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  1. Samson Abramsky (2015). Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory. [REVIEW] In Andrés Villaveces, Roman Kossak, Juha Kontinen & Åsa Hirvonen (eds.), Logic Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. De Gruyter. 15-30.
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  2. M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.) (forthcoming). Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.
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  3. John Anderson (1926). Discussions: Propositions and Judgments. Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  4. John Anderson (1926). Propositions and Judgments. Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  5. Eyal Baharad, Jacob Goldberger, Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan (2012). Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 72 (1):113-130.
    In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-makers’ capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This article presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters’ past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of (...)
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  6. Nick Baigent & Daniel Eckert (2004). Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 56 (4):359-366.
    An impossibility result for completely abstract social aggregation rules is presented. It is shown that non-imposition and a new no-veto property (two properties in the spirit of the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship respectively) are incompatible with an inter-profile consistency condition formulated in terms of proximity preservation.
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  7. Keith Michael Baker (1975). Condorcet, From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics. University of Chicago Press.
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  8. Nicholas Bardsley (2007). Teamwork: Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives, Edited by Natalie Gold. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, XXVI+253 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):237-240.
  9. Gennady S. Batygin (2004). Social Scientists in Times of Crisis: The Structural Transformations Within the Disciplinary Organization and Thematic Repertoire of the Social Sciences. Studies in East European Thought 56 (1):7-54.
    This is a contribution to thesociology and social epistemology of knowledgeproduction in Russian social sciences today. Inthe initial section, the epistemic status andsocial function of Soviet social scientificdiscourse are characterized in terms of textualforms and their modes of (re-)production. Theremaining sections detail the course of therestructuration of social scientific discoursesince the fall of the Soviet Union and draw onextant empirical sources, in particular studiesof bibliographical rubrics, thematicrepertoires, and current textual formsthroughout the public sphere and the academicestablishment in Russia. An underlying (...)
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  10. Dwight Bean, Jane Friedman & Cameron Parker (2008). Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies. Theory and Decision 65 (4):285-302.
    We completely characterize the simple majority weighted voting game achievable hierarchies, and, in doing so, show that a problem about representative government, noted by J. Banzhaf [Rutgers Law Review 58, 317–343 (1965)] cannot be resolved using the simple majority quota. We also demonstrate that all hierarchies achievable by any quota can be achieved if the simple majority quota is simply incremented by one.
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  11. Ruth Ben-Yashar (forthcoming). The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision:1-5.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  12. Aditi Bhattacharyya, Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu (2011). Choice, Internal Consistency and Rationality. Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):123-149.
    The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.
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  13. Jean-Marie Blin (1973). Preference Aggregation and Statistical Estimation. Theory and Decision 4 (1):65-84.
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  14. James Bohman (2012). Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology. Social Epistemology 26 (2):175-187.
    With her conception of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker has opened up new normative dimensions for epistemology; that is, the injustice of denying one?s status as a knower. While her analysis of the remedies for such injustices focuses on the epistemic virtues of agents, I argue for the normative superiority of adapting a broadly republican conception of epistemic injustice. This argument for a republican epistemology has three steps. First, I focus on methodological and explanatory issues of identifying epistemic injustice and argue, (...)
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  15. James Bohman (2006). Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity. Episteme 3 (3):175-191.
    It is often assumed that democracies can make good use of the epistemic benefi ts of diversity among their citizenry, but difficult to show why this is the case. In a deliberative democracy, epistemically relevant diversity has three aspects: the diversity of opinions, values, and perspectives. Deliberative democrats generally argue for an epistemic form of Rawls' difference principle: that good deliberative practice ought to maximize deliberative inputs, whatever they are, so as to benefi t all deliberators, including the least eff (...)
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  16. Walter Bossert, Chloe X. Qi & John A. Weymark (2013). Measuring Group Fitness in a Biological Hierarchy: An Axiomatic Social Choice Approach. Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):301-323.
    This article illustrates how axiomatic social choice theory can be used in the evaluation of measures of group fitness for a biological hierarchy, thereby contributing to the dialogue between the philosophy of biology and social choice theory. It provides an axiomatic characterization of the ordering underlying the MichodSolariNedelcu index of group fitness for a multicellular organism. The MVSHN index has been used to analyse the germ-soma specialization and the fitness decoupling between the cell and organism levels that takes place during (...)
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  17. Harry Brighouse (1994). Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Frohlich Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, Xiv + 258 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 10 (01):127-.
  18. John Broome (1989). Should Social Preferences Be Consistent? Economics and Philosophy 5 (01):7-.
    Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question.
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  19. N. Brunner & R. Mihara (2000). Arrow's Theorem Weglorz's Models, and the Axiom of Choice. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (3):335-360.
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  20. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara (2000). Arrow's Theorem, Weglorz' Models and the Axiom of Choice. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (3):335-359.
    Applying Weglorz' mode s of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social we fare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination”, if and only if in Weglorz' mode there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.
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  21. Ferdinand Buisson (1931). Condorcet. Philosophical Review 40 (3):306-307.
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  22. Mario Bunge (1996). The Seven Pillars of Popper's Social Philosophy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (4):528-556.
    The author submits that Popper's social philosophy rests on seven pillars: rationality (both conceptual and practical), individualism (ontological and methodological), libertarianism, the nonexistence of historical laws, negative utilitarianism ("Do no harm"), piecemeal social engineering, and a view on social order. The first six pillars are judged to be weak, and the seventh broken. In short, it is argued that Popper did not build a comprehensive, profound, or even consistent system of social philosophy on a par with his work in epistemology. (...)
