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  1. G. A. (1974). The Structure of the Life-World. Review of Metaphysics 28 (1):138-139.
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  2. W. S. A. (1979). Marx's Social Ontology. Review of Metaphysics 32 (4):755-756.
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  3. Walter L. Adamson (1981). Marx's Social Ontology" by Carol Gould. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1):108.
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  4. Joseph Agassi (2005). Back to the Drawing Board. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):509-518.
    Within ontology new theories are extremely rare. Hacking bravely claims to have one: "historical ontology" or "dynamic nominalism." Regrettably, he uses "nominalism" idiosyncratically, without explaining it or its qualifier. He does say what historical ontology is: it is "the presentation of the history of ontology in context." This idea is laudable, as it invites presenting idealism as once attractive but no longer so (due to changes in perception theory, for example). But this idea is a proposal, not a theory, muchless (...)
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  5. Joel Anderson (1996). The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory. Constellations 3 (1):17-38.
  6. Sybol Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology. [REVIEW] Critical Horizons 13 (1):134 - 137.
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  7. Sybol Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology. Critical Horizons 13 (1):134 - 137.
    Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds), Recognition and Social Ontology Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 134-137 Authors Sybol Cook Anderson, St. Mary's College of Maryland, USA Journal Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory Online ISSN 1568-5160 Print ISSN 1440-9917 Journal Volume Volume 13 Journal Issue Volume 13, Number 1 / 2012.
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  8. Sybol Cook Anderson (2012). Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology (Leiden, EJ Brill, 2011), ISBN 978-90-04-20290-0 (Hbk), 398 Pp. US $182.00. [REVIEW] Critical Horizons 13 (1):134-137.
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  9. Alejandro Arango (2016). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):403-422.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  10. Margaret S. Archer (2010). After Mandelbaum : From Societal Facts to Emergent Properties. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge
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  11. Hans Arentshorst (2015). Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. [REVIEW] Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):167–170.
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (2015). Human Persons as Social Entities. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1).
    The aim of this article is to show that human persons belong, ontologically, in social ontology. After setting out my views on ontology, I turn to persons and argue that they have first-person perspectives in two stages (rudimentary and robust) essentially. Then I argue that the robust stage of the first-person persective is social, in that it requires a language, and languages require linguistic communities. Then I extend the argument to cover the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective as well. (...)
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  13. Nicholas Bardsley (2001). Collective Reasoning: A Critique of Martin Hollis's Position. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):171-192.
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  14. J. H. M. Beattie (1984). Objectivity and Social Anthropology: J. H. M. Beattie. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 17:1-20.
    This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...)
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  15. T. Bejarano-Fernández (2008). The Construction of Social Reality de John Searle. Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 39:331-334.
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  16. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2008). Plural Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
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  17. Roy Bhaskar (2007). 12 Theorising Ontology. In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge 15--192.
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  18. Matteo Bianchin (2015). From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science. Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):593-608.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
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  19. Matteo Bianchin (2015). Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
    In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...)
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  20. Olle Blomberg (1st ed. 2015). An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour. In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer International Publishing
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  21. Alban Bouvier (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):382-407.
    The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing (...)
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  22. Michael E. Bratman (2015). Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):1-5.
    A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  23. Michael E. Bratman (2015). Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1).
    These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  24. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2008). A Reply to John Searle and Other Traditionalists. Multicultural Education 16 (2):37-40.
    One of the more recent pedagogical debates confronting university instructors is whether liberal education should be replaced with multiculturalism. John Searle has labeled these positions as “traditionalists” and “challengers,” respectively. While not finding “much that is objectionable in the [traditionalists’] assumptions,” Searle argues that the challengers’ assumptions are “weak” and “fallacious.” This negative outcome for the challengers however, is due in large part to Searle’s misrepresentation of their position. Searle presents a flawed, straw-man argument; he unfairly and inaccurately presents the (...)
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  25. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (2009). Methodological Peculiarities of History in Light of Idealizational Theory of Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 97 (1):137-157.
    The aim of the paper is an extension of the idealizational theory of science in order to explicate intuitions of historians and philosophers of history about unpredictability and contingency of history. The author identifies two types of essential structures: the first kind dominated by the main factor and the second kind which is dominated by a class of secondary factors. In an essential structure dominated by the main factor, the power of influence it exerts is greater than the sum of (...)
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  26. F. Buekens & M. Boudry (2012). Psychoanalytic Facts as Unintended Institutional Facts. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2):239-269.
    We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional approach against (...)
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  27. N. S. C. (1964). Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Review of Metaphysics 17 (3):486-487.
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  28. Marc Champagne (2014). Book Review: Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):252-258.
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  29. A. Chatterjee (2013). Ontology, Epistemology, and Multimethod Research in Political Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):73-99.
