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  1. Elizabeth Anderson (2008). An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund's Democratic Authority. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 129-139.
    In Democratic Authority, David Estlund 2008 presents a major new defense of democracy, called epistemic proceduralism. The theory claims that democracy exercises legitimate authority in virtue of possessing a modest epistemic power: its decisions are the product of procedures that tend to produce just laws at a better than chance rate, and better than any other type of government that is justifiable within the terms of public reason. The balance Estlund strikes between epistemic and non-epistemic justifications of democracy is open (...)
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  2. Richard Bradley (2007). Reaching a Consensus. Social Choice and Welfare 29:609-632.
    This paper explores some aspects of the relation between aggregation and deliberation as ways of achieving a consensus amongst a group of indviduals on some set of issues. I argue firstly that the framing of an aggregation problem itself generates information about the judgements of others that individuals are rationally obliged to take into account. And secondly that the constraints which aggregation theories typically place on consensual or collective judgements need not be consistent with the outcomes of rational deliberative processes (...)
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  3. Allen Buchanan (2004). Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2):95–130.
  4. Larissa Conradt, Christian List & Timothy J. Roper (2013). Swarm Intelligence: When Uncertainty Meets Conflict. American Naturalist 182 (5):592-610.
    When animals share decisions with others, they pool personal information, offset individual errors and, thereby, increase decision accuracy. This is termed ‘swarm intelligence.’ But what if those decisions involve conflicts of interest between individual decision-makers? Should animals share decisions with individuals whose goals are different from, and partially in conflict with, their own? A group decision model developed by Larissa Conradt and colleagues finds that, contrary to intuition, conflicting goals often increase both decision accuracy and the individual gains derived from (...)
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  5. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (forthcoming). Probabilistic Opinion Pooling. In A. Hajek & C. Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford University Press
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  6. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  7. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Problem of Constrained Judgment Aggregation. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science: Volume 1 of the series The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective. Springer 125-139.
    Group decisions must often obey exogenous constraints. While in a preference aggregation problem constraints are modelled by restricting the set of feasible alternatives, this paper discusses the modelling of constraints when aggregating individual yes/no judgments on interconnected propositions. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should respect the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability, and judgments on budget items should respect budgetary constraints. In this paper, we make constraints in judgment aggregation explicit by relativizing the (...)
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  8. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2008). Judgement Aggregation Under Constraints. In T. Boylan & R. Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. Routledge
    In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...)
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  9. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  10. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized. Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (4):391-424.
    The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential (...)
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  11. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2004). A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence. Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.
    Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common cause is a (...)
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  12. John S. Dryzek & Christian List (2004). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy : A Response to Aldred. British Journal of Political Science 34 (4):752-758.
    Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy.1 His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow’s conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are (...)
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  13. David Ellerman (2014). On a Fallacy in the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency-Equity Analysis. Constitutional Political Economy 25 (2):125-136.
    This paper shows that implicit assumptions about the numeraire good in the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-equity analysis involve a "same-yardstick" fallacy (a fallacy pointed out by Paul Samuelson in another context). These results have negative implications for cost-benefit analysis, the wealth-maximization approach to law and economics, and other parts of applied welfare economics--as well as for the whole vision of economics based on the "production and distribution of social wealth.".
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  14. Christian Elsholtz & Christian List (2005). A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions. Elemente der Mathematik 60:45-56.
    Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, Sen identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen’s result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen’s condition. We discuss how Sen’s condition is logically related to a number of precursors. Finally, (...)
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  15. Christian Elsholtz & Christian List, A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions.
    Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, Sen (1966) identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen’s result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen’s condition. We discuss how Sen’s condition is logically related to a number of precursors. (...)
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  16. Karin Enflo (2011). Measuring Opportunity. In Rysiek Sliwinski & Frans Svensson (eds.), Neither/Nor. Uppsala University 53-68.
    This essay presents a new measure of opportunity, understood as the freedom to choose whatever one may reasonably prefer to choose.
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  17. Cynthia Farrar, James S. Fishkin, Donald P. Green, Christian List, Robert C. Luskin & Elizabeth Levy Paluck (2010). Disaggregating Deliberation's Effects: An Experiment Within a Deliberative Poll. British Journal of Political Science 40 (2):333-347.
