- Frank Arntzenius (2003). Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
- Frank Arntzenius (2002). Reflections on Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 62 (1):53–62.
- Paul Bartha, How to Put Self-Locating Information in its Place.
- Nick Bostrom (2007). Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model. Synthese 157 (1):59 - 78.
- L. Bovens & J. L. Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3):473-481.
- Luc Bovens (2010). Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 70 (1):23-26.
- Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). The Puzzle of the Hats. Synthese 172 (1).
- D. J. Bradley, Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief.
- D. J. Bradley (2011). Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization. Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
- Darren Bradley (2011). Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
- Darren Bradley (2003). Sleeping Beauty: A Note on Dorr's Argument for 1/3. Analysis 63 (279):266–268.
- Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb (2006). When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments. Analysis 66 (290):119–127.
- Dennis Dieks (2007). Reasoning About the Future: Doom and Beauty. Synthese 156 (3):427 - 439.
- Cian Dorr, A Challenge for Halfers.
- Cian Dorr (2002). Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga. Analysis 62 (4):292–296.
- Kai Draper (2008). Sleeping Beauty's Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):61 - 70.
- Kai Draper & Joel Pust (2008). Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 164 (2):281 - 287.
- Adam Elga (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.
- Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
- Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matt Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis.
- J. Finkelstein, Sleeping Beauty: Theme and Variations.
- Paul Franceschi, Sleeping Beauty and the Problem of World Reduction.
- Paul Franceschi, An Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.
- Paul Franceschi, Sleeping Beauty in Flatland.
- Berry Groisman (2008). The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
- Patrick Hawley (forthcoming). Inertia, Optimism and Beauty. Noûs.
- Christopher Hitchcock (2004). Beauty and the Bets. Synthese 139 (3):405 - 420.
- Terry Horgan (2008). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese 160 (2):155 - 159.
- Terry Horgan (2007). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 67 (293):50–59.
- Terry Horgan (2004). Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day. Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
- Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani (forthcoming). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis:-.
- C. S. Jenkins (2005). Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call. Philosophica Mathematica (Iii) 13 (2):194-201.
- J. B. Kadane (2004). Stopping to Reflect. Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):315 - 322.
- Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre (2010). Sleeping Beauty Meets Monday. Synthese 174 (3).
- Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
- Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384–395.
- Namjoong Kim (2009). Sleeping Beauty and Shifted Jeffrey Conditionalization. Synthese 168 (2):295 - 312.
- Hannes Leitgeb (2010). Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence. Analysis 70 (2):203-205.
- David Lewis (2001). Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga. Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
- Peter J. Lewis (forthcoming). Credence and Self-Location. Synthese.
- Peter J. Lewis (2009). Reply to Papineau and Durà-Vilà. Analysis 69 (1):86-89.
- Peter J. Lewis (2007). Quantum Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 67 (293):59-65.
- Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
- Christopher J. G. Meacham (2008). Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
- Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384 - 395.
- Bradley Monton (2002). Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian. Analysis 62 (1):47–53.
- David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'. Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
- David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). Reply to Lewis: Metaphysics Versus Epistemology. Analysis 69 (1):89-91.
- Daniel Peterson (2011). Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis's Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. Synthese 181:367-374.
- Richard Pettigrew, Self-Locating Belief and the Goal of Accuracy.
- Huw Price, Probability in the Everett World: Comments on Wallace and Greaves.
- Joel Pust (forthcoming). Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence. Journal of Philosophy.
- Joel Pust (forthcoming). Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan. Synthese.
- Joel Pust (2011). Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference. Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
- Joel Pust (2008). Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
- Jacob Ross (forthcoming). All Roads Lead to Violations of Countable Additivity. Philosophical Studies.
- Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review.
- Moritz Schulz (2010). The Dynamics of Indexical Belief. Erkenntnis 72 (3).
- Wolfgang Schwarz (forthcoming). Changing Minds in a Changing World. Philosophical Studies.
- The Oscar Seminar (2008). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68 (298):149–155.
- James R. Shaw (forthcoming). De Se Belief and Rational Choice. Synthese:-.
- Paul D. Thorn (2011). Undercutting Defeat Via Reference Properties of Differing Arity: A Reply to Pust. Analysis 71 (4):662-667.
- Michael G. Titelbaum (2008). The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.
- Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). Ross on Sleeping Beauty. Philosophical Studies:-.
- Brian Weatherson (2011). Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.
- Ruth Weintraub (2004). Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution. Analysis 64 (1):8–10.
- Roger White (2006). The Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Challenge for Thirders. Analysis 66 (290):114–119.
- Masahiro Yamada, Laying Sleeping Beauty to Rest.
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