    Epistemologies and research methods are not free of metaphysics. This is to say that they are both, supported by (or presumed by), and support (or presume) fundamental ontologies. A discussion of the epistemological foundations of "multimethod" research in the social sciences—in as much as such research claims to unearth "causal" relations—therefore cannot avoid the ontological presuppositions or implications of such a discussion. But though there isn’t necessarily a perfect correspondence between ontology, epistemology, and methodology, they do constrain each other. As (...)
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  30. Hyundeuk Cheon (2014). In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
    By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...)
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  31. Alan D. Code (1991). Aristotle, Searle, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell
  32. Julian C. Cole (2012). An Abstract Status Function Account of Corporations. Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):0048393112455106.
    In this article, I articulate and defend an account of corporations motivated by John Searle’s discussion of them in his Making the Social World. According to this account, corporations are abstract entities that are the products of status function Declarations. They are also connected with, though not reducible to, various people and certain of the power relations among them. Moreover, these connections are responsible for corporations having features that stereotypical abstract entities lack (e.g., the abilities to take actions and make (...)
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  33. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is 'ontologically (...)
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  34. John Searle’S. Conception (2010). Acting on Gaps? John Searle's Conception of Free Will. In Jan G. Michel, Dirk Franken & Attila Karakus (eds.), John R. Searle: Thinking About the Real World. Ontos 103.
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  35. J. Coulter (1982). Remarks on the Conceptualization of Social Structure. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (1):33-46.
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  36. Elizabeth Cripps (2011). Collectivities Without Intention. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (1):1-20.
  37. A. S. Cua (1987). The Structure of Social Complexes. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):335 - 353.
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  38. Richard T. de George (1983). Social Reality and Social Relations. Review of Metaphysics 37 (1):3-20.
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  39. Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor (forthcoming). Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law. Journal of Comparative Economics.
    Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...)
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  40. Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor (forthcoming). Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law. Journal of Comparative Economics.
    Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...)
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  41. K. E. (1981). Human Encounters in the Social World. Review of Metaphysics 34 (3):609-611.
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  42. Dave Elder-Vass (2015). Collective Intentionality and Causal Powers. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):251–269.
    Bridging two traditions of social ontology, this paper examines the possibility that the concept of collective intentionality can help to explain the mechanisms underpinning the causal powers of some social entities. In particular, I argue that a minimal form of collective intentionality is part of the mechanism underpinning the causal power of norm circles: the social entities causally responsible for social norms. There are, however, many different forms of social entity with causal power, and the relationship of collective intentionality to (...)
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  43. Dave Elder-Vass (2007). Re-Examining Bhaskar's Three Ontological Domains : The Lessons From Emergence. In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge 15--160.
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  44. Ronald P. Endicott (1996). Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
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  45. Brian Epstein (2015). How Many Kinds of Glue Hold the Social World Together? In Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.), Social Ontology and Social Cognition.
    In recent years, theorists have debated how we introduce new social objects and kinds into the world. Searle, for instance, proposes that they are introduced by collective acceptance of a constitutive rule; Millikan and Elder that they are the products of reproduction processes; Thomasson that they result from creator intentions and subsequent intentional reproduction; and so on. In this chapter, I argue against the idea that there is a single generic method or set of requirements for doing so. Instead, there (...)
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  46. Brian Epstein (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford.
    We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. Epstein explains (...)
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  47. Brian Epstein (2014). What is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism Vs. Anchor Individualism. In Finn Collin & Julie Zahle (eds.), Rethinking the Individualism/Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science.
    Individualists about social ontology hold that social facts are “built out of” facts about individuals. In this paper, I argue that there are two distinct kinds of individualism about social ontology, two different ways individual people might be the metaphysical “builders” of the social world. The familiar kind is ontological individualism. This is the thesis that social facts supervene on, or are exhaustively grounded by, facts about individual people. What I call anchor individualism is the alternative thesis that facts about (...)
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  48. Brian Epstein (2013). Social Objects Without Intentions. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. 53-68.
    It is often seen as a truism that social objects and facts are the product of human intentions. I argue that the role of intentions in social ontology is commonly overestimated. I introduce a distinction that is implicit in much discussion of social ontology, but is often overlooked: between a social entity’s “grounds” and its “anchors.” For both, I argue that intentions, either individual or collective, are less essential than many theorists have assumed. Instead, I propose a more worldly – (...)
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  49. Ioannis D. Evrigenis (2008). Fear of Enemies and Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores the way in which the fear of enemies shapes political groups at their founding and helps to preserve them by consolidating them in times of crisis. It develops a theory of “negative association” that examines the dynamics captured by the maxim “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” and then traces its role in the history of political thought, demonstrating that the fear of external threats is an essential element of the formation and preservation of political (...)
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  50. Ángel Manuel Faerna (2011). Ontología social y derechos humanos en John R. Searle. Análisis Filosófico 31 (2):115-139.
    Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una ontología (...)
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