    Using data from a randomized field experiment within a Deliberative Poll, this paper examines deliberation’s effects on both policy attitudes and the extent to which ordinal rankings of policy options approach single-peakedness (a help in avoiding cyclical majorities). The setting was New Haven, Connecticut, and its surrounding towns; the issues were airport expansion and revenue sharing – the former highly salient, the latter not at all. Half the participants deliberated revenue sharing, then the airport; the other half the reverse. This (...)
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  18. Robert E. Goodin & Christian List (2006). Special Majorities Rationalized. British Journal of Political Science 36 (2):213-241.
    Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolving matters left open by symmetrical special-majority rules – such as (...)
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  19. Robert E. Goodin & Christian List (2006). A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment. American Journal of Political Science 50 (4):940-949.
    May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote (...)
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  20. Mark Hannam (2013). Bentham Was Right. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement (5774):37.
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  21. Christian List, A Note on Measuring Preference Structuration.
    The concept of preference structuration not only provides possible escape-routes from socialchoice-theoretic impossibility problems, but also points towards ways of formalizing notions of 'pluralism', 'consensus' and 'issue-dimensionality'. The present note introduces two methods of (operationally) measuring preference structuration, giving attention to both their conceptual characteristics and their computational feasibility. The method to be advocated, called the 'fractionalization' approach, combines well-known social-choice-theoretic criteria of preference structuration (such as single-peakedness or value-restriction) with the frequently used Rae-Taylor (1970) and Laakso-Taagepera (1979) approaches towards (...)
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  22. Christian List (2014). When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
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  23. Christian List (2012). Collective Wisdom: Lessons From the Theory of Judgment Aggregation. In Helene Landemore & Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In this paper, I discuss the lessons we can learn about collective wisdom from the emerging theory of judgment aggregation, as distinct from the literature on Condorcet’s jury theorem.
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  24. Christian List (2012). Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction. In U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier
    The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, (...)
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  25. Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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  26. Christian List (2011). Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
    While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be (...)
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  27. Christian List (2011). The Logical Space of Democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    April 2011 Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; (...)
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  28. Christian List (2009). Group Decisions in Humans and Animals: A Survey. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364:719-742.
    Humans routinely make many decisions collectively, whether they choose a restaurant with friends, elect political leaders or decide actions to tackle international problems, such as climate change, that affect the future of the whole planet. We might be less aware of it, but group decisions are just as important to social animals as they are for us. Animal groups have to collectively decide about communal movements, activities, nesting sites and enterprises, such as cooperative breeding or hunting, that crucially affect their (...)
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  29. Christian List (2008). Deliberation and Agreement. In Shawn W. Rosenberg (ed.), Can the People Govern? Deliberation, Participation and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan
    How can collective decisions be made among individuals with conflicting preferences or judgments? Arrow’s impossibility theorem and other social-choice-theoretic results suggest that, for many collective decision problems, there are no attractive democratic solutions. In response, deliberative democrats argue that group deliberation makes collective decisions more tractable. How can deliberation accomplish this? In this paper, I explore the distinction between two different types of agreement and discuss how they can facilitate collective decision making. Deliberative democrats have traditionally defended the hypothesis that (...)
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  30. Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
    Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...)
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  31. Christian List (2006). Republican Freedom and the Rule of Law. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):201-220.
    At the core of republican thought, on Philip Pettit’s account, lies the conception of freedom as non-domination, as opposed to freedom as noninterference in the liberal sense. I revisit the distinction between liberal and republican freedom and argue that republican freedom incorporates a particular rule-of-law requirement, whereas liberal freedom does not. Liberals may also endorse such a requirement, but not as part of their conception of freedom itself. I offer a formal analysis of this rule-of-law requirement and compare liberal and (...)
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  32. Christian List (2005). The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions. Social Choice and Welfare 24 (1):3-32.
    Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to (...)
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  33. Christian List (2004). On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
    Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty , and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror’s competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, (...)
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  34. Christian List (2004). The Impossibility of a Paretian Republican? Some Comments on Pettit and Sen. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):65-87.
    Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal (...)
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  35. Christian List (2004). A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions Over Multiple Propositions. American Political Science Review 98 (3):495-513.