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  23. Donald Thomas Campbell (1988). Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science: Selected Papers. University of Chicago Press.
    Since the 1950s, Donald T. Campbell has been one of the most influential contributors to the methodology of the social sciences. A distinguished psychologist, he has published scores of widely cited journal articles, and two awards, in social psychology and in public policy, have been named in his honor. This book is the first to collect his most significant papers, and it demonstrates the breadth and originality of his work.
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  24. Ian Carter & Matthew H. Kramer (2008). How Changes in One's Preferences Can Affect One's Freedom (and How They Cannot): A Reply to Dowding and Van Hees. Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):81-96.
    How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the “pure negative” conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by (...)
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  25. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Probability, Acceptance and Aggregation. Erkenntnis.
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  26. Thomas Christiano (2001). Democracy and Social Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):67-90.
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  27. L. Czayka & H. Krauch (1972). A Graph-Theoretical Approach to the Aggregation of Individual Preference Orderings. Theory and Decision 3 (1):12-17.
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  28. Jelle de Boer (2012). A Strawson–Lewis Defence of Social Preferences. Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.
    This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude . Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually (...)
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  29. Howard DeLong (1991). A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem. Upa.
    To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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  30. Franz Dietrich, Opinion Pooling on General Agendas.
    How can di¤erent individuals’probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’ of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for many practical applications. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. Our main theorems characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for large classes of agendas, with standard results as special cases.
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  31. Franz Dietrich, Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism.
    In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These objections suggest a multi-aspect informational (...)
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  32. Franz Dietrich & C. List, Opinion Pooling on General Agendas: Linearity or Just Neutrality?
    How can di¤erent individuals’probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’ of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for many practical applications. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. Our main theorems characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for large classes of agendas, with standard results as special cases.
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  33. Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2007). The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):301-319.
    List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.
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  34. Michael Dummett (1988). Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, Editors. In Series Studies in Rationality and Social Change, Edited by Jon Elster and Gudmund Hernes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 250 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):177.
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  35. Michael Dummett (1986). Voting Procedures. Journal of Philosophy 83 (7):398-401.
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  36. Lindy M. Edwards (2009). Ideational Social Capital and the Civic Culture: Extricating Putnam's Legacy From the Social Capital Debates. Social Epistemology 23 (2):125 – 144.
    Robert Putnam's work was a double-edged sword for social capital scholars. It brought unprecedented attention to the research agenda but also created conceptual confusion. Many scholars have tried to disentangle Coleman's concept of social capital from what some described as Putnam's “fuzzy psychological notion” of civic culture values. Despite the rigour of these efforts, Putnam's influence remains, because scholars and policy makers are drawn to the benefits his work promised. This article takes a different tack, and seeks to extricate Putnam's (...)
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  37. Perm C. Fishburn, Algebraic Aggregation Theory.
    An aggregation procedure merges a list of objects into a representative object. This paper considers the problem of aggregating n rows in an n-by-m matrix into a summary row, where every entry is an element in an algebraic field. It focuses on consistent aggregators, which require each entry in the summary row to depend only on its column entries in the matrix and to be the same as the column entry if the column is constant. Consistent aggregators are related to (...)
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  38. Peter C. Fishburn & William V. Gehrlein (1982). Majority Efficiencies for Simple Voting Procedures: Summary and Interpretation. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 14 (2):141-153.
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  39. Marc Fleurbaey (2007). Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):15-43.
    It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was (...)
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  40. Edward I. Friedland & Stephen J. Cimbala (1973). Process and Paradox: The Significance of Arrow's Theorem. Theory and Decision 4 (1):51-64.
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  41. Michael Fuerstein (2008). Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 74-93.
    How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in large part from a (...)
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  42. Joseph S. Fulda (1998). A New Standard for Appropriation, with Some Remarks on Aggregation. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (4):6-11.
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  43. Mattia Gallotti (2011). Why We Cooperate. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.
  44. Peter Gärdenfors (2006). A Representation Theorem for Voting with Logical Consequences. Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):181-190.
    This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set (...)
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  45. Gerald Gaus (2013). Arrow's Theorem. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  46. Gerald F. Gaus (1996). Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This book advances a theory of personal, public and political justification. Drawing on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology, the work develops a theory of personally justified belief. Building on this account, it advances an account of public justification that is more normative and less "populist" than that of "political liberals." Following the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Kant, the work then argues that citizens have conclusive reason to appoint an umpire to resolve disputes arising from inconclusive (...)
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  47. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley (2009). The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule. Theory and Decision 67 (3):267-293.
    When voters’ preferences on candidates are mutually coherent, in the sense that they are at all close to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed, or perfectly polarized, there is a large probability that a Condorcet Winner exists in elections with a small number of candidates. Given this fact, the study develops representations for Condorcet Efficiency of plurality rule as a function of the proximity of voters’ preferences on candidates to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed or perfectly polarized. We find that the (...)
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  48. C. Genest, S. Weerahandi & J. V. Zidek (1984). Aggregating Opinions Through Logarithmic Pooling. Theory and Decision 17 (1):61-70.
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  49. Robert E. Goodin (2009). Rationalising Discursive Anomalies. Theoria 56 (119):1-13.
    Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.
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  50. K. Gordon (1924). Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights. Journal of Experimental Psychology 7 (5):398.
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