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  1. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  2. A. J. Baker (1953). Logic and Singular Propositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):155 – 169.
    The author contends that the analogies between "the logical roles of singular and universal statements" are important but do not "justify the conclusion that singular statements are reducible to propositions" of the forms a, E, I, And o. (staff).
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  3. Arvid Båve (2009). A Deflationary Theory of Reference. Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
    The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...)
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  4. Arvid Båve (2008). A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...)
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  5. John L. Bell & William Demopoulos (1996). Elementary Propositions and Independence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):112-124.
    This paper is concerned with Wittgenstein's early doctrine of the independence of elementary propositions. Using the notion of a free generator for a logical calculus–a concept we claim was anticipated by Wittgenstein–we show precisely why certain difficulties associated with his doctrine cannot be overcome. We then show that Russell's version of logical atomism–with independent particulars instead of elementary propositions–avoids the same difficulties.
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  6. João Branquinho (1996). Singular Propositions and Modes of Presentation1. Disputatio 1:05-21.
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  7. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2013). A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
    Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...)
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  8. J. A. Chadwick (1928). Singular Propositions. Mind 37 (148):471-484.
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  9. Tadeusz Czeżowski (1955). On Certain Peculiarities of Singular Propositions. Mind 64 (255):392-395.
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  10. Tadeusz Czeżowski (1955). On Certain Peculiarities of Singular Propositions. Mind 64 (255):392-395.
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  11. Matthew Davidson (2007). Transworld Identity, Singular Propositions, and Picture-Thinking. In , On Sense and Direct Reference.
    metaphysics of modality. So, we read David Kaplan in 1967: I'll even let you peep through my Jules Verne-o-scope [into another possible world G]. Carefully examine each individual, check his fingerprints, etc. The problem is: which one is our Bobby Dylan—of course he may be somewhat changed, just as he will be in our world in a few years…Our problem is [to] locate him in G (if he exists there). The task of locating individuals in other worlds is the problem (...)
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  12. Matthew Davidson (2000). Direct Reference and Singular Propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):285 - 300.
    Most direct reference theorists about indexicals and proper names have adopted the thesis that singular propositions about physical objects are composed of physical objects and properties (and/or relations—I will use "properties" for brevity's sake).1 There have been a number of recent proponents of such a view, including Scott Soames, Nathan Salmon, John Perry, Howard Wettstein, and David Kaplan.2 Since Kaplan is the individual who (at least recently) is best known for holding such a view, let's call a proposition that (...)
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  13. John Dilworth & Dylan Sabo (2014). A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping. Erkenntnis 79 (3):511-522.
    On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported by current (...)
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  14. G. W. Fitch (1994). Singular Propositions in Time. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):181 - 187.
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  15. Greg Fitch, Singular Propositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Danny Frederick, The Unsatisfactoriness of Unsaturatedness.
    Frege proposed his doctrine of unsaturatedness as a solution to the problems of the unity of the proposition and the unity of the sentence. I show that Frege’s theory is mystical, ad hoc, ineffective, paradoxical and entails that singular terms cannot be predicates. I explain the traditional solution to the problem of the unity of the sentence, as expounded by Mill, which invokes a syncategorematic sign of predication and the connotation and denotation of terms. I streamline this solution, bring it (...)
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  17. Danny Frederick (2013). Singular Terms, Predicates and the Spurious 'Is' of Identity. Dialectica 67 (3):325-343.
    Contemporary orthodoxy affirms that singular terms cannot be predicates and that, therefore, ‘is’ is ambiguous as between predication and identity. Recent attempts to treat names as predicates do not challenge this orthodoxy. The orthodoxy was built into the structure of modern formal logic by Frege. It is defended by arguments which I show to be unsound. I provide a semantical account of atomic sentences which draws upon Mill's account of predication, connotation and denotation. I show that singular terms may be (...)
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  18. Cody Gilmore (2014). Parts of Propositions. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. 156-208.
    Do Russellian propositions have their constituents as parts? One reason for thinking not is that if they did, they would generate apparent counterexamples to plausible mereological principles. As Frege noted, they would be in tension with the transitivity of parthood. A certain small rock is a part of Etna but not of the proposition that Etna is higher than Vesuvius. So, if Etna were a part of the given proposition, parthood would fail to be transitive. As William Bynoe has noted (...)
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  19. Leon Gumański (1960). Singular Propositions, and 'This' as a Quantifier. Mind 69 (276):534-543.
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  20. Aviv Hoffmann (2003). A Puzzle About Truth and Singular Propositions. Mind 112 (448):635-651.
    It seems that every singular proposition implies that the object it is singular with respect to exists. It also seems that some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist. The puzzle is that it can be argued that there is contradiction between these two principles. In this paper, I explain the puzzle and consider some of the ways one might attempt to resolve it. The puzzle is important because it has implications concerning the (...)