    I model sequential decisions over multiple interconnected propositions and investigate path-dependence in such decisions. The propositions and their interconnections are represented in propositional logic. A sequential decision process is path-dependent if its outcome depends on the order in which the propositions are considered. Assuming that earlier decisions constrain later ones, I prove three main results: First, certain rationality violations by the decision-making agent—individual or group—are necessary and sufficient for path-dependence. Second, under some conditions, path-dependence is unavoidable in decisions made by (...)
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  36. Christian List (2004). Democracy in Animal Groups: A Political Science Perspective. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 19 (4):168-169.
    This short paper proposes an application of Condorcet's jury theorem to animal group decisions.
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  37. Christian List (2004). Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation. Public Choice 119:119-142.
    Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence of attractive aggregation procedures depends on certain informational assumptions, specifically about the (...)
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  38. Christian List (2003). Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? Erkenntnis 58 (2):229 - 260.
    On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utilityare not empirically meaningful, and ``hence'' impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws onthe parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguisticmeaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empiricallyunderdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of (...)
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  39. Christian List (2003). The Voting Power Approach : A Theory of Measurement. A Response to Max Albert. European Union Politics 4 (4):487-497.
    Max Albert has recently argued that the theory of power indices “should not ... be considered as part of political science” and that “[v]iewed as a scientific theory, it is a branch of probability theory and can safely be ignored by political scientists”. Albert’s argument rests on a particular claim concerning the theoretical status of power indices, namely that the theory of power indices is not a positive theory, i.e. not one that has falsifiable implications. I re-examine the theoretical status (...)
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  40. Christian List (2002). Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem. Theory and Decision 52 (3):287-301.
    Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In (...)
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  41. Christian List (2002). Two Concepts of Agreement. The Good Society 11 (1):72-79.
    This paper develops a distinction between "substantive agreement" and "meta-agreement" and explores the significance of this distinction for democracy and social choice.
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  42. Christian List (2001). Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles - Appendix 3 to 'Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3).
    This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. (...)
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  43. Christian List (2001). A Note on Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare as an Escape-Route From Arrow's Theorem. Pacific Economic Review (Special Section in Honour of Amartya Sen) 6 (2):223-238.
    Since Sen's insightful analysis of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Sen, 1970/1979), Arrow's theorem is often interpreted as a consequence of the exclusion of interpersonal information from Arrow's framework. Interpersonal comparability of either welfare levels or welfare units is known to be sufficient for circumventing Arrow's impossibility result (e.g. Sen, 1970/1979, 1982; Roberts, 1980; d'Aspremont, 1985). But it is less well known whether one of these types of comparability is also necessary or whether Arrow's conditions can already be satisfied in much narrower (...)
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  44. Christian List, The Epistemology of Special Majority Voting: Why the Proportion is Special Only in Special Conditions.
    I am grateful to Geoffrey Brennan, Campbell Brown, Franz Dietrich, <span class='Hi'>Christian</span> Elsholtz, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson and David Soskice for very helpful comments and suggestions; and to the participants of a Social and Political Theory seminar at the ANU in February 2003 and the participants of a conference panel of the Australasian Association of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide in July 2003 for comments and discussion.
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  45. Christian List, Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles.
    Although the pairwise Condorcet winner criterion may seem an attractive democratic decision procedure, it is famously threatened by Condorcet's paradox: pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical collective preferences. But how probable is the occurrence of cycles?
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  46. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Opinion Pooling on General Agendas.
  47. Christian List & Franz Dietrich (2007). Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized. Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (4):391-424.
    The widely discussed "discursive dilemma" shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential (...)
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  48. Christian List & John Dryzek (2003). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science 33 (1):1-28.
    The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote (...)
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  49. Christian List, Christian Elsholtz & Thomas Seeley (2009). Independence and Interdependence in Collective Decision Making: An Agent-Based Model of Nest-Site Choice by Honey Bee Swarms. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364:755-762.
    Condorcet's classic jury theorem shows that when the members of a group have noisy but independent information about what is best for the group as a whole, majority decisions tend to outperform dictatorial ones. When voting is supplemented by communication, however, the resulting interdependencies between decision-makers can strengthen or undermine this effect: they can facilitate information pooling, but also amplify errors. We consider an intriguing non-human case of independent information pooling combined with communication: the case of nest-site choice by honey (...)
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  50. Christian List & Robert E. Goodin (2001). Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...)
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