This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
152 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 152
  1. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Timo Airaksinen (1985). Absolutely Certain Beliefs. Philosophy Research Archives 11:393-406.
    This paper presents a critical review and discussion of three recent major theories of epistemic scepticism. Odegard and Rescher both agree that real knowledge entails certain beliefs. But they both fail to see how beliefs could be absolutely certain. Klein’s book, Certainty: A Refutationof Scepticism, presents the strongest possible view in favor of absolute certainty. I pay attention to its technical details and development by Klein. My conclusion is that Klein’s theory rests on some presupposed ideas that are either counterintuitive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. James Allan (2000). A Tale of Two Scepticisms or Relying on What Comes Naturally or the Problem with Deriving an Epistemology From Literary Theory. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):181–194.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Robert Almeder (1973). Defeasibility and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):238 – 244.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Robert Audi (1995). Deductive Closure, Defeasibility and Scepticism: A Reply to Feldman. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):494-499.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Yuval Avnur (2012). Mere Faith and Entitlement. Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Rainer Baasner (1987). Wezel. The Dark Side of the Enlightenment. Sceptical Life-Philosophy Between the Later Enlightenment and Early Romanticism. Philosophy and History 20 (1):25-26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Andrew Bacon (2014). Giving Your Knowledge Half a Chance. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    One thousand fair causally isolated coins will be independently flipped tomorrow morning and you know this fact. I argue that the probability, conditional on your knowledge, that any coin will land tails is almost 1 if that coin in fact lands tails, and almost 0 if it in fact lands heads. I also show that the coin flips are not probabilistically independent given your knowledge. These results are uncomfortable for those, like Timothy Williamson, who take these probabilities to play a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Brian Baigrie (1987). Science and Scepticism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (4):535-541.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nathan Ballantyne (2013). Counterfactual Philosophers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):368-387.
    I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2013). Schaffer's Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2010). Sosa's Dream. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249 - 252.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Adrian Bardon (2005). Performative Transcendental Arguments. Philosophia 33 (1-4):69-95.
    ‘Performative’ transcendental arguments exploit the status of a subcategory of self-falsifying propositions in showing that some form of skepticism is unsustainable. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between performatively inconsistent propositions and transcendental arguments, and then to compare performative transcendental arguments to modest transcendental arguments that seek only to establish the indispensability of some belief or conceptual framework. Reconceptualizing transcendental arguments as performative helps focus the intended dilemma for the skeptic: performative transcendental arguments directly confront the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Chris Barker (2009). Clarity and the Grammar of Skepticism. Mind and Language 24 (3):253-273.
    Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so should be at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p . However, mutual belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity ( It is clear that God exists ). I propose instead that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) 'the publicly available evidence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David James Barnett (2013). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Chantal Bax (2013). Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Joseph Beatty (1979). 'Communicative Competence' and the Skeptic. Philosophy and Social Criticism 6 (3):268-287.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Guy Bennett-Hunter (2012). A Pragmatist Conception of Certainty: Wittgenstein and Santayana. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2):146-157.
  19. Niels Ole Bernsen (1978). Knowledge: A Treatise on Our Cognitive Situation. Odense University Press.
  20. Jonathan Birch (2013). On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism. Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jes Bjarup (2006). Scepticism and Scandinavian Legal Realists. In J. W. Harris, Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott, Joshua Getzler & Edwin Peel (eds.), Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David Bloor, Scepticism and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge. The Case of the Boundary-Layer.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Tomas Bogardus (2009). A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View. Episteme 6 (3):324-335.
    Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Charles Bolyard, Medieval Skepticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  25. Jochen Briesen (2010). Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
    Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jochen Briesen (2008). Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation. Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Justin Broackes (2004). Realism, Scepticism and the Lament for an Archimedean Point: Stroud and the Quest for Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):415–422.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Otavio Bueno (2008). Relativism and Scepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):247 – 254.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Tyler Burge (2003). Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Alex Byrne (2004). How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes? Noûs 38 (2):299–325.
    The sceptic about the external world presents us with a paradox: an apparently acceptable argument for an apparently unacceptable conclusion—that we do not know anything about the external world. Some paradoxes, for instance the liar and the sorites, are very hard. The defense of a purported solution to either of these two inevitably deploys the latest in high-tech philosophical weaponry. On the other hand, some paradoxes are not at all hard, and may be resolved without much fuss. They do not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Nicholas Capaldi (1982). Skepticism & Cognitivism. Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):455-456.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. L. S. Carrier (1993). The Impossibility of Massive Error. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):405-409.
    I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. L. S. Carrier (1974). Skepticism Made Certain. Journal of Philosophy 71 (5):140-150.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Robert Todd Carroll (1998). The Skeptic's Champion. The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (2):12-13.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Quassim Cassam, Foreword to Strawson's Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties.
    In that book I had two different, though not unrelated aims. The first chapter was concerned with traditional scepticisms about, e.g., the external world and induction. In common with Hume and Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of all human thought and enquiry. In the other chapters my target was different. It was that species of naturalism which tended (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Venant Cauchy (1972). Le Scepticisme Philosophique. Par André Verdan. Collection « Pour Connaître la Pensée ». Paris-Montréal, Bordas, 1971. 146 Pages. [REVIEW] Dialogue 11 (04):613-615.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Hsiu-Chen Chang (1998). Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Edited by Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp.Xx +240. [REVIEW] Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25 (2):269-271.
  41. Chung-ying Cheng (1977). Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese Philosophy. Philosophy East and West 27 (2):137-154.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.) (1989). Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Andrew Cling (2009). Reasons Regresses and Tragedy. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):333-346.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Stewart Cohen (2009). Knowledge as Aptness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):121--125.
    I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Guest Editors' Preface. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):5-6.
    This is the guest editors' preface to the Discipline Filosofiche special issue on Knowledge and Justification.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Troy Cross (2010). Skeptical Success. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question.<br><br>This is an earlier draft.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Joseph Cruz, Is There Reason for Skepticism?
    Two compelling and persistent projects of contemporary epistemology are engaging skepticism and searching for adequate epistemic principles. The former, of course, can be traced in various forms through the ancients and moderns, and the last decade has seen skepticism debated with renewed vigor. The centrality of skepticism in epistemology is manifest. It both presents a foil against which positive epistemic theses may be modified and tested, and offers powerful arguments that perhaps even lead to the conclusion that skepticism correctly captures (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Robert C. Cummins (1975). Epistemology and the Cartesian Circle. Theoria 41 (3):112-124.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Kim Davies (1982). The Concept of Experience and Strawson's Transcendental Deduction. Analysis 42 (1):16-19.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Corey W. Dyck (2011). Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Ghosts of Descartes and Hume. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):473-496.
    This paper considers how Descartes's and Hume's sceptical challenges were appropriated by Christian Wolff and Johann Nicolaus Tetens specifically in the context of projects related to Kant's in the transcendental deduction. Wolff introduces Descartes's dream hypothesis as an obstacle to his account of the truth of propositions, or logical truth, which he identifies with the 'possibility' of empirical concepts. Tetens explicitly takes Hume's account of our idea of causality to be a challenge to the `reality' of transcendent concepts in general, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 152