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  1. Tony Cheng (2016). The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self. Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):3-14.
    In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After the diagnosis, (...)
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  2. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Intelligence Without Representation: Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:367-83.
  3. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Refocusing the Question: Can There Be Skillful Coping Without Propositional Representations or Brain Representations? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):413-25.
  4. Walter J. Freeman & Christine A. Skarda (1990). Representations: Who Needs Them? In J. McGaugh, Jerry Weinberger & G. Lynch (eds.), Brain Organization and Memory. Guilford Press
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  5. Pete Mandik & Rick Grush (2002). Representational Parts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (389):394.
    In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scientific explanations. We (...)
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  6. Mohan Matthen, Representationalism Defended.
    This is a comment on Frances Egan's paper, "How to Think About Mental Content." Egan distinguishes mathematical and cognitive content; she accepts the former and rejects the latter. In this comment, which was delivered at the Oberlin Colloquium in 2012, I defend cognitive content.
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  7. Mohan Matthen (2014). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  8. Marcin Miłkowski (2015). The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):73-88.
    In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would (...)
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  9. M. Morris (1991). Why There Are No Mental Representations. Minds and Machines 1 (1):1-30.
    I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue (...)
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  10. Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press 153-167.
    A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Perception is the construction of perceptual representations that represent the world correctly or incorrectly. This way of thinking about perception has been questioned recently by those who deny that there are perceptual representations. This article examines some reasons for and against the concept of perceptual representation and explores some potential ways of resolving this debate. Then it analyzes what perceptual representations may be: if they attribute properties to (...)
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  11. Tobias Schlicht & Ulrike Pompe (2007). Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):250-254.
  12. Johanna Seibt (2009). Functions Between Reasons and Causes : On Picturing. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press