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  1. David Archard (2007). Is It Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women's Consent Seriously - by Joan McGregor, Making Sense of Sexual Consent - by Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds, the Logic of Consent, the Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defence to Criminal Conduct - by Peter Westen, and Consent to Sexual Relations - by Lan Wertheimer. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):209–221.
  2. David Archard (1999). [Book Review] Sexual Consent. [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (3):643-644.
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  3. Thom Brooks (2009). The Problem with Polygamy. Philosophical Topics 37 (2):109-22.
    Polygamy is a hotly contested practice and open to widespread misunderstandings. This practice is defined as a relationship between either one husband and multiple wives or one wife and multiple husbands. Today, 'polygamy' almost exclusively takes the form of one husband with multiple wives. In this article, my focus will centre on limited defences of polygamy offered recently by Chesire Calhoun and Martha Nussbaum. I will argue that these defences are unconvincing. The problem with polygamy is primarily that it is (...)
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  4. Brian D. Earp (2013). Criticising Religious Practices. The Philosophers' Magazine 63:15-17.
    In 2012, a German court ruled that religious circumcision of male minors constitutes criminal bodily assault. Muslim and Jewish groups responded with outrage, with some commentators pegging the ruling to Islamophobic and anti-Semitic motivations. In doing so, these commentators failed to engage with any of the legal and ethical arguments actually given by the court in its landmark decision. In this brief commentary, I argue that a firm distinction must be drawn between criticisms of religious practices that stem from irrational (...)
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  5. Renee Heberle (2002). Book Review: Edited by Sharon Lamb. Victimization and Consent and New Versions of Victims: Feminists Struggle with the Concept. New York: New York University Press, 1999. And Pamela Haag. Consent: Sexual Rights and the Transformation of American Liberalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. [REVIEW] Hypatia 17 (3):257-264.
  6. Igor Primoratz (2001). Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough? [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):201-218.
    The liberal view that valid consent is sufficient for a sex act to be morally legitimate is challenged by three major philosophies of sex: the Catholic view of sex as ordained for procreation and properly confined to marriage, the romantic view of sex as bound up with love, and the radical feminist analysis of sex in our society as part and parcel of the domination of women by men. I take a critical look at all three, focusing on Mary Geach''s (...)
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  7. Eric Reitan (2007). Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Pp. XV + 293. Utilitas 19 (2):261-263.
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  8. Alan Soble (1997). Antioch's “Sexual Offense Policy”: A Philosophical Exploration. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (1):22-36.
    An analytic investigation of Antioch's "Sexual Offense Policy.".
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  9. Rosemarie Putnam Tong (1999). David Archard, Sexual Consent:Sexual Consent. Ethics 109 (3):643-644.
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  10. Jonathan Webber (2009). Sex. Philosophy 84 (2):233-250.
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures classed as sexual. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege some sexual desires, activities, or pleasures as paradigmatic. Since the phenomenal quality unifying the sexual domain is not itself morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The (...)
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