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  21. Luca Incurvati (2013). The Reference Book By John Hawthorne and David Manley. Analysis 73 (3):582-585.
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  22. Mark Jago (forthcoming). Hyperintensional Propositions. Synthese:1-17.
    Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct accounts of how (...)
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  23. Robin Jeshion (ed.) (2010). New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.
    Leading experts in the field contributing to this volume make the case for the singularity of thought and debate a broad spectrum of issues it raises, including ...
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  24. Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.) (2014). Mereology and Location. OUP Oxford.
    A team of leading philosophers presents original work on theories of parthood and location. Topics covered include how we ought to axiomatise our mereology; whether we can reduce mereological relations to identity or to locative relations; whether Mereological Essentialism is true; and what mereology and propositions can tell us about one another.
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  25. C. H. Langford (1928). Singular Propositions. Mind 37 (145):73-81.
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  26. Michael McGlone (2012). Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  27. Christopher Menzel (1993). Singular Propositions and Modal Logic. Philosophical Topics 21 (2):113-148.
    According to many actualists, propositions, singular propositions in particular, are structurally complex, that is, roughly, (i) they have, in some sense, an internal structure that corresponds rather directly to the syntactic structure of the sentences that express them, and (ii) the metaphysical components, or constituents, of that structure are the semantic values — the meanings — of the corresponding syntactic components of those sentences. Given that reference is "direct", i.e., that the meaning of a name is its denotation, an apparent (...)
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  28. Gilbert Plumer (1996). Truth and Collective Truth. Dialectica 50 (1):3-24.
    The paper argues for the applicability of the notion of collective truth as opposed to distributive truth, that is, truth at times or possibilia taken in groups rather than individually. The underlying reasoning is that there are transtemporal and transworld relationships, e.g., those involving the relations of <being a descendant of> and <thinking about>. Relationships are (one type of) truth-makers. Hence, there are transtemporal and transworld truth-makers. Therefore, there is transtemporal and transworld truth, i.e., collective truth. A semantics is developed (...)
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  29. Gilbert Plumer (1988). Kaplan Rigidity, Time, and Modality. Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):329-335.
    Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true (...)
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  30. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting” (the so-called "George IV puzzle"). This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such (...)
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  31. Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106–126.
    The *Tractatus* contains an argument that there are simple, necessarily existent objects, which, being simple, are suited to be the referents of the names occuring in the final analysis of propositions. The argument is perplexing in its own right, but also for its invocation of the notion of "substance". I argue that if one locates Wittgenstein's conception of substance in the Kantian tradition to which his talk of "substance" alludes, what emerges is an argument that is very nearly--but not quite--cogent.
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  32. Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
    An article explicating Wittgenstein's logical atomism and surveying the relevant secondary literature.
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  33. Sarah Sawyer (2012). Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought? Mind and Language 27 (3):264-283.
    In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acquaintance theory that distinguishes (...)
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  34. Anders J. Schoubye (2012). Against the Argument From Convention. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):515-532.
    In recent years, a new argument in favor of Donnellan’s (Philos Rev 77: 281–304, 1966) semantic distinction between attributive and referential descriptions has been proposed by Michael Devitt and Marga Reimer. This argument is based on two empirical premises concerning regularity of use and processing ease. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate (a) that these empirical observations are dubious and fail to license the conclusion of the argument and (b) that if the argument were sound, it would severely overgenerate. (...)
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  35. Jeff Speaks (2012). On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.
    Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't exist unless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view that some objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without giving up either Serious Actualism (...)
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  36. D. C. Stove (1973). Laws and Singular Propositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):139 – 143.
    The author claims to prove by example that, Contrary to what is generally maintained, A singular preposition of an observational kind is in some cases deducible from a natural law alone. On this basis he raises the question whether the universe might not be deterministic in a 'hyper-Laplacean' sense: that is, Whether the laws of nature might not be logically sufficient on their own to determine every actual state of the universe.
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  37. Arthur Sullivan (1998). Singular Propositions and Singular Thoughts. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (1):114-127.
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  38. Kenneth Taylor (2010). On Singularity. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oup Oxford.
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  39. Chris Tillman & Gregory Fowler (2012). Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):525 - 539.
    It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass some costs of denying (...)
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  40. J. David Wald (1979). Geach on Atomicity and Singular Propositions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):285-294.
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  41. Kai -Yee Wong (1991). A Priority and Ways of Grasping a Proposition. Philosophical Studies 62 (2):151 - 164.
  42. Edward N. Zalta (1989). Singular Propositions, Abstract Constituents, and Propositional Attitudes. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 455--78.
    The author resolves a conflict between Frege's view that the cognitive significance of coreferential names may be distinct and Kaplan's view that since coreferential names have the same "character", they have the same cognitive significance. A distinction is drawn between an expression's "character" and its "cognitive character". The former yields the denotation of an expression relative to a context (and individual); the latter yields the abstract sense of an expression relative to a context (and individual). Though coreferential names have the (...)
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