9. Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method (...)
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  10. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
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  11. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Introspective Misidentification. Philosophical Studies.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are “immune to error through misidentification” (IEM), relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that (...)
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  12. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection. Mind and Language.
    Many theorists claim that inner speech is importantly linked to human metacognition (thinking about one’s own thinking). However, their proposals all rely upon unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes. The core problem is that they require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content. Difficulties for the views emerge when we look closely at how such contents might be integrated into one or more states or processes. The result is that, if inner (...)
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  13. William S. Larkin, A Broad Perceptual Model of Privileged Introspective Judgments.
  14. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "Inner Sense". Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
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  15. Eric Lormand, Inner Sense Until Proven Guilty.
    Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is (...)
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  16. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese:1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  17. Cynthia Macdonald (1999). Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38.
    What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against (...)
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  18. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye&Quot;. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties (...)
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  19. Gerald E. Myers (1986). Introspection and Self-Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.
    Since locke, introspection has been generally defined as a form of observation. this is true, for example, of the classical tradition in psychology exemplified by wundt and titchener. recent experimental work by cognitive psychologists continues to treat introspection as a mode of observation while denying its alleged success in identifying cognitive processes. besides psychologists, philosophers such as james, ryle, and quinton are discussed, and they, too, define introspection as a type of observation analogous to perception. the present article calls attention (...)
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  20. Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (2007). A Representational Account of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2):337 - 353.
    Self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own states (or processes) in an indexical mode of presentation. The philosophical debate is concentrating on mental states (or processes). If we characterize self-knowledge by natural language sentences, the most adequate utterance has a structure like “I know that I am in mental state M”. This common sense characterization has to be developed into an adequate description. In this investigation we will tackle two questions: (i) What precisely is the phenomenon referred to by “self-knowledge” and (...)
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  21. Anne Newstead (2006). Evans's Anti-Cartesian Argument: A Critical Evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.
    In chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans claimed to have an argument that would present "an antidote" to the Cartesian conception of the self as a purely mental entity. On the basis of considerations drawn from philosophy of language and thought, Evans claimed to be able to show that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to (...)
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  22. Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...)
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  23. Uwe Peters (2013). Indirect Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-13.
    Indirect sensory-access theory and conscious intentions. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.749560.
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  24. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Self-Recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.
  25. Michael Roche (2013). A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.
    A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.
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  26. Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Perception Vs. Inner Sense: A Problem About Direct Awareness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.
  27. Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
    This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
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  28. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
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  29. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
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  30. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314.
    Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counterexemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three (...)
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  31. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
  32. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):271 - 290.
  33. Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 115--138.
    An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction (...)
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  34. Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain.
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  35. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
    Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
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Expression-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  1. Rogers Albritton (1995). Comments on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.
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  2. Robert F. Allen, The Subject is Qualia: Paronyms and Temporary Identity.
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  3. Dorit Bar-On, Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.
    As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...)
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  4. Dorit Bar-On, Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner) UNC-Chapel Hill.
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
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  5. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
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  6. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):1-7.
  7. Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):53 - 71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  8. Dorit Bar-On (2008). Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
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  9. Dorit Bar-On (2007). Review of Akeel Bilgrami, Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
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