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Sense-Datum Theories

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. R. I. Aaron (1958). The Common Sense View of Sense-Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.
  2. E. M. Adams (1958). The Nature of the Sense-Datum Theory. Mind 67 (April):216-226.
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  3. V. C. Aldrich & Herbert Feigl (1935). Spatial Location and the Psycho-Physical Problem. Philosophy of Science 2 (2):256-261.
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  4. Virgil C. Aldrich (1979). Objective Sense-Data. Personalist 60 (January):36-42.
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  5. Virgil C. Aldrich (1955). Is an After-Image a Sense-Datum? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):369-376.
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  6. Virgil C. Aldrich (1934). Are There Vague Sense-Data? Mind 43 (172):477-482.
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  7. R. E. Allinson (1978). A Non-Dualistic Reply to Moore's Refutation of Idealism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):661-668.
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  8. William P. Alston (1957). Is a Sense-Datum Language Necessary? Philosophy of Science 24 (1):41-45.
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  9. D. Z. Andriopoulos (1979). Did Aristotle Assume a Sense-Data Theory? Philosophical Inquiry 1 (2):125-128.
  10. David Malet Armstrong (1979). Perception, Sense-Data, and Causality. In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.
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  11. J. L. Austin (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press.
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  12. J. L. Austin (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  13. A. J. Ayer (1970). Metaphysics and Common Sense. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.
    On making philosophy intelligible.--What is communication?--Meaning and intentionality.--What must there be?--Metaphysics and common sense.--Philosophy and science.--Chance.--Knowledge, belief, and evidence.--Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?--Professor Malcolm on dreams.--An appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--G. E. Moore on propositions and facts.--Reflections on existentialism.--Man as a subject for science.--Philosophy and politics.
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  14. A. J. Ayer (1967). Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140.
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  15. A. J. Ayer (1945). The Terminology of Sense-Data. Mind 54 (October):289-312.
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  16. A. J. Ayer (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.
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  17. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  18. Ba (2004). On the Ontological Issue of Sense Data. Philosophia 33 (2):125-154.
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  19. Winston H. F. Barnes (1945). The Myth of Sense-Data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118.
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  20. H. C. Becroft (1925). Professor Norman Kemp Smith's Theory of the Sensa. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):179 – 189.
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  21. Gustav Bergmann (1947). Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence. Philosophy of Science 14 (2):152-163.
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  22. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Naturalized Sense Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):353-374.
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  23. Stephen H. Bickham (1975). What is at Issue in the Ayer-Austin Dispute About Sense-Data. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:1-8.
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  24. Shokti Charan Biswas (1967). The Nature and Status of Sensa. [Allahabad]Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Allahabad.
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  25. Max Black (1971/1963). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  26. John W. Blyth (1935). A Discussion of Mr. Price's Perception. Mind 44 (173):58-67.
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  27. W. Russell Brain (1960). Space and Sense-Data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (November):177-191.
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  28. Walter R. Brain (1959). The Nature Of Experience. London,: Oxford University Press,.
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  29. Philip Bretzevonl (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.
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  30. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  31. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). The Argument From Illusion Reconsidered. Disputatio 9 (1):1-7.
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  32. Richard N. Bronaugh (1964). The Argument From the Elliptical Penny. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):151-157.
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  33. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  34. Norman O. Brown (1957). Sense-Data and Material Objects. Mind 66 (April):173-194.
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  35. Charles A. Campbell (1947). Sense Data and Judgment in Sensory Cognition. Mind 56 (October):289-316.
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  36. James D. Carney (1962). Was Moore Talking Nonsense in 1918? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):521-527.
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  37. Gregg Caruso (1999). A Defence of the Adverbial Theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.
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  38. Peter T. Cash (1979). The Argument From the Hand. Philosophical Investigations 2 (4):47-70.
    This paper is an "ordinary language" analysis of the philosophical discussion of visual perception in the context of Twentieth Century British "sense datum" theorists, primarily G.E. Moore. -/- The title of the paper is derived from A.J. Ayer's "argument from illusion", which also forms part of the context of this paper. Both Moore and Ayer believed in sense datum theory, but Moore provides an interesting illustration that is intended to clarify (and also prove) sense datum theory in his paper, "A (...)
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  39. Albert Casullo (1987). A Defense of Sense-Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):45-61.
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  40. Suresh Chandra (1976). Sensible Awareness of Sense-Objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366.
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  41. Roderick Chisholm (1942). Discussions: The Problem of the Speckled Hen. Mind 51 (204):368-373.
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  42. Roderick M. Chisholm (1950). The Theory of Appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.
  43. Andrew Chrucky, The Alleged Fallacy of the Sense-Datum Inference.
    Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data.
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  44. J. N. Chubb (1973). Are There Sense-Data, Part I. Journal of the Philosophical Association 14 (January-December):135-158.
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  45. Paul Coates, Sense-Data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Experiences of all kinds have a distinctive character, which marks them out as intrinsically different from states of consciousness such as thinking. A plausible view is that the difference should be accounted for by the fact that, in having an experience, the subject is somehow immediately aware of a range of phenomenal qualities. For example, in seeing, grasping and tasting an apple, the subject may be aware of a red and green spherical shape, a certain feeling of smoothness to touch, (...)
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  46. Paul Coates, Sense-Data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  47. William Cooney (1985). Some Comments on the Sense-Datum Theory and the Argument From Illusion. Dialogue 28 (October):8-15.
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  48. James W. Cornman (1970). Sellars, Scientific Realism, and Sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.
  49. Daniel Cory (1948). Are Sense-Data in the Brain? Journal of Philosophy 45 (September):533-548.
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  50. Daniel Cory (1939). The Private Field of Immediate Experience. Journal of Philosophy 36 (16):421-427.
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