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Sensation and Perception

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1974). The Subjectivity of Sensation. Ajatus 36:3-18.
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  2. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson, Theories of Sensory Affect: Compare and Contrast.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  3. Winston H. F. Barnes (1954). Talking About Sensations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54:261-278.
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  4. Charles A. Baylis (1966). Foundations for a Presentative Theory of Perception and Sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:41-54.
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  5. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
    The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. (...)
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  6. Malcolm Budd (1986). Wittgenstein on Sensuous Experiences. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):174-195.
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  7. Andrew Chignell (2009). Descartes on Sensation: A Defense of the Semantic-Causation Model. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (5):1-22.
    Descartes's lack of clarity about the causal connections between brain states and mental states has led many commentators to conclude that he has no coherent account of body-mind relations in sensation, or that he was simply confused about the issue. In this paper I develop what I take to be a coherent account that was available to Descartes, and argue that there are both textual and systematic reasons to think that it was his considered view. The account has brain states (...)
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  8. Joseph M. Christianson (1998). Criterion of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:353-398.
    This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e. , the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz. , how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense (...)
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  9. Austen Clark (2007). Sensory and Perceptual Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally thinks that (...)
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  10. Rebecca Copenhaver (forthcoming). Thomas Reid on Aesthetic Perception. In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Mind, Knowledge and Action: Essays in Honor of Reid’s Tercentenary.
  11. Rebecca Copenhaver (2010). Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):285-312.
    Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and (...)
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  12. James W. Cornman (1975). Analysis And Metaphysics. Reidel.
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  13. James W. Cornman (1975). Chisholm on Sensing and Perceiving. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis And Metaphysics. Reidel. 11--33.
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  14. David J. Crossley (1978). A Question About Sensations. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June):355-360.
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  15. James T. Culbertson (1942). A Physical Theory of Sensation. Philosophy of Science 9 (April):197-226.
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  16. Phillip D. Cummins (1990). Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid's Theory of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):755-762.
  17. William L. Davidson (1881). Definition of "Sensation". Mind 6 (24):551-557.
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  18. Grace A. de Laguna (1916). Sensation and Perception II: The Analytic Relation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (23):617-630.
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  19. Grace A. de Laguna (1916). Sensation and Perception. I: The Genetic Relationship. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (20):533-547.
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  20. F. Dretske (1988). Sensation and Perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Fred Dretske (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  22. Fred Dretske (2003). Sensation and Perception (1981). In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  23. Timothy J. Duggan (1960). Thomas Reid's Theory of Sensation. Philosophical Review 69 (1):90-100.
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  24. Steven M. Duncan, Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  25. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1984). Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation (...)
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  26. Richard C. Flint (1877). On Some Alleged Distinctions Between Thought and Feeling. Mind 2 (5):112-118.
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  27. Marina Folescu (forthcoming). Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed. In Todd Buras Rebecca Copenhaver (ed.), Mind, Knowledge and Action: Essays in Honor of Reid’s Tercentenary.
    The present investigation concerns Reid’s explanation of how objects (be they real or nonexistent) are conceived. This paper shows that there is a deep-rooted tension in Reid’s understanding of conception: although the type of conception employed in perception is closely related to the one employed in imagination, three fundamental features distinguish perceptual conception (as the former will be referred to throughout this paper) from imaginative conception (as the latter will be called henceforth). These features would have been ascribed by Reid (...)
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  28. Giovanni B. Grandi (2008). Reid and Condillac on Sensation and Perception. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):191-200.
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  29. A. P. Greenway (1973). Psychological Findings and Sensory Experience. International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (March):99-110.
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  30. Edmund Gurney (1882). The Passage From Stimulus to Sensation. Mind 7 (26):295-298.
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  31. Jonathan Harrison (1963). Sensation and Perception. By D. W. Hamlyn. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961. Pp. Xi+210. Price 25s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 38 (144):190-.
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  32. Charles Hartshorne (1963). Sensation in Psychology and Philosophy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):3-14.
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  33. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Love in the Time of Cholera. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford UP.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
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  34. George Henry Lewes (1876). What is Sensation? Mind 1 (2):157-161.
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  35. Glenn D. Higginson (1935). Stimulus, Sensation, and Meaning. Journal of Philosophy 32 (24):645-650.
    We can find no place in psychology for the concept of stimulus as a physical agent to which an individual responds in a psychological manner. Moreover, we can find no place for sensation and image when considered as simple mental elements. We would also purge ...
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  36. J. Michael Hinton (1974). This is Visual Sensation. In Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.
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  37. Nicholas Humphrey (2001). Doing It My Way: Sensation, Perception – and Feeling Red. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):987-987.
    The theory presented here is a near neighbour of Humphrey's theory of sensations as actions. O'Regan & Noë have opened up remarkable new possibilities. But they have missed a trick by not making more of the distinction between sensation and perception; and some of their particular proposals for how we use our eyes to represent visual properties are not only implausible but would, if true, isolate vision from other sensory modalities and do little to explain the phenomenology of conscious experience (...)
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  38. Sean Dorrance Kelly (2008). Content and Constancy: Phenomenology, Psychology, and the Content of Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.
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  39. Michael W. Levine & Jeremy M. Shefner (1991). Fundamentals of Sensation and Perception. Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
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  40. Chris Lindsay (forthcoming). Reid on Instinctive Exertions and the Spatial Content of Sensations. In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Mind, Knowledge and Action: Essays in Honor of Reid’s Tercentenary.
    In his last great philosophical essay, 'Of Power', Reid makes the plausible claim that 'our first exertions are instinctive' and made 'without any distinct conception of the event that is to follow'. According to Reid, these instinctive exertions allow us to form beliefs about correlations between exertions and consequential events. Such instinctive exertions also explain the origin of our conception of power. In this paper, I argue that we can use the notion of instinctive exertions to address several objections that (...)
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  41. Alphonso F. Lingis (1981). Sensations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):160-170.
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  42. Michael Madary (2008). Specular Highlights as a Guide to Perceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639.
    This article is a contribution to a recent debate in the philosophy of perception between Alva Noë and Sean Kelly. Noë (2004) has argued that the perspectival part of perception is simultaneously represented along with the non-perspectival part of perception. Kelly (2004) argues that the two parts of perception are not always simultaneously experienced. Here I focus on specular highlights as an example of the perspectival part of perception. First I give a priori motivation to think that specular highlights are (...)
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  43. G. A. Malinas (1975). Sensations and Understanding. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):28-35.
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  44. Joseph Margolis (1966). Awareness of Sensations and of the Location of Sensations. Analysis 26 (October):29-32.
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  45. E. L. Mascall (1964). Perception and Sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:259-272.
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  46. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). The Individuation of the Senses. In , Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Anima. H. P. Grice (...)
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  47. Patrick Mckee (1976). An Explanation-Model of Visual Sensation. Philosophical Studies 29 (June):457-464.
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  48. J. W. Meiland (1964). Meaning, Identification and Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (December):360-374.
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  49. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in (...)
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  50. James L. Mursell (1922). The Concept of Sensation. Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):684-690.
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